The 'strategic partnership' signing could have been timed to send a message, but a deeper examination reveals it to be a pragmatic alliance borne of a shared enemy rather than shared interests
AFP
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian after signing the association treaty in the Kremlin on January 17, 2025.
It may be coincidence that Iran and Russia pledged to deepen their strategic relationship just days before the inauguration of Donald Trump as the next US president in Washington. In diplomacy, timing has a habit of being interesting.
To similar fanfare, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed their bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement—which has been under discussion since 2013—updating an agreement from 2001.
According to their statements, relations are moving “to a new level”, but underlying the back-slapping bravado, there are notable points of contention, and, in terms of defence, neither is promising to rush to the other’s side if attacked. To some, their pact looks more like a temporary alliance subject to the whims of change in two of the world’s most rapidly changing regions: the Middle East and South Caucasus.
Evolved relationship
The new agreement reflects the evolution of the Russia-Iran relationship, which has had its ups and downs. These days, Russia is increasingly reliant on Iranian weapons to sustain its war in Ukraine. The two states are also coordinating on the circumvention and mitigation of Western sanctions.
Regionally, both have been weakened in recent months. Iran’s principal proxy—Hezbollah, in Lebanon—has had its leadership, weapons, finances, and communications effectively targeted by Israel, such that it is now a diminished force. Meanwhile, Moscow’s main regional ally—Bashar al-Assad in Syria—has fled Damascus, leaving the fate of Russia’s two Syrian military bases up in the air.
Russian soldiers stand aboard a ship at the Russian naval base in the Syrian Mediterranean port of Tartus on September 26, 2019.
While Trump has promised to revert to his first-term policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, he has also said he will end the war in Ukraine. Leaders in Kyiv are concerned that the terms of such an agreement, as might be pushed by Trump's administration, appear to lean closer to the Russian position than theirs.
Putin described the treaty with Iran as a “real breakthrough”. In a not-too-subtle dig, he said: “Our countries firmly defend the principles of international law, sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. They pursue an independent path on the global stage, jointly resisting external pressures and the imposition of politically motivated, illegitimate sanctions.”
Yet the agreement seems heavily trade-centric, with Pezeshkian and Putin highlighting how they would intensify cooperation in politics, security, trade, transport, and energy. At the same time, Pezeshkian revealed “some minor errors and delays”, suggesting that the agreement was not as full and ready as he had hoped.
He said: "We tried to resolve all these issues and delays. I am pleased to announce that our ministers and experts are discussing all the outstanding issues on the agenda, and I am confident they will agree on how to move forward within the day."
Still, the revelations caught analysts' eyes. The inference? That Iran is in a hurry. Presumably, this is because Iran wanted to send a message to its enemies (and to Trump) that it has reliable, powerful allies who share its views.
Russia-Iran relations are moving "to a new level", but behind the back-slapping bravado are notable points of contention
Russia's wiggle room
While Russia may be a powerful ally, the omission of any mutual defence clause was also noticed. The 47-clause treaty deals with everything from agriculture to space exploration, but some have suggested that it more closely resembles a framework agreement, one that requires detailed agreements in each area.
As such, it does not signal a significant shift in the nature of the relationship. This is not surprising, given the differing priorities and challenges faced by each party. Although there is mention of enhancing joint security and improving intelligence coordination, it is strikingly different to agreements Russia signed with North Korea and Belarus last year, both of which provided for mutual defence in the event of external aggression.
The treaty between Russia and Iran outlines military cooperation, such as by holding joint exercises, but avoids any mention of mutual defence, instead stating that "in the event of external aggression against one party, both parties commit not to provide any form of assistance that would facilitate the continuation of the aggression".
Beyond not helping their partner's enemy, they promise only to "work to resolve the disputes" at the United Nations and elsewhere. Nowhere do they offer weapons or troop support, nor is there any agreement on how to identify the aggressor—often a disputed issue in global conflicts—allowing either side to evade even this minimal commitment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian sign a strategic partnership treaty during a ceremony following their talks at the Kremlin in Moscow on January 17, 2025.
The treaty maintains room for military and security consultation and cooperation to address shared threats and challenges, but it appears that Moscow has insisted on maintaining flexibility by avoiding the role of direct military ally to Iran in the event of war with, for instance, the United States or Israel.
The Wall Street Journal reported last month that Trump was weighing the "possibility of conducting pre-emptive air strikes" on Iran, given the reports that Tehran is now hastily pursuing a nuclear weapon as a kind of Plan B after Israel took a sledgehammer to its network of proxies.
