The year Qasem Soleimani died a second death

Assad's fall means Iran loses its contiguous land corridor. Without it, 'Axis of Resistance' forces will find it difficult to work together. Meanwhile, Iran's ally, Russia, looks to be on its way out.

An Iranian holds a picture of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed by an Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024; and Iran Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, killed by the US in January 2020.
ATTA KENARE / AFP
An Iranian holds a picture of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed by an Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024; and Iran Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, killed by the US in January 2020.

The year Qasem Soleimani died a second death

A statesman dies two deaths: His own and that of the world he tried to build. Iranian General Qasem Soleimani went through the first in 2020 when an American drone killed him at the behest of President Trump. The second came this year, as the edifice he imagined and helped create—a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean—collapsed upon itself.

This year, Israel dealt Hezbollah—Iran’s ally in Lebanon—a string of painful blows. Hamas has been defeated as a conventional force, and to make things worse, Bashar al-Assad, a key piece of the puzzle, unceremoniously departed the country for a dacha in Moscow as opposition forces were closing in on the Syrian capital.

King among ruins

As the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force since 1998, Soleimani oversaw a period of tumult but also of the expansion of Iran's “area of influence"—an era that turned it into a King among ruins.

The fall of Saddam Hussein and the ensuing chaos in Iraq, the breakout of the Syrian revolution, the Arab Spring revolts (including in Yemen), the rise of the Islamic State (IS), and Iran’s ties with an increasingly confident Hezbollah all served as the pillars upon which Soleimani’s edifice was created. Substate actors emerged from the ruins of falling or past regimes, and Iran quickly befriended them.

By carefully building ties with sympathetic minorities, sending advisors and propping up these proxies with missiles and drones, Iran managed to break the wall of its own borders without having to officially invade any country. In an age where definitive military victory is elusive, making territorial expansion the exception rather than the rule, Iran managed to gain significant control over large swathes of territories in the region.

In doing so, it secured allies who could fight in its place without endangering the Islamic Republic itself. Hezbollah, the Houthis, several Iraqi militias, the now defunct al-Assad regime, as well as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad all played a role in a loose but functional network that was part of Soleimani’s “Axis of Resistance”.

Abdallah Adel/AFP
Yemenis wave flags and lift placards of Hezbollah senior commander Fuad Shukr, who was killed in an Israeli strike, and slain Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh, during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa on August 2, 2024

This axis was built on a narrative that was broader than Iran’s narrow Shiite identity, as Tehran was aware that this religious identity would narrow its ambitions. The Axis of Resistance mixes anti-imperialism with anti-US and anti-Israel sentiment while portraying itself as the defender of a Palestinian cause it cares little about.

Rings of fire and land corridors

Soleimani was the one who finalised an important land corridor as Iranian-backed militias managed to wrest control over the Iraq-Syria border. As a result, Iran and its allies had significant control over an uninterrupted area that went through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. After that, Soleimani and his allies could cross from one side of the border to the next.

This represents a force multiplier: By breaking the walls of borders, Iran created a versatile force that could mobilise not only assets from a certain country but units and militias from all of the countries controlled by Iran. Iraqi militias could now easily fight alongside Lebanese Hezbollah members, co-opted Syrian local defence units, Afghan refugees turned Iranian foot soldiers—all under the guidance of Soleimani.

It created a strategic depth that went beyond Iran while making sure it was not bearing the brunt of its own expansionist appetite as others were dying. By expanding outward, Iran could also apply pressure in three critical seas: The Arabian Gulf, which has always been Iran’s main naval avenue of influence; the Indian Ocean; and the Red Sea. It is stunning to think that the year the Soleimani edifice effectively crumbled is also the year we got the clearest demonstration of Iranian strength—one of which was the ability to nearly close down a key maritime checkpoint using missile and drone attacks.

Imagine now what Iran could do, as it controlled three seas and could even hope to do the same, if needed, in the Mediterranean. The Islamic Republic—an entrenched, terrestrial regime—managed to punch far above its weight, particularly when considering that it also faces significant domestic opposition.

The land corridor went further than this. After being hammered with sanctions, Iran has always sought to make sure it would have access to the world—or at least a segment of it. The land corridor was a long-term guarantee that Iran could never be isolated. It controlled an area that could be an avenue for investment and revenue with the help of allies from outside the region. It was situated in a region of the world that is key to ongoing efforts to better connect the world.

The land corridor connecting Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria was a long-term guarantee that Iran could never be isolated. It has now lost this contiguity.

Tehran was making sure it would be part of the conversation. Many could be (rightfully) sceptical of its true value and economic potential. We will never know because that land corridor collapsed as Iraqi militias and Syrian troops stationed in the border town of Albu Kamal, along the Syria-Iraq border, fled to Iraq instead of fighting in Syria.

Soleimani was also the man behind another key achievement: bringing Russia into the fray. In 2015, he travelled to Russia and convinced them to intervene in Syria. Putin agreed, and soon enough, Russian planes were helping al-Assad and Iran's army of proxies. They changed the Syrian civil war dynamic from a slow defeat to a gradual "victory". Now, Russia's presence in Syria is in question following the fall of the Assad regime.

In building this land corridor, Soleimani also shaped a new "Ring of Fire" around Israel without directly involving Iran. This year, this "Ring of Fire" forced Israel to fight a seven-front war, with drones and missiles coming from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza, as Iran also continued to arm groups in the West Bank and even decided to fire its own arsenal at Israel.

Branches of a hollow tree

Of course, it is true that within Iran's own strategy lies the key to its defeat. Ruins make for poor Kingdoms. As a power that ran through minorities, Iran's control rested on brute force and cohesion of the few, chaos and confusion of the rest. It was (and still is) susceptible to greater political change, such as the one we just saw in Syria.

