Sudan militias: How a stretched army created a chain reaction of violencehttps://en.majalla.com/node/310856/politics/sudan-militias-how-stretched-army-created-chain-reaction-violence
Sudan militias: How a stretched army created a chain reaction of violence
In the vast country, tribes were armed to help the army fight militias, creating parallel armies that went rogue
Albane Simon
From the arming of tribes to protect goat herders to the rise of the RSF, who are currently fighting the military, Al Majalla sheds light on Sudan's endemic militia problem.
Sudan militias: How a stretched army created a chain reaction of violence
Usually, when there is a proliferation of armed groups somewhere, there is a reason. But, in Sudan’s case, there are quite a few: inequality, injustice, marginalisation, and a power-grabbing elite.
The Sudanese have not had many bright moments since independence in 1956. The way they have typically challenged power is by grabbing weapons. Yet even before independence, there were problems.
In 1955, for instance, as the British prepared to leave, South Sudanese leaders in the army rebelled with the support of South Sudanese politicians, protesting unequal treatment and opportunities in the distribution of post-colonial jobs.
They had a point: being allocated only three of 800 jobs smacks of unfairness. But there were other grievances, too, often related to development.
Challenging power
War and conflict have never been far from the country, with weapons profuse. Successive Sudanese governments have fought those they felt posed a threat to the constitution, labelling them as rebels and deviants.
Yet these governments have mostly been weak, with limited funds and limited fighting capabilities. Sudan is vast, and its army is stretched, so militias have the advantage, but the military has fought back by enlisting the help of tribes.
Those who agreed were given arms. This led to the formation of militias and parallel armies to the Sudanese armed forces.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and troops from Rapid Support Forces (RSF) celebrate after recapturing the Daldako area, about 20km (12 miles) northeast of South Kordofan's state capital, Kadugli, on 20 May 2014.
A catastrophic oversight
Yet the creation of militias by the government and the army overlooked the nature of parallel armies. This oversight set in motion the dismantling of the state we see today.
Just ask General Ibrahim Abboud, who seized power in Sudan through a military coup in 1958 at a time when Sudan still encompassed what is now South Sudan.
In 1963, there was an intense rebellion in the Upper Nile Province in southern Sudan, where the national army had only one battalion and limited police forces.
As discontent grew, authorities decided to arm the Nuer tribes in Nasir, Akobo, and Fangak Bantiu, as well as the Morlei tribe in Bibor, the Dinka tribe in Bor, and the Shilluk tribe in Kodok. The pretext was to protect lives and property from attacks by rebels, who recruited young fighters and seized livestock to sustain their forces.
While the arming was limited – a few old rifles, mainly – analysts say Abboud's policy opened the door to today's mess, partly because it became a runaway process, with no monitoring checks to prevent escalation.
If history is any lesson, turmoil in Khartoum led to the ousting of General Abboud and his government within a year of his decision to arm the tribes in southern Sudan.
Sudan is vast, and its army is stretched. So, it arms tribes to help fight militias, leading to the formation of parallel armies.
Guarding herds
General Jaafar Nimeiri was Sudan's president from 1969 to 1985 and its prime minister for much of the same period.
In 1972, his regime signed an agreement with the People's Movement, which led the armed struggle on behalf of the people of South Sudan.
As herders' livestock made its annual summer journey from the northwest to the south in search of water and grass, the herders clashed with the locals and armed road gangs. Something had to be done.
Two battalions were sent. One was stationed in Sufaha to move with the Rizeigat tribe as they herded from the north to the south at Aweil. The second was stationed in Al Miram to move with the Misseriya tribe south of Gogrial.
The tribes whose herds were being guarded by soldiers were of Arab descent in Darfur, so rumours soon spread that the Nimeiri government was arming "Arab tribes" against the tribes of South Sudan.
These areas were natural spheres of influence for the National Umma Party, a prominent Sudanese party. Umma was, therefore, accused of arming tribes loyal to it for self-defence. The party denied the allegations on several occasions.
Setting a trend
Experimenting with arming tribes for self-defence originated during Nimeiri's presidency. Among the more prominent was the Maraheel Forces.
Again set up to guard cattle (up to 5,000 head) and cattle herders, the Maraheel Forces later became the present-day Popular Defence Forces.
