Somalia-Ethiopia détente: Turkey calms tempers with agreement

A deal to give Ethiopia commercial Red Sea access in return for its recognition of Somali territorial integrity has been brokered by Ankara to much acclaim. Where does that leave Egypt?

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan poses with Somali President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed following a press conference in Ankara, Turkey,
December 11, 2024
Presidential Press Office/Reuters
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan poses with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed following a press conference in Ankara, Turkey, December 11, 2024

Somalia-Ethiopia détente: Turkey calms tempers with agreement

Last week’s Turkish-brokered agreement to end tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia has raised questions about Egypt’s future involvement in the Horn of Africa, given its recent military support to Somalia.

On 11 December 2024, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that they had come to an arrangement after Ethiopia had earlier signed a deal with the want-away Somali province of Somaliland.

A huge but landlocked country, Ethiopia has long wanted to establish a naval presence on the Red Sea coast and announced plans to do so through Somaliland in January. This caused consternation in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, where leaders saw it as a breach of sovereignty.

In return for leasing the Red Sea naval base, Ethiopia planned to give diplomatic recognition to Somaliland and to offer it a stake in Ethiopian Airlines. This led to a political and diplomatic confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia that threatened to escalate into a military fight.

There is a significant mismatch in terms of military capabilities, Ethiopia having by far the bigger armed forces, so in stepped Egypt, with an offer to help the Somalis.

Egypt is an archenemy of Ethiopia, the two having most recently fallen out over a huge hydroelectric dam that Ethiopia has built across the Blue Nile, imperilling Egypt’s main source of fresh water. Egyptian weapons and soldiers began entering Somalia in the summer.

Turkey steps in

To avoid escalation, Erdoğan offered to mediate earlier this year and has since hosted at least three rounds of talks, both in Ankara and in the Horn of Africa. Turkey has good relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, so was well-placed to step in.

If reports are to be believed, Turkish diplomats succeeded by fair means and foul, even preventing Ethiopian and Somali leaders from leaving one of the rooms in the Presidential Complex in Ankara before they agreed a deal.

Ethiopia has long wanted a naval presence on the Red Sea coast and announced plans to do so through Somaliland in January

What is now known as the 'Ankara Declaration' acknowledges Ethiopia's commercial desire for sea access and outlines plans for technical negotiations to facilitate this, beginning by February 2025 and concluding within four months. Any access would be granted under Somalia's sovereign authority.

Erdoğan has said he will visit the Horn of Africa early in the new year, during which he may hope to prod Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to reach a final agreement that protects Somalia's territorial integrity while giving Ethiopia the commercial pathway to the Red Sea that it craves. 

The Ankara Declaration has been well received by international actors including the US, the UK, and the African Union, with Turkey's role widely praised. The success is likely to increase Turkish influence in a region it has invested in, leaving analysts asking where now for Egypt.

Egyptian involvement

Beginning in August, Cairo sent several arms shipments and thousands of troops to Mogadishu after Somalia asked for help against its more menacing neighbour. Some Egyptian troops were to be deployed as part of an African Union peacekeeping mission, while others were sent to train their Somali peers. 

The Ankara Declaration stipulates the creation of a commercial port for Ethiopia, not a military one. Egypt would see any Ethiopian military presence on the Red Sea—close to the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—as a threat to its security and economic interests.  

Presidential Press Office/Reuters
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan holds a press conferencewith Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and EthiopianPrime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ankara, Turkey, December 11,2024

Cairo and Addis Ababa are rivals for continental supremacy and a military naval presence would make Ethiopia the first non-Arab state to plant its feet near the Gulf of Aden. Egypt has been clear that it would prevent this. It does not want its nemesis controlling movement around the southern entrance of the Red Sea, given that the Suez Canal is such a key source of national income for Egypt.

A military naval presence on the coast would make Ethiopia the first non-Arab state to plant its feet near the Gulf of Aden

There is significant mistrust between Egypt and Ethiopia. Their talks over the dam ended with Egyptian negotiators accusing their counterparts of intransigence and stalling tactics to buy time for the dam's construction.  

Politicians in Cairo see the dam's primary purpose not as a contributor to Ethiopian economic welfare (by way of generating electricity and income) but as a means of bringing Egypt to its knees. 

A cautious welcome

The Ankara Declaration appears to be a win-win, then, serving the interests of Somalia (protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity), Ethiopia (giving Red Sea access), Egypt (reducing the burden of having to arm and train Somalia), and Turkey (prestige and the security of its investments).

Some think last week's deal leaves Egypt with less influence, but Egypt is unlikely to reverse its militarily investment in Somalia any time soon. It already has military cooperation agreements with Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti, effectively encircling Ethiopia, and works ever closer with Eritrea, which shares a 1,000km border with Ethiopia and fought a vicious two-year war with its southern neighbour from 1998-2000. 

After Ankara, Egypt will be wary of Ethiopia's proclaimed ambitions and may wonder whether Addis Ababa really intends to limit its Red Sea naval activity to commerce once the port is up and running. As such, Cairo will be keeping two eyes on the coast for the foreseeable future.

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