Assad's fall could put Lebanon and Syria on divergent paths

The end of Assad's rule also means the end of his influence in Lebanon, and Lebanese politicians who served the interests of Damascus for decades could see their power drastically curtailed

Former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and his counterpart Elias Hrawi during their meeting in Damascus on March 14, 1998.
AFP
Former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and his counterpart Elias Hrawi during their meeting in Damascus on March 14, 1998.

Assad's fall could put Lebanon and Syria on divergent paths

Social media users recently unearthed a tweet from former Lebanese interior minister and MP Suleiman Frangieh, in which he suggested that his closeness with Syria’s president gave him a political advantage.

“I have something that many do not have: the trust of Hezbollah and the trust of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” the Marada Movement leader posted on 23 April 2023. “I can achieve with them what others cannot.”

Frangieh—a Christian politician whose grandfather was the Lebanese president—was suggesting that his ties to the dominant forces in Lebanese politics would open doors others could not access. Less than two years later, that tweet is now the subject of mockery, some even joking that with friends like those, he would struggle to chair the committee of his own residential building.

Joking aside, it illustrates the rapid and dramatic changes reshaping the Arab world in the last 18 months. When Frangieh posted that tweet, Hezbollah and al-Assad were indeed dominant players in Lebanon’s politics. Today, al-Assad has vanished into Russian obscurity, while Hezbollah has been so battered it will take perhaps a decade to recover if it ever does.

Dismantling the old

Israel killed Hezbollah’s first- and second-tier leaders, exposed its vulnerabilities, destroyed its communications systems, struck its financial, administrative, and media structures, bombed much of its weaponry and missile stockpiles, and wrought widespread destruction across Lebanon.

REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
Vehicles drive near damaged buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect, Lebanon November 27, 2024.

Israel also bombed Damascus and other Syrian sites associated with Hezbollah operations, including Albukamal near the Iraqi border, Qusair, and the countryside of Homs and Hama. All the while, Iran proved incapable of stopping the Israeli attacks on its interests or those of its proxies and allies. Indeed, Iran had its own problems: its consulate in Damascus was targeted, and its commanders assassinated.

Iran did not want a full-scale war with Israel, for which it was unprepared and for which it would not win. It knows that Israel has far superior intelligence, military, and technological capabilities, with advanced methods of information collection, classification, and precision targeting, which now uses AI.

Without Iran's help, Israel's war against Lebanon, which ended with a ceasefire at the end of November, radically transformed Hezbollah's regional role, effectively ending its influence. Whereas in the past, its fighters had come to the aid of Bashar al-Assad's regime, which cost the militia hundreds of lives, in 2024, it could not.

And when al-Assad fell, so too did his security and media apparatus and its extensions in Lebanon, which facilitated money laundering, smuggling, drug manufacturing, and the import of luxury goods. This will have repercussions on the many Lebanese politicians who served the interests of Damascus for decades.

Loyalty and domination

There is already a lot of backtracking, with declarations of "disassociation," clarifications, and expressions of goodwill for Syria issued by factions that once thrived under Syrian influence. They are all fully aware of the magnitude of this geopolitical earthquake. Lebanese politicians who once cosied up to al-Assad now worry that they may share his fate.

The slogan "unity of path and destiny"—once a rallying cry for Syrian loyalists in Lebanon—now takes on a chilling tone

The slogan "unity of path and destiny"—once a rallying cry for Syrian loyalists in Lebanon—now takes on a chilling tone. It also warrants closer scrutiny because it was used to rationalise al-Assad's control over every aspect of Lebanese sovereignty and independence. It meant that Lebanon could not pursue its own path in the Arab-Israeli negotiations that followed the Madrid Conference in 1991. 

Hafez al-Assad, Syrian president from 1971-2000, considered any deviation from his approach to be an act of betrayal. This domination extended to micro-managing Lebanese public administration appointments, weakening its trade unions, controlling media outlets, and stifling independent Lebanese political discourse. 

Some Lebanese factions resisted, insisting on their independence, but others played the game, professed loyalty to Damascus, and submitted to al-Assad's oligarchic sectarian regime.  The so-called 'Lebanon complex' still dominates the mindset of many Syrian politicians and public figures, who believe that Lebanon is a colonial creation carved out of Syria. 

They refuse to accept that Lebanon has developed its own distinct identity and, despite its repeated crises, has no desire to merge with Syria. Even Hafez al-Assad rejected proposals to unite them. He knew that Syria derived far more benefit from an independent Lebanon than it ever would from absorbing Lebanon, such that it became a Syrian province.

Two chronically ill patients

Today, both Syria and Lebanon are in serious trouble; their state and governance infrastructure has effectively collapsed. In Lebanon, a caretaker government lacks legitimacy and resources, and any vision for the future is reliant on Hezbollah's approval to elect a new president—a position that has been vacant since October 2022. 

In the immediate aftermath of al-Assad's overthrow, Syria will do well to stave off a constitutional and political vacuum after 54 years of relentless oppression and persecution, which escalated to genocidal levels in the years following the Syrian revolution in 2011. Some analysts think it will do well to avoid another civil war. 

Both countries stand on the brink of radical transformation. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has lost its supply lines, funding, military infrastructure, political allies, and popular support, which is tied in part to its inability to compensate those who lost homes and loved ones, unlike its response following the 2006 war. Both its influence and credibility have, therefore, eroded, although its supporters would deny that.  

For Syria, which is still under sanctions imposed after al-Assad's brutal crackdown in 2011, there is an important and immediate economic problem. To circumvent international sanctions, the Assad regime exported and imported goods through Lebanon. Will it continue to do so?

The dynamics of these two nations' economic interactions could either contribute to the recovery of both or prolong their collective suffering. Similar interdependence is evident in political, cultural, and social spheres. Much will depend on how the new Syrian government chooses to address the catastrophic legacy of Baathist rule. 

AFP
The entry of Syrian forces into Beirut on November 1, 1976.

The hope is that the two peoples can work together to overcome the enmities and divisions sown by the Assad regime, addressing their grievances in ways that ensure peace and prosperity for both. This means moving beyond forced concepts of "unity of path and destiny" or the notion of "one people in two states". Instead, it means building a future based on mutual respect and collaboration.

font change

Related Articles