The arming of tribal militias is seen as sowing the seeds of weapons proliferation. Herders would attack those who attacked their herds or prevented their grazing, leading to retaliation leading to a spiral.
Nimeiri's regime was toppled in April 1985, by which time the armed People's Movement, led by Dr John Garang De Mabior, had gained momentum in South Sudan.
John Garang, commander-in-chief of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, near the town of Kapoeta in Sudan's southern province of Equatoria on 11 September 1986.
Political leaders believed that Nimeiri's overthrow would pave the way for peace with the People's Movement, but De Mabior refused to negotiate.
Fighting escalated in the south. People's Movement forces attacked the Kordofan region. The transitional government sent a delegation to the Nuba Mountains, including the defence minister and a major general, but they were attacked.
There were three options.
One was for the government to protect people and property from rebel attacks. The second was for the tribes to arm and defend themselves. The third was for people to surrender to the rebel army to avoid them or their livestock being killed or their crops being destroyed.
The government felt it had no choice but to arm the tribes in the buffer zone between the north and south under the supervision of the army.
They hoped to let tribes protect themselves and prevent them from joining the enemy's ranks.
Maj. Gen. Fadlallah Burma Nasser, the defence minister at the time, said he "feared the random arming" of tribes and "preferred it to be supervised by the army through the chiefs and elders".
Army for retirees
Imam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi was democratically elected prime minister in 1986 and sought to establish a force composed of retired army and police officers, naming it the Popular Defence Forces (PDF).
The idea and impetus came from the regular army's inability to secure the full territory of Sudan. He described it as "a popular force to support the army, which had lost many of its resources in the war".
Yet, during his tenure, the army weakened. Military outposts in South Sudan fell to the People's Movement, and fighting expanded into Kordofan.
He hoped that the PDF would protect cities and trade routes, but whilst the idea was approved by his cabinet, it was never implemented because, in 1989, there was another coup carried out by the armed forces against the democratically elected government.
President Omar al-Bashir speaks as Sudanese fighters participate in a rally on 28 February 1992 in Ed Daein.
The 1989 coup was led by military officer Oman al-Bashir, who would retain power for about 30 years, yet in the weeks and months after he assumed power, he did not dispense with the idea of the PDF.
Rather, he tweaked it and executed it in a manner that would lay the groundwork for Sudan's militias in the modern era.
Al-Bashir had seized power with the support of the Islamic Movement (the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan). Young recruits were told that they were fighting a war for Islam. It became a jihadist war in the name of religion.
Fighting escalated in the south. People's Movement forces attacked the Kordofan region. The transitional government sent a delegation to the Nuba Mountains, including the defence minister and a major general, but they were attacked.
There were three options.
One was for the government to protect people and property from rebel attacks. The second was for the tribes to arm and defend themselves. The third was for people to surrender to the rebel army to avoid them or their livestock being killed or their crops being destroyed.
The government felt it had no choice but to arm the tribes in the buffer zone between the north and south under the supervision of the army.
They hoped to let tribes protect themselves and prevent them from joining the enemy's ranks.
Maj. Gen. Fadlallah Burma Nasser, the defence minister at the time, said he "feared the random arming" of tribes and "preferred it to be supervised by the army through the chiefs and elders".
The arming of tribes sowed the seeds of weapons proliferation. Herders would attack those who attacked their herds, leading to a vicious cycle of retaliation.
Army for retirees
Imam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi was democratically elected prime minister in 1986 and sought to establish a force composed of retired army and police officers, naming it the Popular Defence Forces (PDF).
The idea and impetus came from the regular army's inability to secure the full territory of Sudan. He described it as "a popular force to support the army, which had lost many of its resources in the war".
Yet, during his tenure, the army weakened. Military outposts in South Sudan fell to the People's Movement, and fighting expanded into Kordofan.
He hoped that the PDF would protect cities and trade routes, but although the idea was approved by his cabinet, it was never implemented because, in 1989, there was another coup carried out by the armed forces against the democratically elected government.
The 1989 coup was led by military officer Oman al-Bashir, who would retain power for about 30 years, yet in the weeks and months after he assumed power, he did not dispense with the idea of the PDF.
