Sudan locked in the horns of the Kremlin

Disappointment at a dictator deposed

When al-Bashir was deposed, Russia did not conceal its dissatisfaction with the April 2019 revolution and where it was heading. Moscow patiently worked to protect its influence over Sudan's security and military institutions, as Sudan's transitional government tried to move the country toward democracy.

The prospect of civilian rule collapsed in October 2021, when the regular army, then with the support of the RSF, seized power in a military coup.  By April 2023, there were fighting for control of the country and Russia was working once again to maintain its presence, this time as the civil war took hold.

Its actions then, and beforehand, show that Moscow wants its ties to Sudan to be constant throughout turbulent times. And it seems to prefer military or authoritarian rule to the prospect of civilian, democratic government.

Russian playbook

The ousting of al-Bashir was branded as a "violent and unconstitutional change of power" by Andrei Klishas, chairman of the Russian Federation Council for Constitutional Legislation.

During the 2019 revolution, Wagner assisted the al-Bashir government. Leaks from the group picked up in later reports said that Prigozhin expressed frustration with "al-Bashir's cautious stance" towards the protesters. It was attributed to the president's refusal to heed Russian advice to accept "limited but acceptable losses in lives" to control the mass protests.

Wagner prepared a document for the al-Bashir regime on how to counter the December revolution, which was also subsequently leaked. The suggestions this Russian playbook made were broad.

They included expanding legal definitions of incitement and increasing penalties for unauthorised gatherings. Wagner recommended spreading accusations of foreign collusion in the uprising and tightening control over independent media.

It also suggested using the media to promote the regime's narrative and arresting leaders the day before demonstrations, while holding rival pro-government gatherings near the protests.

None of it could save al-Bashir. But neither did it end Sudan's cooperation with Wagner.

Straight after al-Bashir was deposed – and before the start of transitional civilian rule that was supposed to lead to democracy – Russia consistently used its influence to support continued military and authoritarian rule in Sudan.

It prevented the United Nations Security Council from condemning a massacre in June 2019 in which dozens of peaceful, pro-democracy protestors were killed in front of the army's headquarters.

It later denounced external interventions in Sudan while keeping up its own support for the military there and paying lip service to the transition to civilian rule.

Sudanese gold and the Soviet flag

Throughout, Russia was diligent in maintaining its military influence in Sudan, which includes economic components.

One of the most prominent is an arrangement to support gold mines run by the RSF. It has helped build up bullion reserves in Russia's central bank, a vital source of wealth for Moscow, especially after the sanctions which followed its invasion of Ukraine.

Read more: How successive conflicts have bankrupted the 'land of gold'

In 2021 alone, around 16 Russian military flights took gold from Sudan to Russia through Latakia Airport in Syria, and then to the Chkalovsky Airbase in the Russian Federation. An old Soviet flag flies over some of the joint mines, which are heavily guarded by security forces.

Media reports suggest that two companies – Marawi Gold and Sulaj – are being used by the RSF to transfer assets as a means of avoiding sanctions targeting Wagner.

M-Invest, the investment arm of Wagner, controls Marawi Gold according to the company's registration certificate issued by the Companies Registrar in Sudan in 2017.

In the final days of his rule, al-Bashir put the government's shares in gold miners into Marawi Gold, which also got the rights to gold prospecting sites in the country.

Reassurance for Russia

After the fall of al-Bashir, the RSF leader, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, used his growing influence in the Darfur region to strengthen his economic and political alliance with the Wagner.

The Russian group was at work enhancing Moscow's influence in the Sahel, which it sought to control. Hemedti saw an opportunity.

Just days after al-Bashir's fall, the second most senior RSF figure, Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo, went to Russia with an official from the regular government, the secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense, Jamal Omar.

They met the Russian deputy defence minister, Alexander Fomin, and, in effect, offered reassurance that agreements with Russia would be honoured.

Since then, Moscow has patiently worked on its influence and military presence in Sudan.

Pre-coup social media

Before the coup that ended the transition toward civilian rule, Russia used social media to manipulate public opinion in favour of the military.