Moscow seems to be anticipating escalation between Iran and the US, especially given Trump's "maximum pressure 2.0" strategy of deterring Iran from advancing its military nuclear programme. Speaking to Time magazine in December, Trump did not rule out the possibility of war. "Anything can happen," he said. "The situation is very volatile."
Trust and allies
A mutual defence pact between Russia and Iran was always unlikely, in part because of a historical lack of trust between the two nations, dating back to the Russian Empire's annexation of Azerbaijan from Iran in the 19th century. There was further hostility during the Soviet era, while more recently, Iran wondered whether Russia colluded with Israel to help Tel Aviv strike Iranian assets in Syria. Looking ahead, the two countries' interests in the South Caucasus do not align.
The ruins of Iran's consulate in Damascus which was destroyed in an Israeli bombing on 1 April 2024.
Meanwhile, in the Gulf, where Iran is still kept at a distance, Russia has good relations with states whose interests collide with Tehran's—not least its OPEC+ partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. If Russia were to enter a military alliance with one regional party, this could undermine its relations with others.
Russia's good relations with other OPEC+ members has yielded tangible benefits, not least the sustained high oil prices of recent years. The revenues generated by these high prices have financed Moscow's war in Ukraine.
Wielding the weapons
At both the official and expert levels, discussions of major arms deals were conspicuously absent from the treaty, with no confirmation or denial of Iran receiving advanced military systems such as air defence systems, radar equipment, electronic jamming devices, or the much-discussed Russian-made Su-35 fighter jets.
Given the increased Ukrainian missile and drone strikes on Russian territory using Western-made weaponry, Russian air defence systems currently need to be deployed at home to protect military and economic facilities such as oil refineries.
US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Moscow set up a drone manufacturing facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia's southern Tatarstan region and has recently scaled up its production of Iranian-designed attack and surveillance drones using a range of Chinese components, according to a CNN report. Russia has also bought hundreds of thousands of 155mm artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles from Iran for use in Ukraine, despite their lack of precision. Yet there are limits to their cooperation.
A nuclear no-no
It seems clear that Russia is wholly unwilling to let Iran's nuclear programme reach the threshold of weaponisation. For instance, Moscow has not given Iran any delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons, such as aircraft capable of carrying nuclear munitions or solid-fuel ballistic missiles.
Nuclear power for domestic electricity generation is a different matter, and in response to journalists' questions, Putin said the two states had discussed the construction of new energy units for the existing nuclear reactor in Bushehr but noted problems related to increasing cost calculations and payment methods.
Putin also pointed out technical and administrative challenges obstructing the North-South Corridor project, aimed at developing transport routes and rail links connecting Iran's southern coast to St. Petersburg in Russia. Both states see this as crucial for increasing trade and circumventing Western sanctions.
Energy competitors
On energy, Putin noted different views on pricing for Russian gas to Iran, so he proposed starting with an annual supply of around 2 billion cubic metres, increasing to 55 billion cubic metres annually if they could resolve their disputes. Iran has substantial gas reserves but imports supplies from Turkmenistan to meet the needs of its northern regions and areas surrounding the Caspian Sea.
The two countries discussed cooperation in oil exploration and production, but they are in competition as suppliers to the Indian and Chinese markets. Both also know that additional production contributes to a drop in global oil prices, which does not serve Russia's interests.
Russia has good relations with its OPEC+ partners in the Gulf, whose interests collide with Tehran's
Pezeshkian said the two states were "determined to overcome obstacles" in trade relations, including "hurdles related to customs duties, banking, trade in goods, national currencies, investment guarantees, and easing the movement of traders and visas".
Bilateral trade is up by 17% on last year, but as a total value it is still very low. Iran's ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalali, said the total volume does not exceed $4bn. It peaked in 2022, reaching $5bn, but declined the following year.
By comparison, annual trade volume between Russia and Türkiye stands at $40bn, while in 2010, Iran's trade with the European Union in 2010 amounted to $37bn. For Tehran, Europe and China are still far more important trading partners than Russia.
In summary, while the timing of the cooperation agreement signing may have been arranged to send a message, a deeper examination reveals that Russia-Iran relations fall short of a true strategic partnership. At best, this is a pragmatic alliance borne of a shared enemy rather than shared interests. For both Russia and Iran, there is something to gain from this. But despite the love-in for the cameras, this is no brotherly bond.
