The Syrian government slowly solidifies Iran’s strategic losses

For decades, Tehran bore its way deep into the Syrian state. Dismantling its influence is no easy feat, as Syria’s new ministers are discovering, but it is important.

The Syrian government slowly solidifies Iran’s strategic losses

A newly appointed minister in the Syrian government recalls that upon delving into his ministry’s archives, he was stunned by the scale and gravity of the ‘Iranian files.’

He found that his department, like many others, was a tangled web of documents, contracts, deals, intelligence, and affiliations—some extending as far as Tehran. Such infiltration into the state’s power structures means that unhooking Iran’s claws in post-Assad Syria will be neither swift nor simple.

In past decades, Syria–Iran relations have increased in complexity and scope with every new crisis and test, since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the Iran–Iraq War of 1980, when Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad aligned himself with Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.

Early offerings

In 1982, with Israel having invaded Lebanon, Assad gave Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps access to Lebanese territory, facilitating the founding of Hezbollah. In the 1990 Gulf War, Assad turned against his Baathist counterpart in Baghdad and joined the coalition to liberate Kuwait the following year.

Even during US-brokered peace talks with Israel in the 1990s, Assad preserved Iran’s regional foothold in Syria and maintained coordination with Tehran’s allies among the Palestinian factions that opposed the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Assad also cooperated with Russia, China, and North Korea on military and security matters, while preserving political and economic ties with the Arab world. Yet it was with Iran that Assad Sr. worked most closely, not least in covert scientific collaborations such as on missile development programmes.

In past decades, Syria–Iran relations have increased in complexity and scope with every new crisis and test

With the ascension of his son Bashar in 2000, the relationship between Syria and Iran evolved from calculated alliance to near-total alignment with the Supreme Leader's directives. 

In 2005, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon after Lebanese politician and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed. A year later, war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah. By this point, the Syrian regime was becoming increasingly and openly embedded within the Iranian sphere of influence.

An ally in control

In 2011, with the eruption of the Syrian revolution, Bashar al-Assad's regime effectively became an Iranian vassal when the Supreme Leader sent Hezbollah fighters across the border to fight alongside (and bail out) Assad's soldiers. It worked, keeping Assad in power and extending Tehran's influence. 

Strategic decisions were being made in Tehran and Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburb, not Damascus. Syria essentially became a battleground for regional dominance and a smuggling route for weapons and ammunition from Tehran to Lebanon via Iraq. In this way and others, Iran embedded itself in Syria. 

It used affiliated militias, training camps, covert routes, border crossings, smuggling networks, sanctions-evading companies, weapons and missile programmes, military and civilian installations, economic ventures, industrial zones, security coordination structures, a cyber operations unit, and undercover cells, taking advantage of the Syrian regime's disintegration and rot over the past decade.

In effect, Iran sought to construct a 'shadow state' through its military, economic, security, and social footholds. With each new archival file opened by Syria's new rulers, the extent of this takeover becomes clearer. Even now, numerous properties are still registered to Iranian institutions. 

Dismantling a network

When Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia in December 2024, it marked the end of Iran's overt presence in the country. Its militias and 'advisers' pulled back, while its drones and aircraft were targeted and destroyed. Yet much remains concealed. 

From 2000, Syria-Iran relations evolved from a calculated alliance to near-total alignment with the Supreme Leader's directives

Smuggling networks for arms and narcotics still exist, as do the much-used covert transit routes along Syria's borders, together with the clandestine cells and secret programmes within the architecture of the Syrian state.

Iran's imprint is pervasive. Removing it is a slow, arduous, and complex process. Yet the systematic neutralisation of these secret networks is a critical mission for the government of new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

The enthusiastic embrace of his government by Arab and European states signals their readiness to support Damascus in this regional reordering, solidifying the setbacks of the Iranian 'crescent' across Syria and the broader Middle East.

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