Where does the counter-IS mission stand after Sharaa-SDF deal?

An SDF shift away from the US partnership and the risk of IS resurgence could undo years of hard-won progress in the fight against terrorism

The US-led Operation Inherent Resolve coalition against the Islamic State (IS) trains SDF fighters in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on September 7, 2022.
Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP
The US-led Operation Inherent Resolve coalition against the Islamic State (IS) trains SDF fighters in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on September 7, 2022.

Where does the counter-IS mission stand after Sharaa-SDF deal?

On 10 March, Damascus struck a stunning deal with the largely Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, who agreed to integrate into Syria’s political and security landscape. The deal marked a historical breakthrough and was a crucial step towards uniting Syria after the swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime last December.

But a month later, there seem to be more questions than answers about the path forward. The SDF and Damascus have yet to hammer out details to integrate their security forces, political systems, and control over locations such as oil fields and Islamic State (IS) detention centres.

This is a tall order to fill in the year-long timeline the SDF and Damascus have agreed to, particularly given that both actors have conflicting visions: Damascus seeks to absorb and dissolve the SDF, while the SDF aims to maintain degrees of autonomy within this new federal structure.

While the deal is seen by some as a potential step toward regional stability, its implications for the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve Mission are complex and could not only jeopardise the fragile security environment in north-east Syria but also the region’s broader fight against IS.

It is also increasingly likely that the Trump administration—desperate to disentangle itself from conflicts in the Middle East—will perceive this deal as a green light to withdraw US troops in the Syrian north-east, with reported plans already drawn up to cut American personnel in the country by half.

Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP
SDF forces participate in a joint military exercise with the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve coalition against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on September 7, 2022.

Key partner

The SDF has been a key US partner in Syria’s north-east and a pivotal force in suppressing IS activity in the region. Backed by the US-led coalition, the SDF has played a key role in rolling back IS's territorial caliphate, contributing to the liberation of key cities such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The group's police force—the Asayish—has also overseen IS detention centres with US support.

The US-SDF partnership has long irked NATO ally Türkiye, which considers the group to be linked to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a designated terrorist group. Despite these tensions, the US has maintained its cooperation with the SDF due to their crucial role in combating IS.

For its part, the Trump administration has largely refrained from defining its stance in a post-Assad Syria. However, key US defence agencies such as the US. Central Command (CENTCOM) has had some engagement in the country’s emerging security landscape. CENTCOM’s commander, General Patrick Ryder, engaged in some notable shuttle diplomacy ahead of the 10 March SDF-Damascus agreement, meeting with key figures such as the SDF’s commander, General Mazloum Abdi, to encourage dialogue with Damascus and explore a potential agreement. This quiet role played by CENTCOM and the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve mission reflects America's lingering influence in a post-Assad Syria—particularly when it comes to broad security reform.

As both sides move on from the initial excitement of forging a formal agreement, concerns have been raised over the deal’s still-ambiguous scale and scope. While Abdi confirmed that both sides are on the same page in unifying—that there should not be two separate armies, but a single, unified military force—the devil is in the details.

Both the Syrian Democratic Council and Damascus have agreed to a year of negotiations between counterparts on issues such as governance, security, and economic cooperation, as well as the logistics and timelines for implementation. One of the central elements of the deal includes greater integration of SDF-controlled areas into Syria’s broader political and economic framework, which would provide the region with much-needed resources and support from the central government in Damascus.

Given the ambiguity that lies ahead over the SDF-Sharaa deal, a dangerous dynamic may emerge that could undermine counter-IS efforts in the region

This deal represents not only a pragmatic move for the SDF but a positive step towards unification for Syria's security landscape. The integration of armed groups—many of which possess impressive capacities and lessons to be shared with Syria's new armed forces—is a crucial step toward building a healthy, unified state system.

Dangerous dynamic

However, given the ambiguity that lies ahead, coupled with a risk of negotiations going sour, a dangerous dynamic may emerge that could complicate the OIR mission in the north-east and undermine counter-IS efforts in the region.

The SDF's rapprochement with Damascus, while cautious and measured, signals a shift away from the US as a primary partner in the region and a key step toward diversifying its security relationships. A key factor that will influence SDF-Damascus discussions is the mechanisms of their security cooperation in the country's north-east and how to proceed with the counter-IS mission.

While it is clear that Damascus seeks an eventual US withdrawal from the region as a means to improve independence and resilience within the country's security landscape, the year ahead is crucial for stability as both actors work out the details of how exactly the SDF will be integrated into Syria's armed forces. As a result, the US-led counter-IS mission and the continued partnership with the SDF remain intact.

However, Trump is playing a different game. He has always been a sceptic of American forward presence in the Middle East—particularly in Syria and Iraq. In his first term in 2019, he infamously announced he would pull nearly all US troops stationed in north-east Syria, which led to a Turkish offensive against the SDF, drawing the ire (and resignation) of many members of his national security apparatus.

But backlash over the withdrawal, which put its SDF partners directly in harm's way, caused Trump to reverse his decision. To save face, he said their mission was to "protect local oil fields and other assets". 

A year later, during the spring and summer of 2020, following a barrage of strikes exchanged with Iran-backed militias, Trump announced a partial withdrawal of American forces, assets, and the consolidation of bases in Syria. His administration halved the US presence from 5,000 forces to 2,500, transferred over eight bases, and withdrew US equipment from key defensive assets.

Kevin Dietsch / AFP
National Intelligence Director nominee former US Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, US President-elect Donald Trump and Vice President-elect JD Vance attend an Army-Navy football game in Maryland on December 14, 2024.

In this second term, Trump has surrounded himself with advisors, such as Tulsi Gabbard and JD Vance, who have adopted a much more isolationist stance with the assertion that the fight against IS has been long over. Trump reiterated this perspective shortly after the Assad regime surprisingly collapsed in early December before his inauguration, stating, "We're not involved in Syria. Syria is in its own mess. They've got enough messes over there. They don't need us involved."

Amidst this fragile, crucial transition period and negotiation process between the SDF and Damascus, there is a very real chance that Trump and his team could again pull a significant number of US troops out of Syria. The 'obstacle' that held Trump back in 2019—the isolation of the SDF—has seemingly been removed by the forged agreement with al-Sharaa's interim government, justifying a US departure.

Already, there have been reports from Israeli officials that the Pentagon has notified Tel Aviv of plans to cut US personnel in north-east Syria by half, bringing the force capacity down from 2,000 to 1,000 forces.

Turning point

The SDF's deal with the Syrian government marks a turning point in the complex geopolitics of north-east Syria, raising serious concerns for the future of counter-IS efforts. While the agreement may offer some short-term benefits to the SDF in terms of political and economic stability, it poses substantial long-term risks to the region's security. A shift away from the US partnership, increased coordination with the Sharaa government, and the risk of IS resurgence could undo years of hard-won progress in the fight against terrorism.

As US policymakers weigh their next steps, they must carefully consider the implications of this deal and its potential to destabilise an already fragile region. The future of the US-led counter-IS mission in north-east Syria hinges on navigating the delicate balance between local political dynamics, regional powers, and the ongoing threat of terrorism.

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