Could Israel cut off Lebanon's internet and telecoms?

After Israel avoided prevention measures and sent tens of thousands of messages to Lebanese citizens, fears have grown over the security of a key part of the country’s infrastructure

Women use their mobile phones as ambulances carrying the bodies of three Palestinian leaders who were killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut's Kola district on September 30, 2024.
REUTERS/Omar Ibrahim
Women use their mobile phones as ambulances carrying the bodies of three Palestinian leaders who were killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut's Kola district on September 30, 2024.

Could Israel cut off Lebanon's internet and telecoms?

Before Israel detonated thousands of pager and radio devices carried by Hezbollah senior officials and members, there were reports that it had been manipulating the Global Positioning System in a tactic known as “GPS spoofing”.

Such tactics are usually used against hostile missile attacks, which interfere with guidance systems. While strikes can be repelled by GPS spoofing, it is also dangerous, interrupting the operations of aviation technology—including over the Mediterranean—and regular users navigating in cars and for deliveries. There was also disruption to important civil infrastructure.

Israel initially denied responsibility but later admitted to being behind what it called a “GPS outage.” In July, Lebanon lodged a complaint with the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) regarding manipulating GPS.

Amid the current threat of a full-scale war, there are serious concerns that Israel might cut Lebanon’s connection to the world by bombing the undersea cable that provides access to the internet.

There are other ways in which internet access can be disrupted. The telecommunications switching gear required needs a supply of diesel. Maintenance teams from Ogero, the executive body of the Ministry of Telecommunications, need to be able to work. The disruption caused by the July 2006 war—when Israel blockaded Lebanon and fuel ran short—is still fresh in the minds of Lebanese.

Warnings and threats

And now there are fresh fears over the security of the telecommunications network after Israel used it to stoke fear by sending tens of thousands of warning messages. Residents in Lebanon received automated telephone messages and text messages warning them to evacuate their homes, which are likely to have been orchestrated by Israel.

According to Imad Kreidieh, who spoke to Reuters, the director-general of the national telecoms firm Ogero, over 80,000 such calls were made. They were not just received in southern Lebanon, toward the border with Israel, where the attacks were being made. Residents of the town of Ghazieh near Sidon received landline calls from Israel, ordering them to leave their homes immediately.

Lebanese citizens in Beirut and its southern suburbs received messages, including via mobile phones, warning them to stay away from Hezbollah sites until further notice. They were told that anyone near the party’s installations and weapons would be risking their lives.

Government officials also received the warnings. Ziad Makari, the caretaker minister of information, received one saying the building should be evacuated. Mohammad Wissam Mortada, the minister of culture, received a warning call from someone speaking classical Arabic with a strange accent, urging them to leave the office immediately.

Amin Salam, the caretaker minister of economy and trade, also received a suspicious message from an unknown source. Throughout, false reports and rumours of other messages created a feeling of uncertainty and chaos.

The Ministry of Telecommunications said that Israel did not need to breach the security of Lebanon’s official telecommunications network to send the messages, which came as part of a low-tech effort to get round measures to block calls originating from Israel. The ministry is moving to a different system which will be less prone to such attacks.

But doubts have been voiced about whether the change—to a different form of digital communication—will work and whether the system was breached. Dr Abdel-Munem Youssef, a former director-general for investment and maintenance at the ministry and former director-general of Ogero, said: “How does this relate to securing networks and protecting them against Israeli breaches?”, adding: “If these deceptions and frauds via electronic applications don’t constitute a breach, then what do they represent?”

Current Ogero director-general Kreidieh also denied there was a security breach, rather “a circumvention of the international code system” which blocks calls from Israel. “If the enemy calls via a foreign code, this isn’t considered a breach of the system”, he said.

But Youssef insisted to Al Majalla that a breach occurred because messages cannot be sent to Lebanese mobile devices on the Alfa and Touch networks without the main Ministry of Telecommunications network being hacked.

Messages cannot be sent to Lebanese mobile devices without the Ministry of Telecommunications network being hacked

Dr Abdel-Munem Youssef, former director-general of Ogero

Dire implications

What would the implications be if Lebanon's telecoms and internet infrastructure were destroyed and the country was cut off from the world? Can Lebanon, its bankrupt government, public and private institutions, banks, remote workers, and expats endure such isolation? And how likely is such a prospect, given the state of the country's vital infrastructure?

The current network hasn't been updated since 2019, and Lebanon's telecommunications have been compromised for years. Does this mean that if a full-scale war breaks out, Lebanon will face near-total internal paralysis and isolation from the outside world? Is there any alternative plan in place if telecommunications and internet services are cut off?

Dr Youssef said: "We don't have accurate information on this matter, but one thing is certain: Lebanon's various telecommunications infrastructures, whether landlines, distribution networks, subscriber systems in buildings, mobile networks, data networks, internet networks, or satellite stations, are all outdated and outside the scope of modern development."

"This poses a significant threat to Lebanon's communications landscape. To this day, the capacity of fibre optic networks reaching buildings, offices, and homes is limited to only 35,000 subscribers, whereas it was supposed to serve 800,000 subscribers. The capacity of smart switches operating on IMS installed so far only covers 80,000 subscribers, even though a plan announced in 2020 promised 15 million lines," he added.

Meanwhile, mobile networks in Lebanon still operate on 3G and 4G systems, with no 5G services, even though 5G entered global markets in 2021.

No Starlink

Some people hope for Starlink, but according to some sources, negotiations between the Ministry of Telecommunications and Starlink reached a dead end long ago. Starlink wants to enter the Lebanese market without restrictions, while the ministry insists on licensing a limited number of devices for a few privileged individuals.

Being cut off from the internet would add to Lebanon's list of problems, which include its presidency vacuum, governmental paralysis, terrifying security situation, economic crisis, bankrupt banks, rampant unemployment, inflation, and rising living costs.

Lebanese citizens face these worries while enduring the world's worst and most expensive internet service. There is no plan to secure the internet, and Starlink is not a viable solution. The only emergency plan prepared by the state in case of an internet blackout focuses on maintaining communication between essential national agencies such as ministries, the army, hospitals, and media outlets.

AFP
AFP cameraman Dylan Collins speaking on his mobile phone after being injured by Israeli shelling at Alma al-Shaab border village with Israel in southern Lebanon on October 13, 2023.

This plan provides only a minimal internet connection. It does not aim to reconnect the entire Lebanese population to the network. Whatever may lie ahead, doubts remain about what has already happened and how the network's management has been problematic.

Youssef also cast further doubt on the official explanation of the warning messages, saying they technically and exclusively pass through the Lebanese international code. He explained: "The current breach results from the accumulation of administrative errors in the communications sector, the introduction of foreign and local private companies into this sector, and the installation of devices and equipment without taking precautionary and security measures since the beginning of 2017".

He added, "Among these companies is the American Israeli AKOTEK, which obtained all passwords and usernames, entered all software, and obtained all documents."

He also questions recent activity and investment in the sector: "Where has the over $400mn spent on Ogero since 2017 gone? This massive amount was supposedly allocated to purchase state-of-the-art Smart and IM Switches, advanced NCCC control centres, MPLS networks, NGN networks, FTTX networks, LTE networks, and many other highly publicised high-tech developments."

"These projects were accompanied by grandiose promises made in numerous press conferences attended by ministers, deputies, heads of government, general managers, private sector companies, and local, regional, and international organisations. Yet, here we are today, left with the ironic reality that, despite all the spending, we remain proud of our outdated switches."

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