Biden weighs options after US troops killed in Jordan
In an election year, Biden needs to draw a line for Iran to deter future attacks while also avoiding a further regional escalation
Reuters
US President Joe Biden is briefed on the deadly drone attack at a US outpost in Jordan by members of the national security team in the Situation Room at the White House in Washington, US, 29 January 2024.
Biden weighs options after US troops killed in Jordan
Since mid-October last year, Iranian proxies have carried out 165 attacks against US bases in Iraq and Syria without causing any direct fatalities.
But this week, the streak ended, as a drone crashed into the living quarters of “Tower 22”, a US base in northeast Jordan, close to the border with Syria, killing three soldiers and wounding more than 30. This is the worst attack for US forces since the escalation began, and even before, marking a significant escalation.
This time, US air defences and sheer luck failed to save the day and prevent US casualties — as they did 164 times before. At least, this is how this will be presented and analysed. But the timing and location of the attack may point to the possibility that this was not just an “accident” but rather a more deliberate effort on Iran’s part to escalate tensions in the region.
Significance of attack
Even without considering the very high number of casualties US forces suffered, the attack is significant and differs from previous patterns. This is first and foremost because of the location: While Iranian-tied attacks against US forces were all carried out in Syria and Iraq, this attack was carried out in Jordan.
While Iranian-tied attacks against US forces were all carried out in Syria and Iraq, this attack was carried out in Jordan, which adds to its significance.
The base that was attacked, Tower 22, is situated in a strategic area close to both the border with Iraq and Syria. The outpost serves to support US operations in southern Syria, amongst others, including those coming out of the al-Tanf base, another base situated in a critical area.
Although Tower 22 and al-Tanf were mainly designed as part of the counter-IS mission, they have acted as a thorn in Iran's side — particularly as Tehran is looking to build a ground corridor that stretches from Iraq to the Mediterranean (and through Syria).
Al-Tanf sits along the most direct road between Baghdad and Damascus. Attacks against al-Tanf have been regularly reported, leading the US to create a de facto buffer zone around the base.
Iran has been looking to push US troops out of Syria as a whole, but also specifically out of this area. Just days before the attack, reports claimed that the US was considering such a withdrawal.
American soldiers patrol the Rmelan countryside in Al-Hasakah Governorate, northeastern Syria, on June 7, 2023.
But this time, Iranian proxies went a step further, targeting not only al-Tanf but its support base in northeastern Syria.
Just hours before the US confirmed the news of the attack and the killing of three US soldiers, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (an umbrella group that includes Iranian-backed Iraqi militia) claimed responsibility for a dual attack both against al-Tanf and the "Rukban camp".
A deliberate attack
This suggests that the attack against Tower 22 was deliberate: The Iranian-made drone that hit the US living quarters did not "overshoot" and accidentally hit the base — situated in a desert area. This was a deliberate escalation meant to send a message to the US amidst rising regional tensions.
Just days before, Iranian proxies also upped the ante by firing a salvo of ballistic missiles and other projectiles at the Ain al-Assad base in western Iraq. The base hosts US troops and has been targeted on many occasions, which explains why the attack did not register as much as it should have.
The Tower 22 attack was a deliberate escalation meant to send a message to the US amidst rising regional tensions.
Indeed, this was not the "routine" rocket or drone attack. This was an attack that was only thwarted through the use of a dozen Patriot interceptors — an attack that used much more potent ballistic missiles.
In a way, it was far closer to the 2020 Iranian attack against the base in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani than to the prior pattern of relatively small-scale attacks. The 2020 attack led to injuries among US troops and could easily have led to fatalities.
This year's attack was also carried out with the intent to kill.
The attack on Tower 22 was outside Iraq and Syria, making it notable. But it was also in Jordan — a country that has increasingly found itself in Iran's crosshairs. It may well be the case that Iran and its proxies picked the target on purpose.
Jordan's dual challenge
The Hashemite Kingdom has generally sought to stay away from regional tensions. Israel's war on Gaza poses a duel challenge for Jordan as most of its population are Palestinian refugees — and because the conflict has also engulfed Jordan's neighbours.
Yet the Kingdom has been dealing with several crises that have involved Iran.
The first stems from drug and weapon smuggling networks operating in Syria and seeking to cross into Jordan. Over the past years, the Syrian regime and its Iranian allies have come to increasingly rely on the production of drugs as a source of funding.
Amman has sought to entice Damascus to curtail drug-trafficking activities with an offer to normalise ties and help make it return to the Arab League. Last year, this led to an agreement that saw Bashar al-Assad make a triumphant return to the Arab world after being ostracised over massacring his own population. In exchange, Amman pushed Damascus to commit to cracking down on drug trafficking.
