No regional war over Gaza but everyone still loses

Iran seeks deterrence not war

Tehran is not in a comfortable position as the Gaza war proceeds. Its economy is ailing, and it must suppress public demonstrations by force. Meanwhile, its inability to provide concrete help directly to its ally, Hamas, shows the limits of its regional power.

In addition, the elimination or serious weakening of Hamas makes Hezbollah in Lebanon more vulnerable to Israeli attack and diminishes Hezbollah's ability to deter Israel from attacking Iran.

Immediately after 7 October, some American analysts thought that the destruction of Hamas would cross an Iranian red line. In fact, beyond its public statements that it does not seek a regional war, Tehran has not encouraged any of its militia allies to launch unlimited military operations.

It appears that Iran's red line to start a major escalation may not include the survival of Hamas as an Iranian military tool.

Red Sea strikes

Even if they try to avoid an unlimited war, Tehran and its allies do aim to pressure Israel and its allies, and thus, Iran has encouraged and helped the Houthis harass commercial shipping in the Red Sea. 

By the start of 2024, seven of the ten largest shipping companies rerouted ships from the Red Sea, and economic analysts were predicting supply disruptions and higher prices first in Europe and then in North America.

Read more: Piracy off Yemeni coast raises global shipping costs

This was unwelcome news for President Biden, who was already facing public unhappiness with price inflation from 2022 to early 2023.

So far, the American-organised joint naval operation has not calmed the Red Sea waters. The American sinking of three Houthi-armed boats that killed ten Houthi fighters on 31 December did not stop the attacks on commercial ships.

If Houthi warnings are credible, more strikes by both sides are likely after the January 11 air strikes aimed at deterring the Houthis definitively. However, it is unlikely that Iran would decide to intervene directly and confront the Americans over the navigation of the Red Sea. Iran's red line does not extend to Red Sea shipping.

Instead, Iran will play a long game and seek the survival of the Houthi movement, helping the Houthis maintain limited but constant pressure on the Americans and their partners in the Red Sea. The Americans can live with this. It is worth noting that oil tankers continue to use the Red Sea.

Time on Iran's side in Iraq

Tehran and Washington will operate similarly in Iraq and Syria. American air strikes against Harakat Hezbollah Nujaba in Hilla on 26 December and 4 January in Baghdad aimed at deterring Iranian-backed militias that launched more than 130 attacks against American bases in Iraq and Syria since 7 October.

The 4 January drone strike on Nujaba Movement leader Abu Taqwa's vehicle in central Baghdad 4 January was an escalation, the first American assassination of a militant commander since the killing of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on 3 January 2020.

Read more: As slain leaders commemorated, Iraq and Iran attacked yet again

The American escalation did not seek to destroy the militias, which probably is an Iranian red line. Iran's response thus has been relatively restrained.

It is worth remembering that Tehran passed a warning to the Americans before it launched a ballistic missile barrage against the al-Assad airbase in Iraq in retaliation for the killing of its beloved Soleimani and al-Muhandis. (An American military officer at al-Assad airbase at the time later confirmed the warning to me.)

One of the unwritten rules between the Americans and Iranians is to avoid large casualties on either side. Instead of massive retaliation, Tehran is working on finding a replacement in Iraq for Abu Taqwa.

In addition, Tehran knows that its political allies in the Iraqi Coordination Framework are gradually gaining ground, as we saw in the results of the provincial elections in December. Those allies want the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq.

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani is not in a hurry to expel the Americans. Still, he has said the reason for their presence no longer exists, and they must depart after a negotiation.

A source in the Coordination Framework told Iraqi Mada newspaper on 6 January that the American military presence will end within the next five years. Understanding the dynamics, Iran has no reason to escalate in the meantime if the Americans do not threaten Iran's powerful influence in Iraq.

The Syria theatre

The same applies to Syria.

The Americans and Israelis have repeatedly bombed Iranian-backed militias and killed commanders, even senior officers like Revolutionary Guard General Sayyed Razi Mousavi on 25 December.

Read more: US forces come under increased attack in Iraq and Syria

However, the air strikes do not threaten Iran's deep presence in Syria, and the Iranian-militia response has remained limited.

