Martin Griffiths: let’s state facts, this is genocide in Gaza

I don't think there is a 'grand plan' for the Middle East. It's much more important and interesting to see it in segments, like events in Syria, or asking where Gaza is going in terms of governance, or progress towards a two-state solution now that the Saudis are fully involved. It was interesting when that meeting (about the two-state solution, at which France was rumoured to be preparing to recognise a 'State of Palestine') was classically postponed due to events (Israel's bombing of Iran). So, I think it's a piecemeal thing, which is much more difficult to manage when it comes to suffering.

Trump in the White House is a key difference to the recent past, and he said several times that he wanted to impose peace by force. But in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, nothing has yet been solved...

Because it's so much more difficult than he imagined. Wars are always more difficult to end than to start. You're right to say there is something different (Trump). You have a very energetic president in the White House who wants to end wars, who's publicly tied his administration to those objectives. With talk about Nobel Peace Prizes, he's very deliberative about this. He's also a bit erratic, but he's deliberative.

In a sense, we're lucky to have President Trump, because he's an actor, he's not just an observer. That's always good in ending wars. We always talk about the lack of political will. Well, there's no lack of political will here (with Trump). There may be a lack of political direction, but that's a different thing.

What I think is missing is a grand scheme, a sense of reality and the likelihood of his policies—and his allies' policies—being convincing. For example, turning Gaza into a place of defenestration, of deportation, of "humanitarian cities" that would clearly be illegal, at the very least. This kind of thing isn't convincing in terms of it being likely to work, and the states in the region will rise up against it.

So, I don't doubt that President Trump wants to make peace—I question how he wants to do it. Making the Abraham Accords the central proposition of peace in the Middle East seems to be a slightly skewed notion of what's going on in the region.

You described Israel's actions in Gaza as genocide. Why?

Why is it genocide? Because it is genocide. It's the destruction of a whole population, of their potential for reproducing and continuing their existence, of their homeland and their expulsion from it. I don't think there can be any doubt about it. That's the reality. Lawyers can argue over it, of course, and that will be the last word. I'm not a lawyer and I'm not in the United Nations, but I felt that it was important to state the facts on the ground as my humanitarian community sees it.

There has been a scapegoating of Palestinians, so many of whom were described as "Hamas officials" despite evidence to the contrary. All these claims from Israel, including that UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine) was part of the 7 October attacks, with no evidence adduced to that, no independent inquiry.

There is a Latin legal phrase: 'res ipsa loquitur'. It means, 'the thing speaks for itself'. I don't think there's any question, but the courts will decide. Accountability will come, but we need to understand what we're facing.

You're not happy with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) now distributing aid there. Why not?

One reason is a personal reason: they have traduced and undermined the principles that I have abided by for my professional working life—those of humanitarian operations. I started four decades ago, dealing with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Thailand, and the Khmer Rouge were hardly kind people, as you know. I've dealt with that sort of stuff ever since, and I've learned some very difficult lessons along the way. These are lessons that the GHF is now simply ignoring.

For example, you don't lure people into a killing zone. And it is a killing zone. It's a terrible way to undermine the provision of needed supplies for people who are desperately in need and starving to death. You can't do it this way. This is not a joint Israeli-Palestinian operation, or an independent UN or INGO operation. It has been funded, created, and supported by one party to the conflict. We don't support this, and we see the consequences: up to 500 people now killed in this zone.

There's no monitoring of it. They push the bags out, these poor people from Gaza have to tramp up and down the Strip to get there in blistering heat, dragging a sack. If they're lucky, they'll get it without being wounded or worse, or without it being looted on the way back.

The GHF claim that they have distributed so many millions of meals—you couldn't get away with that in normal humanitarian delivery, because donors and others would ask questions: how many sacks went to people in need, how many went to the black market, how many were looted, how many were traded subsequently… It's a terrible example of the compromise of humanitarian delivery. If we get a ceasefire, what will the relationship be between GHF operations, the UN, and others?

Where are we on the political level, with a possible two-state solution?

You know (the answer), we've seen this movie before. Remember January? A well-constructed ceasefire, with two or three different phases to end the war, leading to a withdrawal of (Israeli) forces and Palestinian hopes for their own place in the world, that was stopped after the first phase. What a surprise! It would be absurd to think that this is going to be anything different.

