Politics

The dangers of a US withdrawal from Syria

Without US military presence, the vice currently around the neck of IS in northeastern Syria would be loosened considerably, if not removed altogether.

AFP

US troops patrol on the roads of the Syrian town of al-Jawadiyah, in the northeastern Hasakeh province, near the border with Turkey, on December 17, 2020.

The dangers of a US withdrawal from Syria

Charles Lister

last update on 26 Jan 2024

For more than eight years, the United States has maintained a military deployment in northeast Syria. Over time, that presence has evolved from several dozen soldiers to 2,500 and now 900.

From 2015 to 2019, US troops played an integral role in training and equipping the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and supporting their consequential fight to defeat the Islamic State (IS) territorially. By March 2019, that goal had been accomplished, with IS defeated in its last pocket of land in al-Baghouz.

Since then, within a region comprising a third of Syrian territory, US forces have been the glue holding together the only meaningful and impactful effort to contain and degrade a determined IS insurgency.

The SDF have been loyal and capable partners, but make no mistake, without the US military presence and all the intelligence, logistics, fire support and political backing that it brings with it, the vice currently around the neck of IS in northeastern Syria would be loosened considerably, if not removed altogether.

Yet despite the vital nature of the US deployment and the relative cost-effectiveness of it (900 troops represent just 1.5% of forces across the broader Middle East), pressure for an American withdrawal is rising.

US troops patrol near an oil well in al-Qahtaniyah in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province, close to the border with Turkey, on June 14, 2023.

The decision by many regional governments to re-engage with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2023 added considerably to that pressure, but more recently, so too has regional chaos and unpredictability.

Since Hamas attacked Israel on 7 October and Israel's subsequent war on Gaza, the region has been ablaze.

More than 450 Hezbollah attacks have targeted Israel; more than 175 Iranian proxy attacks have targeted US forces in Iraq and Syria; more than 30 Houthi missile attacks have targeted commercial shipping in the Red Sea; and other long-range missile and drone attacks have targeted Israel, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan from Iran, Yemen and Iraq.

Careful consideration

Amid this regional crisis, and with Israel’s war in Gaza raging, the US government has begun to consider the seemingly inevitable: a withdrawal from Syria.

As I wrote recently in Foreign Policy, no decision has been made to withdraw, but ongoing government reviews of both Syria policy and regional military force posture have factored in the need to consider how an eventual Syria withdrawal will take place and what the US must do to create the necessary conditions to ensure a withdrawal is safe, orderly and would not leave behind a vacuum into which malign actors would step.

In the event of an eventual withdrawal, the US must create the necessary conditions to ensure it is safe and orderly and would not leave behind a vacuum into which malign actors would step.

According to multiple senior officials involved in those discussions, a determination has been made that a withdrawal is coming. However, what remains to be seen is how to get there, when, and through what manner of arrangement.

As the US prepares to begin imminent discussions with Baghdad about the future of the US military mission in Iraq – described by the government as a "transition" but by Iraq as a "withdrawal" – a path does indeed appear to be being paved that leads towards a US withdrawal from Syria, but it is by no means imminent.

The fact that a US withdrawal is now part of the internal policy discussion can lead to many lines of speculation – including that the US may seek to facilitate a deal between the SDF and al-Assad's regime to collaborate in a joint campaign against IS.

Although such an arrangement appears all but impossible, it would also create conditions that fuel IS itself. Part of the SDF may have periodic contact with al-Assad's regime, but they are far from natural allies; the regime would never allow the SDF to sustain itself, and Turkey would do everything in its power to kill what remained.

AFP — Relatives and members of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) carry the coffin of an Arab fighter in the SDF who was killed the previous week in the eastern Deir Ezzor province during his funeral.

The SDF's Kurdish constituency would feel justifiably abandoned, and the SDF's Arab components — most of whom originated in Syria's armed opposition — would find themselves in front of a virtual firing squad. For IS, therein lies the biggest opportunity.

And all of this is before acknowledging that pushing for such a deal would be tantamount to the US government offering al-Assad's regime de facto legitimacy and responsibility for a crucial issue of international security.

That would come after 12 years of horrendous war crimes and crimes against humanity, which themselves have been responsible for fuelling IS more than any other factor.

IS poised to benefit

Ultimately, IS stands poised to benefit from a US withdrawal whenever it does happen. Despite the very real success of the US-SDF partnership in the northeast, IS has managed to slowly but methodically recover elsewhere in Syria – like in the Badiya desert, where Bashar al-Assad's regime is in control, at least on paper.

IS stands poised to benefit from a US withdrawal. Despite the very real success of the US-SDF partnership in the northeast, IS has managed to slowly but methodically recover elsewhere in Syria.

There, IS has returned to rural territorial control and in large expanses of territory, it is increasingly recognised as a shadow authority. The intensity of its attacks has also led to increasing reports of desertions in regime ranks.

In 2022, in the Badiya alone, IS conducted at least 212 attacks, killing more than 500 people. In the first ten days of 2024, the group conducted 35 attacks in Syria – almost all in the Badiya – which represented more than a third of the group's activities worldwide.

While there is little the US can do to challenge IS's recovery in regime-held areas of Syria, the American presence in northeast Syria and next door in Iraq remains vital to preventing a serious IS resurgence.

With Syria's crisis entirely unresolved and Iran's regional network of terrorist proxies more confident than ever, the last thing the US should be doing right now is considering downgrading or withdrawing its forces from such sensitive and vital theatres.

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