By empowering minorities—and even a minority within a minority—and creating little value for others, it always ran the risk of alienating the majority. And it did, as a set of protests across Lebanon and Iraq in 2019-20 demanding reform ignited the Axis of Resistance. This was not directly or solely aimed at Iran, but it did threaten the order that allowed Iran to expand— so its proxies swiftly put the protests down.

They did so successfully, killing the chance of reform that could have helped both countries eliminate corruption and avoid deeper crises. In doing so, Iran also helped erode the Lebanese economy and its currency, which had an immediate effect on Syria, as the Syrian regime used Lebanon as a main access point to the world and a cash stockpile.

MENAHEM KAHANA/AFP
People stand on top of the remains of an Iranian missile in the Negev desert near Arad on October 2, 2024, in the aftermath of an Iranian missile attack on Israel.

This year, the conflict in Gaza prompted Iran and its proxies to escalate their attacks against Israel. Though Tehran was likely aware of the risks, it couldn't possibly stay on the sideline of the Gaza conflict after effectively building its own expansion partly upon the Palestinian cause. The Islamic Republic, as well as its most potent proxy, Hezbollah, sought to strike a delicate balance between creating a "support front" that would show support for Hamas and force Israel to back down from its assault while still avoiding a full-scale confrontation. This assumed Israel, a country the Axis of Resistance often claims to be as "weak as a spider web", would not escalate and continue to play it safe.

After months of attrition war, Iran's decision to directly involve itself in the conflict—a risky bet that backfired—as well as renewed confidence in the Israeli military's ability to deal a critical blow to Hezbollah following a failed revenge attack by the Lebanese group, saw Israel climb the farthest it has been on the escalation ladder.

The pillars of Iran's deterrence and power projection in the region then cracked like branches of a hollow tree. Hezbollah suffered significant blows: Its arsenal of missiles, which is critical to Iran's deterrence against Israel, has been significantly damaged, while its ability to launch an October-7-type of attack (another key part of Iran's deterrence against Israel) has also been removed.

Israel responded to Iran's direct attacks by destroying Iran's most effective air defence while damaging critical parts of Iran's ballistic missile programme—and perhaps even part of its secretive nuclear programme. In doing so, Israel also paves the way for further attacks that could deal more extensive damage.

A tragedy for Iran

The final blow was dealt not by Iran's stated enemy, Israel, but by the Syrian opposition—whom the Axis of Resistance had spent more than a decade fighting. In a statement in 2015, now-deceased Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that the regime of President Bashar al-Assad could not fall, or else Hezbollah itself and the "Axis of Resistance" would fall too. The statement, which at the time served to legitimise Hezbollah's continued involvement in the war in Syria, was and still is absolutely true. Syria made the whole Axis more coherent, not just as a mosaic of different militias but as a cohesive, geographically defined sphere of influence.

AAREF WATAD / AFP
Islamist-led rebels pose for a picture with a Syria army helicopter on the tarmac at the Nayrab military airport in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on December 2, 2024, after a surprise lightning offensive on November 30.

The rapidity with which the regime fell, itself a testament to the hollowness of the Assad regime, likely stunned Tehran, which tried to use diplomatic contacts through Turkey and Russia to make sure rebels wouldn't get to do what they eventually did. As the three countries that were part of the former "Astana Format" finally met, it was already too late. A war that lasted more than a decade was won in little more than ten days.

Al-Assad's fall is a tragedy for Iran. Geographically, the Axis of Resistance is once again disunited. It can no longer have a multiplying effect by having forces from different parts of the land corridor work together. Meanwhile, Iran's partner in (actual) crime, Russia, is on its way out. Whether it can keep its naval base in Syria is far from certain. Russian planes will no longer provide air cover for Iranian-tied militias. Russian special forces will no longer fight side by side with Iranian footsoldiers and Tehran's proxies—including Hezbollah.

The fall also put an end to any hope that Iran would eventually benefit economically from the crisis. Iran spent between $30bn-$50bn to prop up al-Assad. It had planned to recover this enormous cost and even hoped to generate income by taking over a number of facilities in eastern and central Syria, from oil and phosphate to infrastructure, telecommunication and even agriculture.

It's not clear that Iran could have generated enough revenues to recoup the cost of its intervention, but what is clear is that all of those dozens of projects and revenue lines hinged on al-Assad staying in power. Many of those projects would be effectively controlled by the revolutionary guards themselves, which could then be pumped back into Iran's war machine and make sure the most radical elements within the Islamic Republic continue to cement power.

REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
Vehicles drive near damaged buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect, Lebanon November 27, 2024.

What the future holds

Over the course of a few months, Iran lost some of the pillars of its deterrence, both vis-a-vis Israel but also outside powers, such as the US. It can no longer count on Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles, nor on a fused army of militias that could work across borders together, just as it also lost some of its most efficient air defences and showed its own missile arsenal to be insufficient to truly replace other key components.

One remaining component is Iran's own geographic position around the critical Arabian Gulf and its ability to close it off if needed. The Houthis have also shown themselves capable of choking another global node, which means Iran still has leverage.

But the death of Soleimani's legacy will likely prompt a rethink as to what Iran can do. Some are predicting a mad rush towards a nuclear bomb, which is possible though risky, as Iran has also never been more vulnerable to foreign attacks.

In general, the Islamic Republic has shown strategic patience in building its Axis of Resistance and may show patience again in rebuilding the broken pieces and rearranging them. Yet the Mollah's regime has also never faced the collapse of such a significant project as the Axis of Resistance, and there may be many finger-pointing in Tehran—with this internal struggle serving to shape Iran's own future.

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