Washington seems to have lost its diplomatic will in Lebanonhttps://en.majalla.com/node/322714/politics/washington-seems-have-lost-its-diplomatic-will-lebanon
Washington seems to have lost its diplomatic will in Lebanon
A flurry of diplomatic activity accompanied Israel's war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Fast-forward to today, there has been a lacklustre response to end the war. Why? Al Majalla explains.
Axel Rangel Garcia
Washington seems to have lost its diplomatic will in Lebanon
Despite the parallels with Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006, the latest invasion already dwarfs the conflict of 18 years ago in terms of Lebanese casualties. Lebanon’s Health Ministry announced on 4 October that more than 2,000 have been killed by Israeli attacks, easily surpassing the 1,191 civilians killed in 2006. And the number is growing.
The high Lebanese casualty number is not the only notable difference from 2006. The nature of Israel’s assault and its decapitation strategy towards Hezbollah has, thus far, contributed to fewer casualties on the Israeli side. 33 Israelis have been killed in the north since October 7, 2023, compared to 165 in just over a month in 2006.
But it is arguably beyond the battlefield, among the international community, where the greatest contrast with 2006 can be found. July and August 2006 saw a scramble of activity among international diplomats, with frequent meetings at the UN Security Council and elsewhere as leading global actors debated how a ceasefire could be brokered to stop the war.
The international community of 2024 is comparably silent. Middle Eastern leaders have voiced their condemnation of Israel’s attacks, while Western nations have urged restraint, especially after Israel seemingly targeted UNIFIL positions. However, standing out in its muteness is the United States.
For nearly 70 years, the US has been arguably the most decisive external actor in Lebanon. It sent troops in 1958 to prevent the collapse of the pro-Western government. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Philip Habib was the key negotiator of the PLO’s withdrawal after Israel invaded in 1982, resulting in the deployment of a Multinational Force in which the US played a leading role.
Biden may be reluctant to pressure Netanyahu for fear the Republicans win pro-Israel votes from the Democrats
In 2006, while Washington was supportive of Israel's right to attack Hezbollah, it still led the international community's efforts to end the conflict. Though initially preventing efforts at the UNSC for an immediate halt to fighting, the George W Bush administration was pushing for a ceasefire within two weeks of the war's outbreak. Initially, these efforts were still too favourable to Israel for European and Arab diplomats, but eventually, Washington was persuaded to adopt a more balanced solution that became UN Resolution 1701.
Though it made no secret of its closeness to Israel, the US still, seemingly, saw itself as the leader of the international community and responsible for resolving the conflict. No such calculus appears to be driving the Biden administration today. In fairness, after a year of failing to negotiate a ceasefire deal in Gaza, it's plausible that his team lack the will to try again in Lebanon.
Domestic considerations
Similarly, domestic considerations are at play. With Donald Trump regarded as more pro-Israel than Kamala Harris, Biden may be reluctant to pressure Benjamin Netanyahu for fear the Republicans win pro-Israel votes from the Democrats.
Moreover, the White House has not been inert. It led attempts to broker a Lebanese ceasefire at the UN General Assembly, before Israel's assassination of Hassan Nasrallah torpedoed any such hopes. Yet since then, the US has fallen back on emphasising Israel's "right to conduct...limited incursions to degrade Hezbollah's capability," according to the State Department, and there has been next to no talk of pushing for a ceasefire. This is nothing like the shuttle diplomacy of 2006 and 1982.
Though no US spokesperson will say it, as well as the domestic reasons holding Biden back, the US' geopolitical priorities are starkly different from either 2006 or 1982. While the White House no doubt abhors the civilian casualties, the reality is Lebanon is just not as important to Washington as it once was.
The year 2006 was the high point of the Bush administration's 'War on Terror' and its goal of transforming Middle Eastern states into pro-western democracies. The previous year had seen the US lead efforts, with France, to force Syria out of Lebanon in the wake of the assassination of Rafic Hariri, paving the way for elections that Washington hoped would deliver a more pro-western government. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted how central Lebanon was to US plans for the region when she described the violence of 2006 as "the birth pangs of a new Middle East" – though Hezbollah's survival ultimately helped derail Bush's agenda.
Palestinian fighters raise the victory sign and carry pictures of Yasser Arafat, on a military truck as they leave Beirut for Tunisia, August 22, 1982.
In 1982, similarly, while Washington was happy to see the PLO ejected from Lebanon, Cold War dynamics led the US to carefully manage how this happened. The last thing Washington wanted was for Lebanon to flip into the Soviet camp. The same fears motivated Eisenhower's intervention in 1958.
In contrast, today, Lebanon holds no such geopolitical importance. Apart from Iran, which continues to plough funds and arms to Hezbollah, Lebanon has lost its value to many of the external actors that once jostled for influence. Saudi Arabia cut much of its funding to the Sunni-led Future Movement in 2017, while Syria has been too weak since its civil war to regain much clout.
Turkey, Russia and China
Nor have new powers sought to increase their influence. Turkey has spoken of Lebanon's plight but has not established a serious influence. Russia and China similarly have invested little.
Lebanon's attractiveness to outsiders has been hit by the financial crisis that has engulfed it for years, diminishing its past position as a regional banking hub. Meanwhile, the Syrian civil war blocked the overland route for the many tourists who used to flock to Beirut from the Gulf in the summer months. All things combined, Lebanon is no longer the key prize it was during the Cold War and the War on Terror, and the US' lack of interest in halting today's war reflects that.
Of course, this could change. New factors could incentivise Biden or his successor to take a renewed interest in stopping the conflict. As with Gaza, an increase in casualty numbers might prompt new diplomatic initiatives. The changing US domestic situation, especially once the presidential election is over, could prompt Biden to engage more fully with both Lebanon and the Gaza conflict in his final months in office.
However, the geopolitical calculus is unlikely to shift. Lebanon's importance, beyond a general US preference for minimising conflict and favouring Middle Eastern stability, is not what it was. As a result, Washington's willingness to leave the Lebanese to deal with the crisis alone should not be surprising.