It is easy to imagine that Iran would escalate in response to an American move to control the Iraq-Syria border crossing at AbuKamal so vital to Iranian logistics in Syria, but so far, Washington has avoided such an escalation. The Biden administration wants the status quo and stability in Syria, not a broader war.

Iranian and Israeli redlines cross in Lebanon

A mistake I and others in the Obama administration made at the start of the Syrian civil war in 2012-2013 was misunderstanding that the survival of a strong Hezbollah in Lebanon is a huge Iranian red line.

That Iranian red line could cross the Israeli red line that insists that 80,000 Israelis displaced from their homes near the Lebanese border be able to return safely.

There is a real risk that a large set of strikes from either Hezbollah or Israel would trigger a powerful retaliation from the other and slide into subsequent rounds of escalation on both sides.

Israeli Defence Minister Gallant on 7 January told the Wall Street Journal that Israel could "copy-paste" the destruction in Gaza to Lebanon. Nasrallah and Tehran understand the political and military risks to Hezbollah and have refrained from massive missile strikes against Israel.

Despite the Israeli assassination of a Hamas official in Beirut on 2 January, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, in a 5 January speech, hinted at an eventual negotiation with Israel about the land border between Israel and Lebanon.

Such a negotiation is far away; in the meantime, the risk of escalation is real. Washington, therefore, has pressed Israel to exercise restraint. In return, Israel will use strikes and threats to compel the Americans, French, and other intermediaries to pressure Hezbollah to move Hezbollah forces away from the border.

Given a final, clear choice between escalation and all-out war on the one hand and tactical retreat on the other, Tehran and Nasrallah are more likely to make a small tactical concession.

Their core interest is to maintain Hezbollah's powerful military capability, especially its arsenal of thousands of missiles that can hit Israel, instead of seeing most of that military capability destroyed in a war over the exact position of Radwan forces near the border.

Everyone loses in the end

Even if the region avoids a massive war between states, all the major actors will emerge from the Gaza war diminished. Israel has inflicted terrible devastation on Palestinians in Gaza and is sharply reducing — if not eliminating — Hamas' military capabilities.

It will also eliminate Hamas's ability to govern Gaza alone or manage flows of assistance from abroad. However, Israel, too, will suffer from the war.

Beyond its hundreds of casualties, Israel's far-right government likely will lose in the next election. Perhaps most importantly, like Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria's war, Israel did not understand that videos of its brutality would move from cellphones in Gaza to living rooms around the world. Israel's image in world opinion will never fully recover.

Read more: UN court hears South Africa genocide case against Israel

The International Court of Justice genocide case, the sharp criticism from humanitarian aid agencies ranging from Doctors Without Borders to senior United Nations officials, as well as the Pope, and the millions who demonstrated in the streets against Israeli operations all represent a very different response from the wars of 1967 or 1973 or 2006. 

Iran, too, has lost standing.

It has been unable to stop the attacks against Hamas and the Houthis. The militias in Syria and Iraq can hit the Americans but cannot eject them any time soon. Hezbollah's caution in Lebanon reflects its own vulnerabilities.

All these limited responses result in part from Tehran's aversion to risk. It would be difficult to argue in January 2024 that Iran's ability to deter Israel is greater than it was on 6 October. Washington, not Iran, is constraining Israel now.

Perceptions in the region that only Washington — not Beijing — can restrain Israel have boosted American influence. But it is important to remember that since President Obama, Washington has wanted to spend its time and resources not on the Middle East but on China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

Read more: Biden's security strategy reflects waning US interest in the Middle East

Washington does not appear wiser due to the Gaza war; no one forgets the president's national security advisor's public statement on 29 September that the Middle East was relatively quiet and focused on normalisation with Israel and business.

Now, the price of ignoring the Palestinians and achieving normalisation has gone up. The longer-term cost to the United States may be the greatest.

The American leadership's refusal to take strong action to discipline Israeli military behaviour has set back Washington's claim that it seeks to improve international norms of behaviour of and between states — the top goal of Biden's national security strategy published in 2022.

The genocide case at the Hague shows that leadership of a rules-based order has passed from the United States to a new generation of leaders in countries with interests different from those of America.

That transfer cannot help American interests in the long term.