Rather, he tweaked it and executed it in a manner that would lay the groundwork for Sudan's militias in the modern era.
Al-Bashir had seized power with the support of the Islamic Movement (the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan). Young recruits were told that they were fighting a war for Islam. It became a jihadist war in the name of religion.
The PDF idea was still alive. Yet this time, it was not limited to retired military and police personnel. Camps were opened for everyone, voluntary at first, then mandatory for students whose applications were contingent on completing training.
Later, civil servants and professors had to undergo military training to prepare for jihad. Promotion was soon based on it. Failure could result in dismissal.
Female members of the Sudanese Popular Army wear traditional dress as they take part in a parade on 3 December 1993 organised for participants in the Islamic Conference ongoing in Khartoum.
Chance to shine
The camps received significant attention from both the Islamic Movement, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and the government, since they were the perfect indoctrination centres. Girls were even recruited so young men would join.
According to a military officer, the PDF was "essentially the armed forces of the ruling Islamic organisation at the time". They had "no connection to the regular armed forces".
PDF leaders and fighters had a higher status than regular army soldiers. Over time, they evolved into an Islamic Jihadist militia sponsored by the state, particularly feared in the regions. Their numbers swelled to 100,000 fighters. Some likened them to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran.
From within the PDF, other militias emerged. These were more rigid, including the Tanks Brigades, led by prominent figures in the ruling National Congress Party, such as Ali Ahmed Karti, a former foreign minister under Bashir.
Before the Islamists' overthrow, the PDF was a fully equipped militia with expensive offices and a massive budget from the state. After the revolution, however, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chairman of the Sovereignty Council, dissolved them.
Compelled to fight
Dead but not buried, many doubted whether these brigades had handed over all their weapons to the government.
Fighting erupted in Darfur in 2003. Suddenly, parallel armed movements intersected with the national army. Militia soldiers tended to be members of the same ethnic group or area.
Over time, militias proliferated in Darfur. Rifts and splits in armed movements led to the emergence of new, smaller groups.
Amidst the fighting between the government, armed movements, and small militias, civilians were stuck facing violence, looting, and displacement.
Over time, militias proliferated in Darfur. Rifts and splits in armed movements led to the emergence of new, smaller groups.
Tribes sought weapons and formations. Heavy weapons started appearing. In a government campaign to collect weapons from tribes and residents in Darfur, more than one million pieces of weaponry were collected.
Some of these militiamen became mercenaries, heading off to fight in the Libyan war in exchange for money.
Oil as lubricant
In 1999, al-Bashir opened a 1,600km oil pipeline to carry 250,000 barrels of oil a day from the Western Upper Nile region in the south to refineries and Port Sudan in the north.
The oil wealth soon became what al-Bashir's National Congress Party relied on to rule, yet war in Darfur began three years after oil money began, creating yet another battle-front in a country already riven with them.
Other conflict hotspots were in South Sudan, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, where the army was busy arming local tribes.
Renowned officer Wad Ibrahim, alongside intelligence officers and security personnel, had earlier begun arming the Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes in South and West Darfur.
In 2012, tribes in oil-rich areas went on strike and refused to fight armed movements because the government had not paid them what it promised.
Likewise, politicians were accused of letting the Misseriya get wiped out after 107 tribe members were killed in a single battle.
Against this backdrop, tribal 'armies' expanded and became a threat to state authority, forcing the government to appease them with money and promises of development.
Chadian cart owners transport belongings of Sudanese people who fled the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region
Good, Bad, and Ugly
Some tribes formed small militias that attacked oil companies and kidnapped geologists prospecting for oil, including Chinese nationals and employees of foreign organisations. They were released after a ransom was paid.
Others became politically ambitious, their members soon becoming first lawmakers, then eventually ministers.
Suddenly, the state was beholden to the armed groups, who were guarding national oil facilities and fighting alongside the army, becoming, in essence, 'parallel armies.'
Of the militias in Darfur, the most notorious and terrifying was the Janjaweed, led by Musa Hilal, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court.
Under his leadership, this militia is accused of committing war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.
The Janjaweed was formed after the first attack on the city of Nyala by the Sudan Liberation Movement, in which they kidnapped an Air Force commander with the rank of Brigadier General from the airport.