A (60-day ceasefire) is extremely welcome and important, just for the survival of people and the flow of aid, but anybody would fear it will end at the moment when it (the ceasefire) becomes conclusive and we start dealing with the future of the Palestinian people, their governance rights, their self-determination rights, their security rights, the issue of the Riviera deportation.

I don't think (Israeli) Prime Minister (Benjamin) Netanyahu should ever be blamed for being unclear about his objectives. He's very clear, and he's been clear in Washington, about the continuation of the war, the continuation of an… illegal scheme to deport Gazans from their homeland, and so on. We've yet to see the conclusion. For God's sake, let the people eat. And politically, let's have a deal, a peace deal, not a pause. In the drafts, we see President Trump specifically named as a guarantor of this (deal) moving through the phases. I'd love to see that happen. Would he put his full force behind it? If he did, we'd be lucky.

There is a big UN meeting on the two-state solution, jointly organised by the Saudis and the French, originally scheduled for 17 June and now due to be held on 28 July? What do you expect from that?

I've been over this in my head during the 21 months of war. There is a strident call, and a belief from many quarters, that we have to counter the nonsense of thinking that a two-state solution just isn't going to happen. Israel is very clear about it (that there will be no Palestinian state) but Saudi Arabia has been a great hero on this, by staying firm in the desire for a two-state solution. What's the alternative? Is there any prospect of mutual security without it? I don't think so.

If Israel wants to be safe—and I'd like Israel to be safe, we all would—there needs to be mutual security. We learn that everywhere in the world. You can't just 'make' security with buffers and deportations, it runs against history. So, I think we need to keep going (on a two-state solution). I hope the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia in particular, stick hard to their positions, because we can't give that away casually. It's against the (UN) Charter, it's against the right of self-determination of peoples.

Earlier, you mentioned deportation from Gaza. Is this a realistic plan?

Well, it's illegal, for a start. Unequivocally illegal. We've seen some very interesting comments from human rights lawyers and academics in Israel on international law. Israel is calling it "voluntary emigration". I mean, who wouldn't want to leave, frankly, at this point? You can't really imagine a 'voluntary' decision by Palestinians, can you? They're bombed, deported down to different parts of the Strip, not given any option. It's about taking them into these "humanitarian cities" and from there, they've only got one way out: abroad. That's not 'voluntary' by refugee or migration laws.

If there was real conviction to allow genuinely voluntary departure or voluntary staying, we'd have a real conversation with the people of Gaza about it. We wouldn't be talking about it in the White House or Tel Aviv. We'd be talking about it with the people themselves. I don't think we're seeing that yet.

But do you think it is possible that some people could 'voluntarily' leave?

No, I don't. The circumstances are so specific, it's self-evident. They (Palestinians) are moved forcibly, up to ten times already. They're told: 'You can go if you want, but you can't stay.' This whole (Israeli Defence Minister Israel) Katz thing about 'humanitarian cities' is so brutally clear. I don't have enough facts, and I'm hardly a lawyer, but it's very difficult to come to the conclusion that this is genuinely voluntary.

To have such a programme, it needs to be done independently and internationally, just like it is everywhere else. We have refugee protocols. Both UNRWA and UNHCR can do those things, to ensure that it is actually the genuine will of the people, and that it is properly monitored, rather than (being done by) one party (Israel) that has an interest in (Palestinians') deportation or exit.

Moving on to Syria. You know it well, you've worked there. How do you see Syria now, seven months after the collapse of Assad regime?

I met Assad quite a few times in 2023. We had what now seems like a surreal conversation. He said: "Don't worry, Martin, I've got back into the Arab League. It's all fine. No pressure." He despised dialogue, he hated the Turks, this and that.

Is it true that, when you asked him about Idlib, he said, 'it's not my problem, it's Erdogan's problem'?

He said: "It's a Turkish problem. They'll sort it out. They'll take these people out and they'll send them to some other country." So when it came to December 2024, and contrary to all my activities and profession and history, I found myself thinking that the HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) march on Damascus was actually a good thing, because we were getting nowhere (with Assad), the UN was getting nowhere, Arab normalisation was getting nowhere, and the Syrian people were just being choked.

