After 45 years, is the Syrian regime finally breaking with Iran?

Analysts are asking if this is just another Damascus bluff, gesturing away from Tehran only to emerge backing it, or is this a genuine generational shift, towards the embrace of Arab states?

After 45 years, is the Syrian regime finally breaking with Iran?

This is not the first time that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has hinted at a possible departure from the influence of Iran, in whose debt he has been since 2011, when Iranian proxy militia Hezbollah rescued his regime. There is every chance that this will be another such storm in a teacup, but at the same time, there is every chance this will be a rupture that lasts. After all, few need to be reminded that the situation on the ground has changed dramatically.

Israel has taken a sledgehammer to Hezbollah, by far Iran’s most powerful militia, while Tel Aviv and Tehran have now struck each other directly, most recently with an Iranian shower of ballistic missiles. Israel’s response is awaited.

Today, with al-Assad being tentatively readmitted to the Arab camp, he has signalled his possible realignment. Will he unravel this long-standing partnership, or is he simply sending mixed signals to test the waters of regional diplomacy Moreover, if al-Assad does decide that this is the right time to extract himself from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s orbit, how might the Iranians react? In the past, they have never hesitated to silence allies or proxies who defy them.

Allies’ first embrace

A closer examination of the historical milestones that have defined the Damascus-Tehran relationship may offer insight. After the Iranian Revolution’s triumph in 1979, President Hafez al-Assad—who notably refused to receive Ayatollah Khomeini during his years of opposition—opened a new chapter with the emerging Islamic regime in Tehran. He was quick to leverage the fact that several key figures in the new Iranian leadership, who had been exiled during the Shah’s reign, had lived in Lebanon, where Syria held great sway.

Sensing an opportunity, al-Assad dispatched his foreign minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam, to establish ties with the new Iranian government and its spiritual leader. Their relations quickly evolved into a pivotal regional alliance.

At the time, Syria looked vulnerable. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein threatened from the east, Israel threatened from the south, while Cairo had just made peace with Tel Aviv, so the Syrian leader knew he needed an ally. He made the strategic decision to side with Khomeinist Iran against Saddam’s Iraq in their war from 1980-88. Forged out of necessity and shared enmity, that alliance became a cornerstone of both countries’ foreign policies, shaping the political landscape of the Middle East for decades.

A balancing act

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, al-Assad helped Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) set up Hezbollah in the Bekaa Valley, close to the Syrian border. It later expanded into southern Lebanon, embedding itself in the Shiite communities along Israel’s borders.

Members of Hezbollah’s earlier manifestation were responsible for the devastating 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 American soldiers and 58 French military personnel. This put them on the map—and in the crosshairs.

In the early 1980s, Syria was threatened in the east by Saddam Hussein and by Israel in the south. It needed an ally, so it turned to Iran.

Throughout the 1980s, al-Assad navigated the Iran-Iraq War, the Tanker War, and the Lebanese Civil War by balancing both Iranian and Arab interests, playing both sides while maintaining influence and positioning himself as a mediator This balancing act reached its peak when he joined the international coalition to expel Saddam's forces from Kuwait in 1991, showing his pragmatic approach to power and alliances.

Upon his death in 2000 and the ascent of his son, Bashar, the dynamics shifted dramatically. The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which toppled Saddam) altered the regional landscape. Bashar gradually distanced himself from the Arab world and deepened Syria's involvement in the Iranian axis.

Into Iran's orbit

This drift away from the Arab fold was further exacerbated by the assassination of popular Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, which prompted the Syrian army to withdraw hastily from Lebanon. This widened the divide between Damascus and its traditional Arab allies. Despite that animosity, forcing a wedge between Syria and Iran has been an Arab and Western objective ever since. Two notable attempts stand out.

In 2010, the electoral victories of Ayad Allawi in Iraq and Saad Hariri in Lebanon left Arab capitals urging Damascus to support both men in the formation of their governments. Yet despite promising to do so, Damascus ultimately aligned with Iran and backed Tehran's choices in Baghdad and Beirut.

In 2011, the US pushed for a peace agreement between Syria and Israel. The backbone of the deal was the return of the entire Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for al-Assad cutting ties with Iran and Hezbollah. Yet again, while al-Assad suggested he may pivot away from Tehran, his regime's military cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah only intensified. Shortly after, when Syria descended into civil war, Iran and Hezbollah intervened militarily, financially, and politically to save their ally.

A changed world

More than a decade later, al-Assad remains in power but—across much of Syria—not in control. Vast swathes of the north and east have been rendered a proxy battlefield, dominated by five foreign armies and militias: Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, the United States, and Turkey.

One idea that has been floated quietly by diplomats is the permanent withdrawal of Iranian and Hezbollah forces tied to the simultaneous withdrawal of American and Turkish forces from Syria's north. Russia, which intervened in 2015, and which has two big military bases in Syria, would stay.

Yet the region was upended when Hamas attacked southern Israel in October 2023 and Israel launched its ground invasion of the Strip, alongside an escalated bombing campaign against Hezbollah, which has now become a war.

Forcing a wedge between Syria and Iran has long been an Arab and Western objective

As Hezbollah has been pounded, with its leaders killed and stockpiles destroyed, Damascus sensed an opportunity to distance itself from Tehran and the broader 'Axis of Resistance'. Unlike in 2006 (when Israel last invaded Lebanon to attack Hezbollah), al-Assad has withheld political, military, and media support for the militia that once helped save him.

Damascus has also strictly prevented pro-Iranian militias from attacking Israel from Syrian territory, enforcing tight control over their movements, while Israeli air strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah sites in Syria have continued. Some even wonder whether al-Assad has helped facilitate them.

Parting company

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently visited Damascus to try to convince al-Assad to engage with Axis operations against Israel, but his plea fell on deaf ears. The Syrians even declined to hold a joint press conference with Araghchi—a move that would have signalled a unified front to Iran's enemies.

A different mood is being felt at all levels, even cultural. For instance, in a symbolic indicatation of the changing dynamics, Iranian books were absent for the first time in recent memory at this year's annual book fair in Damascus—one of several signs of a subtle yet significant shift in the two countries' relations.

The loss of Syria would be a blow to Iran. Syria is Iran's bridge to Lebanon and a vital conduit to the Palestinian cause. How will it react? Iran has historically been unforgiving of allies who have strayed from its sphere of influence. Analysts are trying to gauge the next moves. Iran's regime is known for playing the waiting game, sometimes called 'strategic patience,' and a new US president will be in the Oval Office in January, which could further change things.

Will it, for the moment anyway, let Syria's dalliance with Arab states go unpunished, as Iran seeks to avoid further Israeli strikes? Or will it draw a red line? With so many red lines having already been crossed in recent months, the answer could have regional implications.

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