Its brutal tactics and accusations against government leaders, including Bashir, meant that the Janjaweed was fast becoming a problem for the authorities both nationally and internationally, so it changed its name to Border Guard Forces.
This began the trend of forming tribal armies and regulating them by law.
The most notorious and terrifying Darfur militia was the Janjaweed, led by Musa Hilal, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court.
Hemedti's star rises
Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) and his forces joined the fight under the Hilal Brigade and the Border Guard Forces in 2004.
However, a dispute soon arose, and in 2006, Hemedti took his forces and left to engage militarily in South Darfur.
Sudanese intelligence agencies were worried about him. They reported that Hemedti "possesses leadership qualities and has ambitions to amass financial wealth more than power and leadership, unlike Hilal".
Fearing a Hemedti rebellion against the state, al-Bashir summoned him to his residence in the army's General Command and brought him back on-side, cooperating with the leader of the Mahamid, after agreeing to all his conditions.
The president granted Hemedti and his non-biological brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, permission to establish the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Events took a dramatic turn when Hilal rebelled against al-Bashir, threatening to fight the government army.
Some believe that it was caused by a dispute over the gold-rich mountain of Jebel Amer, which Hilal had control over and which the government had decided to concede to Hemedti.
Hilal rejected the peace overtures and soon was engaged in a deadly battle, during which one of his sons was captured and sent to Khartoum, where he was imprisoned until the fall of al-Bashir's regime in 2019.
Shield from enemies
Today, the RSF is well on its way to taking over Sudan, militarily ascendant in its ongoing war with the army. Yet the Sudanese people still remember al-Bashir's populist rhetoric about the RSF.
Addressing a huge crowd, he said: "This is not only Hemedti, this is my own protector." The word for protection or protector is 'Himayati', which sounds very similar to Hemedti. A clever play on words in Arabic, it hinted that Hemedti was his shield against enemies.
After the RSF victory over the Justice and Equality Movement in the Battle of Khor Fakkan, al-Bashir heaped praise on Hemedti in his victory speech.
"When I thought about forming the RSF, I told them to call Hemedti," said the president. "I told him to recruit 5,000 young men. He came with 6,000, and they never let us down."
In this file photo taken on June 18, 2019 Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, leader of the large and heavily-armed paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), smiles during a meeting with his supporters in Khartoum.
The RSF grew under al-Bashir's personal patronage, something the president boasted about until shortly before his downfall.
Faced with increasing pressure from rebels in 2019, he called on Hemedti's forces from Darfur to safeguard his rule. A retired senior officer recently said their relationship "became personal", which further expanded Hemedti's influence.
Officers from Sudan's security and intelligence apparatus began to assume leadership and training roles within the RSF, further cementing the connection. In 2013, al-Bashir issued a presidential decree officially affiliating the RSF with the state.
That same year, the RSF helped the state suppress popular protests over rising prices. More than 100 (mainly young) Sudanese were killed, according to the government's own figures. It claimed an unknown third party was responsible.
Despite supporting the army in combating armed movements, the RSF remained separate from the military. There was a level of friction between them since the army rejected the formation of parallel forces.
The militia matures
In 2017, parliament passed a law regulating the RSF, describing them as a national military force subordinate to the armed forces and operating under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Army.
Training camps were established in several cities, particularly in Darfur, where the RSF operated with a separate national budget. The state's military officers, including intelligence officers, were seconded to them.
After the 2017 law, expansion was swift. The number of RSF forces jumped to more than 40,000 fighters.
It gained financial and political influence, especially after eliminating rebel groups in Darfur and Kordofan. Victories solidified the RSF's presence.
Criticism of the RSF's tactics began to become much more muted. In short, the mood had changed.
Sudan's parliament legalised the RSF in 2017. After that, its ranks grew to 40,000 fighters.
Soon, political leaders who criticised the RSF were arrested. This included the late Imam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar sect and head of the National Umma Party. Although they were later released, the point was being made.
In a public speech, Hemedti said that the RSF was fighting on behalf of the government and its army, so if they were ordered to arrest someone, they had to do so.