One of the most brutal tragedies of the Syrian 12-year war was the detention without trial or notice of so many people. In almost every family, there was someone in these terrible jails, which is now being revealed. I once suggested to Assad that, as a first step towards a great new future for Syria, he could empty the jails. He said: "No, no, no, no, no. I've emptied them. No, no, it's fine. We've done that." So, contrary to my pacifist mediation shtick, the HTS march on Damascus was necessary.

Weren't you supposed to meet Ahmed Al-Sharaa before December 2024?

It was after the earthquake. I wanted to apologise to him (face-to-face) about (comments around) a lack of aid going into the north-west (which he and HTS controlled). One of the permanent members of the Security Council said: "No, no, he's a terrorist, you can't meet him." So, I couldn't, which grieved me, because it's against the principles of humanitarian engagement. What I did have was a discreet conversation with his now foreign minister, who came to see me. God bless him.

Al-Sharaa is no longer designated as a terrorist by the US… Are you planning to go and see him?

I'd love to. I'm hoping to see him this month. I think there are genuine, proper doubts from many, many Syrians about the country and what is really going to happen, about minority rights. I'm always in touch with the Kurds, as you can imagine. This cannot fail. Syria cannot fall back into the internal conflict and disputes that have dominated so far. But Al-Sharaa will only succeed if he takes some advice.

First, he needs to make sure the sequencing of transition is inclusive, not sequential. Yes, security and stability is the first priority, but you can't have that without inclusion. It's not just a security issue, it's not just a stabilisation issue. The issue of the Kurds coming into the Defence Forces of Syria is a good thing and a necessary thing, but it's not divorced from their maybe-overstated claims for devolution and identity, which we see in different ways around the country.

Mr Al-Sharaa has a huge challenge. Most places go through these revolutionary processes, going back to France in 1789. His is an extraordinarily difficult task of stabilising Syria both politically and in security terms, while managing Israeli and Turkish incursions into his country. Türkiye being a key ally for him is good.

The other big issue is the economy. Every year I've been to Syria, people have been getting poorer. Lifting sanctions was belated but essential. I raised this with Tony Blinken, the (former) US Secretary of State, two and a half years ago. There was no action. (Al-Sharaa) needs to succeed. He's very impressive. People worry about his (jihadist) background, but we have him, Syria has him, and more importantly, the region has him. It's the effect on the region as much as anything else.

You mentioned the Kurds. There was a meeting between the (Kurdish-led) SDF and the government in Damascus recently that seems not to have gone very well...

Yes, that's what I heard, too. I've heard a lot from both the Kurds and from Damascus. I think there's a genuine conundrum, but one that can be sorted. The Kurds don't want to give up their own bloc by integrating into the armed forces, and Damascus doesn't want to let them to retain their own bloc because that means they can 'jump out' again at any minute. I spoke to leaders in Ankara a couple of months ago. Understandably, they worry that (armed Kurdish groups in) Syria will simply replace the PKK, which has recently laid down its arms.

So, both (Syrian) the Kurds and Türkiye need reassurance, as does every other minority. Every Syrian wants to know that their identity and their rights will be guaranteed, not just their security. You can't do it one-by-one; you have to do it as a package. That, I think, is the worry not just of the Kurds but of anybody else in Syria, but this (worry) can be overcome. Al-Sharaa has a great personality and charisma. We must do everything we can to help them succeed.

Al-Sharaa has been asked by the United States to join the Abraham Accords, but the Syrian government's priority is for de-confliction and implementation of the 1974 disengagement agreement. What is your view?

When I was a UN Special Envoy for Yemen, I remember my first visit to Riyadh, where I met senior Saudi officials very much involved in Yemen's intelligence, diplomacy, and defence. One, a very experienced and impressive man, said to me: "There will only be peace in Yemen with trade." What we have to do in Yemen—apart from end the war and get human rights into the constitution—is to ensure that there are trade links which guarantee stability.

I think it's the same with the Abraham Accords. What's missing from this discussion, from my perspective, is trade. But trade also follows values. Trade follows interest. It's not simply a matter of establishing trade links and being economically open. It's about aligning interests. Back in my day, in Yemen, the Saudis turned it (an agreement) down because of this lack of aligned values and interests.