It is not clear what Amman really expected from this initiative, for it was clear to anyone following the issue that al-Assad was the very source of the drugs making their way into Jordan.
The Fourth Division of the Syrian army — led by al-Assad's own brother Maher — is one of the key stakeholders when it comes to drug-smuggling activities. Maher has come to rely on the sale of Captagon pills, and so did his main allies, who are none other than Iran and Hezbollah.
This is not a small "side hustle" — it's a major business estimated to bring billions of dollars to various actors in and outside Syria.
As a result, tensions along the Jordan-Syria border have escalated to the point that Jordan was dragged back into the crisis and carried out several rounds of air strikes as smugglers (and by that, I mean state-backed smugglers) grew more and more violent.
In one of the most significant cross-border incidents, these "smugglers" fought for hours with Jordanian troops. Anti-tank missiles were found on those who were eventually captured.
Israel's war on Gaza poses a duel challenge for Jordan as most of its population are Palestinian refugees — and because the conflict has also engulfed Jordan's neighbours.
But smugglers haven't stopped there. They have also been using the same tactics to bring weapons through Jordan into the West Bank at the behest of Iran.
Tehran had been looking to inflame the Occupied West Bank even before the 7 October attacks. And after 7 October, Iranian proxies in Iraq also started firing missiles and drones from Iraq towards Israel. These missiles never reached Israel, which begs the question of whether Jordan — or US troops in Jordan — acted to intercept such projectiles.
Regardless, this was not a random attack in an insignificant place. This was an attack that may have been meant to send a message both to the US and to Jordan, as the Hashemite Kingdom came to be an unwitting obstacle to Iran's ambitions.
Eye on elections
The response will surely come, as Washington can't let such a deadly attack go unanswered. The death of three US servicemen comes at a particularly delicate time, as domestic politics ramp up in America ahead of the presidential elections in November.
Foreign policy rarely plays a pivotal role in elections, but this time, Biden's response will surely be scrutinised by his opponents. Republican figures, including Senator Lindsey Graham, have already called on President Biden to hit back directly at Iran.
This handout image shows a satellite view of the US military outpost, Tower 22 in Rukban, Rwaished District, Jordan, October 12, 2023.
Several Republican figures, including Nikky Haley, who is running to be the party's presidential candidate, have explicitly accused Biden of being responsible for the death of the three soldiers due to his perceived weakness and efforts to appease Iran.
This is no minor issue when considering that the embattled US president is poised to face former President Donald Trump - i.e. the man who ordered the killing of General Qasem Soleimani (and for far less than the attack we saw this week).
Biden is grappling with the need to both draw a line for Iran to deter future attacks and also avoid a regional escalation. Several reports have suggested that a wide range of options are being considered, with the spectrum going as far as possible US strikes against Iran.
Yet, for all the hawkish calls for war with Iran — mostly coming from Biden's political adversaries — it is also clear that engaging in a full-scale confrontation with Tehran is not in Washington's long-term interest.
Not that the US is incapable of taking on Iran, but if the calculus is a domestic one, the Biden Administration is likely fully aware that a confrontation with Iran will likely lead to an escalation in the Arabian Gulf and having oil prices skyrocket before an election isn't a smart play.
With this in mind, the US will likely pick a middle option that doesn't raise the risk of such a full-scale and direct conflict or at least mitigates it.
Biden is fully aware that a confrontation with Iran will likely lead to an escalation in the Arabian Gulf and having oil prices skyrocket before an election isn't a smart play.
Multileveled response
Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the response would be "multileveled, come in stages and be sustained over time". This suggests that the US response may not be a "one-off" but rather in stages.
Iraq and Syria seem to be the logical theatre of response, and a sustained campaign of attacks against Iranian-backed proxies there would make sense. But this would likely be deemed too little and avoids a direct attack on Iran.
While an attack on Iranian soil may be off-limits, an attack against Iranian assets or personnel in the region isn't. There is, for instance, a pesky Iranian surveillance ship sitting off the coast of Yemen that has been widely suspected of assisting Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Iran's "military advisors" across the region are also fair game: After all, why would the US do less than Israel, who hit and killed high-ranking Iranian revolutionary guard officers in Syria three times since December?
More broadly, we're once again in a situation where both sides are slowly raising the regional temperature — be it deliberately or not. Though it is clear that Iran has sought to deliver a message through its attack in Jordan, it may have miscalculated, forcing a shift in the US decision-making.