Facebook disclosed that it had taken action against two fraudulent networks of approximately 1,100 pages with more than 2.8 million followers. These pages were explicitly aimed at Sudan, with the intention of building support for the army to take power. The networks had connections with Russia — particularly its online activist arm, the Internet Research Agency.

Wagner made its own direct and substantial attempts to enhance Russia's reputation among the Sudanese people.

In mid-April 2021, it organised campaigns to provide food assistance to families on the outskirts of Khartoum. It also distributed Russian flags with slogans such as "From Russia with Love" and "A Gift from Yevgeny Prigozhin" printed on them. The campaigns received extensive promotion on various social media platforms.

Naval support

After the coup, its leader and the head of the regular army, Lieutenant General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, used Russia's Sputnik network for his initial media appearance.

During the interview, he reiterated his support for a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast, which was put on hold during the civilian administration.

Just one day before Russia invaded Ukraine, the leader of the RSF, which supported the Sudan coup, went to Moscow. Hemedti said: "The entire world must realise that Russia has the right to defend its people."

On his return from the eight-day visit, Hemedti publicly declared his support for the naval base.

It was, perhaps, a sign of the rivalry that was to come for the two coup leaders, as they jockeyed for position and the favour of Moscow.

High-level visits

Senior-level diplomatic contact continued after the coup.

In August 2023, Sudan's deputy minister of foreign affairs, Dafalla al-Haj Ali, went to Russia for the latest in a series of regular meetings between the governments during the al-Bashir regime.

A similar visit from a Sudanese delegation later that month revived the Russian-Sudanese Joint Government Committee and covered mining, oil exploration, and energy cooperation.

It was clear that Sudan was turning to Russia to make up the $4.4bn economic hole left by the removal of foreign aid after the coup. At the same time, there was a return to government of al-Bashir era diplomats and officials, especially in the foreign ministry. Often Islamists, they were also well-disposed toward Moscow.

During negotiations to renew the mandate of the UN mission to Sudan early last year, Russia and China supported the military government's position.

There has also been assistance to Sudan from Moscow over the various resolutions covering the country.

Veto power

Russia has been leading a sustained campaign at the UN Security Council to relax sanctions on Sudan.

It has sought to restrict the international response to an arms embargo and has thwarted attempts to include calls for the reinstatement of civilian government in UN resolutions.

Moscow's commitment has not wavered, even with the rising tide of violence in Darfur since the coup, revealing its determination to protect its assets and influence.

It has closed its eyes to the violence and criminality of the RSF in the region, particularly West Darfur State, which has been severe enough for the International Criminal Court to call for an inquiry.

High-profile moment

Before the outbreak of civil war, but after the military coup, the alliance between Moscow and Khartoum produced its highest-profile moment: a visit to Sudan's capital from Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

He tried to further the alliance between the regular army and the RSF, which produced the coup, but arrived when it was too late, just two months before the fighting erupted.

Civil war complicated Russia's strategic interests. In practical terms, the escalating tensions between the army and the militia could have had serious consequences for the collaboration between the RSF and Wagner.

Lavrov overtly championed Wagner's activities and its African presence, saying it had brought stability to the region in the face of what he called "terrorist threats".

The senior Kremlin figure said Wagner only deployed forces at the request of sovereign governments. He thanked Sudan for its arrangements with Russian mining companies and reaffirmed the agreement to build the naval base on the Red Sea.

Weeks later, the war was underway, showing the limits of Lavrov's diplomacy and the vulnerability of Russia's strategy of dealing with authoritarian regimes.

Further complications were revealed when Prigozhin's Wagner militia rebelled against Putin's regular army, in a development reminiscent of Sudanese politics before the mysterious death of the group's leader.

He was no stranger to fostering instability and backing military and paramilitary elements opposed to calls for a democratic civilian transition. After the Wagner rebellion, Moscow's presence in Africa remains – and it is run along the same lines.

Moving an embassy

Russia continues to influence both sides of Sudan's war. Its embassy in Khartoum may have been moved nearer to the airport – a revealing decision in turbulent times – but it is still open. And it is the only international diplomatic mission that remains there.

Whatever happens next in this bitter and devastating civil war, Moscow has open lines of communication with both sides.