The worry for Mr Al-Sharaa is that if he goes and shakes Israeli leaders' hands at the United Nations in September, he needs to take his people with him. There's been decades of anxiety and suspicion, so you can't just agree a trade deal without a political deal. It's too simplistic, it doesn't work, and it hasn't worked.

The Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco (signed up to the Abraham Accords)—good start, but it doesn't change the price of bread. So, yes, trade is essential, but before that, you need to ask: 'what are we signing up to?' Is it trade, or something else? The truth is, it wouldn't just be trade.

Unlike Israel's relations with Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco, in Syria there is Israeli-occupied territory: the Golan, the buffer zone, Mt. Hermon, areas captured after 8 December 2024. Also, Syria is an Israeli neighbour. They share a border, unlike with Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco. Given these differences, do Israel and Syria need a different kind of agreement?

I totally agree. It's all about starting carefully and being gradual. Of course, it would be lovely to end up with a free-trade zone for the Middle East. Brilliant. Everybody would benefit. But look how difficult it's been elsewhere, in Europe, after Brexit etc. And as you say, Syrians are still occupied by Israel in parts of their country. That's got to go. You've got to deal with that problem, and Türkiye's problem (armed, independent Kurdish groups on its border), but Syria has to be its own independent state, making its own decisions.

You worked in Yemen from 2018-21. How do you see Yemen now?

It's an opportunity and a threat. We know 'Ansar Allah' (the Houthis) very well. I met Abdul Malik al-Houthi frequently when I was the UN envoy there. We understand their psychology, so it came as no surprise when they joined in as a belligerent against Israel over Gaza. That's kind of what they do.

I had hope that we might see a new direction for Yemen, that there would be a return to common sense. Saudi Arabia is a very, very effective negotiator and first engaged with the Houthis back in 2018-19, with backchannels and so forth. I was a big fan of that. I knew from my own contacts that this was beginning to be tacitly welcomed by the Houthi leadership, who are naturally very suspicious.

We got lots of signals out of Sanaa and Saada about the potential for this (the ceasefire talks with the United States in May 2025) being a route back to trade and inclusion, and there wasn't even an insistence at the beginning that bombing of Israel would have to stop immediately, so there was a much wiser approach. Then the Iran War started (on 13 June 2025) and it was all thrown up in the air.

What I'm really interested in now—and it's very immediate—is whether that momentary glimpse, not quite of a detente but of reduced US involvement and increased Saudi leadership, could lead to something. I would hope so. It's not unresolvable. People overstate Iran's influence. 'Ansar Allah' certainly sees Iran as a major ally, but it's also a nationalist Yemeni, Imam-based, Imam-led movement of confident nationalism. I'm actually fairly optimistic about Yemen.

Talking about Ansar Allah and Iran brings us to Hezbollah. What do you feel is happening in Lebanon today?

Lebanon is a tortured country, because of the way it was set up politically, all these 'special places for special people,' a state-within-a-state (Hezbollah), the way it (Hezbollah) has dragged the people of Lebanon into war, which they don't see as their war.

I was somewhat encouraged by the ceasefire in Lebanon. It's a rare moment for me to be encouraged by a ceasefire, because I've overseen so many that don't hold, and indeed in Lebanon there were further airstrikes, but I'll make two points. One is about not losing focus on Lebanon. History has shown time and again how important Lebanon's stability and vivacity is for the region, where it plays a special cultural role, with a modern, interesting, open society. Hezbollah has always been a drag on that. We risk losing that at our peril.

The second point is that no state should have, within it, an organisation that runs state services and state administration for a population within the state. I don't have an ideological problem with Hezbollah; my problem is that it undermines the fundamental democracy aspirations of the State of Lebanon. So, two things, and they come together. This has to be resolved. It's not going to be resolved by airstrikes from Israel. It's much more important than we think.

With Hezbollah weakened and Assad toppled, do you agree that, for the first time since 1979, Iranian regional influence is dramatically waning?

I do. The disposition of power has changed. Iran and these armed groups have lost power, authority, and assets due to wars that they often create. That is not necessarily a bad thing. So, it's an opportunity to create stability in the region.

But that will only come when countries' leaders recognise that they need to understand the reasons for the armed groups in the first place, understand their constituencies, then deal with them properly in terms of social welfare, governance, and diplomacy, not treat them as pariahs to be eliminated. It won't work, it isn't true, and it's certainly against any concept of mutual stability.