Hemedti’s portrayal of Sudan’s plight relies on twisted facts

The RSF justified its political relationships with other militias because they were all committed to Sudan's Framework Agreement of December 2022. That accord was designed as the culmination of a process to end a period of military rule, established by the coup of October 2021.

That was when the army took control of the Sovereign Council that had been charged with moving the country to democracy after its previous Islamist government of Omar al-Bashir, was deposed.

Armed groups and a flawed Framework

Worries about the rise in the number of armed groups in Sudan ran throughout this political turbulence. The Framework Agreement gave the RSF unprecedented autonomy, which was backed at the time by the army command and the country's executive branch. Hemedti even concedes at one point in the speech that his acceptance of the Framework's suggestion to merge the army and the RSF was tactical.

The power he got fuelled a strong ambition for more in Hemedti, making the conflict inevitable. The Framework and the international support it received from the West, primarily the US, added to the militia leader's confidence.

As he enjoyed this influence, the Frameworks deadlines for reform were too long. It made Sudan's state apparatus into prizes to be shared among warlords. And there were more unintended consequences which led to the current catastrophic conflict in Sudan.

Not least, the Framework provided absolute immunity to the military leadership of both the regular army and the RSF for past crimes, leaving the soldiers and officers directly responsible.

It failed to see the danger of allowing the RSF to expand its financial empire, even as it prevented the army and the police from engaging in economic activities.

This oversight was significant. The RSF's control of parts of the economy in regions of the country flourished under the corruption of the al-Bashir era before the RSF dropped the Islamist leader as its ally. The Framework's failure to put a stop to it was a clear barrier to lasting national peace.

Financial firepower

The authors of the Framework underestimated the extent and reach of the economic and financial operations of the RSF, the source of the funds used to buy up the civilian administrations and groups in the run-up to the October coup in 2021.

This corruption undermined the reform measures designed to open the way to democracy, making the transition vulnerable to RSF-funded subversion control of state institutions and the media.

Hemedti often flaunts his financial power, including when he appeals to members of the regular army to join the RSF.  Should he win the war, he pledges to provide retirement benefits for any troops who defect to his side and threatens to deny any such funds to those who do not.

But the prospect of clear military resolution to the fighting continues to look remote after almost five months.

Doublespeak on defence

One of the triggers for start of the conflict on 15 April was Hemedti's siege of the Merowe air base, from 13 April, which he began in reaction to Egyptian military aircraft being stationed there, which he portrayed as a threat.

But he does not mention it was actually part of a joint defence and training agreement between the two countries. The manoeuvres were not a first, but part of regular exercises.

And neither does Hemedti brand other foreign groups as a threat, ones with which the RSF is allied. Among them are the Wagner Group has a training and supply base in Um Dafuq on the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic.

He also drew no attention to the interventions conducted by his forces in Libya. He did not mention the smuggling of gold and arms via airports in Port Sudan and Tartus. Hemedti unilaterally closed a border there early last year to protect the pro-Russian regime from a coup attempt.

Real motives

The RSF is paramilitary and mercenary group that serves the interests and ambitions of Hemedti, a its owner and leader. That is the reality he ignores.

When he talks of the RSF defending itself and Sudan, restoring democracy and condemning racism, Hemedti keeps quiet about the RSF evicting people from their homes. He does not mention the mass killings and rapes, and looting in the country under his watch.

Nor does he speak of the brutal assassination of the former governor of West Darfur, Khamees Abakar, and the subsequent widespread violence along ethnic lines that engulfed the area afterwards. The displacement of the Masalit community is also left out of his words.

Reality denied

If Hemedti believes what he is saying, he is denying reality and living within an alternative narrative of his creation. That story is imposed on people daily by RSF propagandists, who deny the truth that Sudan's people face daily.

There was one line of truth in the speech that was re-aired on a news network. It came when Hemedti addressed al-Burhan directly, saying:  "The state of '56 is over, my friend!", a reference to the country Sudan when it won its independence from Britain and Egypt.

He was right.

The state's institutions and structures have come to an end. And so should one of its products: The RSF. This militia group is one of the most dreadful creations to emerge from an independent Sudan in the al-Bashir era. Its specific purpose was systemic violence against the country's people.

Stopping war and starting a lasting peace will only happen by returning to the initial, post-Islamist principles in building a new state apparatus with political neutrality at its core.

Any agreement or arrangement to redistribute political and military power among the parties that ignited this latest fighting will be doomed to failure.

It may lead to an even more terrible war in the near future.