When a public dispute arose between him and the prominent leader of the ruling National Congress Party at the time, Ahmed Haroun al-Bashir personally intervened and mediated reconciliation between the two men.
Paved with gold
The RSF gained extensive economic privileges, with the gold trade being central. They seized control of numerous mines in Darfur, especially in Jebel Amer, after forcibly displacing locals and killing more than 800 people in running battles.
The RSF also expanded outside Darfur in search of the precious metal and was accused of smuggling gold to neighbouring countries and then onto global markets.
They deny these allegations, but according to the United Nations, RSF-controlled resources rake in around $600mn annually from gold revenues alone.
Beyond gold, the RSF has expanded its commercial activities into oil, food, and agriculture through the Al Janid company or through companies and individuals acting as fronts for economic activity.
This significant wealth accumulation has been a major motivation for the thousands who have rushed to join the RSF's ranks in recent years.
In 2019, the RSF participated in the overthrow of al-Bashir after Hemedti refused the president's orders to attack rebels and sided with those calling for his ouster.
As a result, he was appointed as the Vice President of the Sovereign Council, a post currently held by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
Finally legitimate
This new status allowed the RSF to enter the capital, Khartoum, and establish training camps within it. Their numbers doubled to 100,000 fighters, and they took receipt of various advanced weaponry from the army.
The RSF took part in what became known as the General Command Sit-In Dispersal Massacre, contributing to a widespread public rejection of them due to the violations they committed during the Islamist rule in Darfur and other areas.
Members of Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) celebrate as they lead dozens of African nationals, caught as they tried to cross into Libya illegally, in front of the media a desert area called Gouz Abudloaa in 2019.
Aware of the public's dim view, Hemedti apologised for the government's violations during its wars with citizens and arrested several senior leaders in his army on charges of violently dispersing the sit-in protest.
It wasn't quiet for long. In October 2021, the RSF supported the coup against the civilian government and helped suppress anti-coup protests, killing several young demonstrators demanding the return of civilian rule.
Hemedti later backed down from the coup and supported the Framework Political Agreement (FPA) proposed by political forces as an alternative.
Growth spurt
Fast forward to 2023. The RSF has been fighting the Sudanese army since April of last year. In size, capability, and ambition, it is unrecognisable from its earlier incarnation a decade ago.
At the outbreak of the war, their count was estimated at 100,000, but experts say it is now closer to 200,000 fighters, who are led by Hemedti and his brother, Abdul Rahim.
These fighters receive intensive training in urban warfare, which helps them win battles against the Sudanese army around the country. Barely a week goes by without another RSF victory.
Since the outbreak of the war, the RSF have been accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide and ethnic cleansing.
This was witnessed and documented in the city of Geneina in western Darfur. They are also accused of looting and of crimes in cities where the army has pulled out.
The RSF now controls half of Sudan's 18 states, several military headquarters, strategic sites such as Khartoum Airport, the Presidential Palace, and the oil refinery. Its slick PR machine is among its best weapons.
The UN says the RSF rakes in $600mn annually from gold. It has also expanded into oil, food, and agriculture.
Noble aims gone bad
Throughout recent Sudanese history, governments have formed most militias during moments of weakness. Their creation was always designed to support the Sudanese Army and to carry out combat missions on its behalf.
Their formation is often justified by noble aims such as protecting citizens, self-defence, or guarding trade routes and supply lines.
Yet, it does not take long for the militias to veer from their original purpose. Instead of maintaining security, they are suddenly contributing to its destabilisation.
The irony is that most of these militias were established under military regimes known for their iron-fist authoritarianism, most notably during al-Bashir's reign.
Not all militias were established for noble aims. Some were born to suppress protests or attack the armed forces. The National Islamic Front went from arming limited militias to establishing parallel armies to the national armed forces.
After al-Bashir was ousted, Sudanese civilians sought to undertake security and military reforms: to integrate all militias and parallel armies into one unified force. The military resisted this. Many believe this is what led to the ongoing war today.
More than 200 years ago in London, a 20-year-old female author published a gothic novel that explores the dangers of ambition and the consequences of playing God.
It is the story of a young scientist who creates a monster that ultimately destroys his life and the lives of those around him.
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein may have lessons for Sudan today.
