The costs and benefits of Saudi-Israeli normalisation
Of the three Saudi requests, elevating the US-Saudi relationship into a treaty alliance is the most serious, challenging, and controversial.
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US Secretary of State Antony Blinken walks during a joint press conference with the Saudi foreign minister (not pictured) after a ministerial meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State in Riyadh in June 2023.
The costs and benefits of Saudi-Israeli normalisation
For all the hype about the potential normalisation of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, it remains vastly unclear whether the United States — the indispensable enabler and guarantor of such a deal — is willing or able to accept the kingdom’s conditions to reach an agreement.
In return for its cooperation, Saudi Arabia wants from Washington a formal defence pact, assistance in building a civilian nuclear programme, and expedited access to high-end US weapons, including F-35 fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
That is a steep price, which President Joe Biden is unsure about meeting. In a 9 July interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, he said the conversation was premature.
In another interview with Thomas Friedman in the New York Times shortly after, he expressed hesitance. But the fact that he dispatched Antony Blinken, his chief diplomat, and Jake Sullivan, his national security advisor, to the kingdom in recent months (Sullivan again, more recently) to explore the possibility of a deal shows that he is seriously weighing his options.
Of the three Saudi requests, elevating the US-Saudi relationship into a treaty alliance — automatically including official US security guarantees to the kingdom — is the most serious, challenging, and controversial.
Of the three Saudi requests, elevating the US-Saudi relationship into a treaty alliance — automatically including official US security guarantees to the kingdom — is the most serious, challenging, and controversial.
This is not to say that helping the Saudis build a civilian nuclear programme or providing them with the US Air Force's crown jewel and the world's most potent military plane will be easy. But on those two deliverables, there is more room for negotiation and compromise, whereas, on the issue of a formal defence pact, there is virtually none because it is binary. Saudi Arabia is either a treaty ally of the United States or isn't.
Little wiggle room
Before addressing the complicated US position on this quid pro quo, it is important to briefly explain why Saudi Arabia, in my view, is so eager to obtain a formal US extended deterrent. This is key to understanding why Saudi officials have little wiggle room and will likely not compromise on this issue.
Over the past few years, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman has unveiled bold ideas and ambitious plans, many of which have already been executed or are in the works. Therefore, there is a temptation to view his security request from Washington as a negotiating tactic to secure strategic benefits for his country.
However, this request is much more than simple political leveraging. There is careful thinking and logic in his request.
The Crown Prince recognises that if Saudi Arabia normalises its relations with Israel, its recent diplomatic accord with Iran, which has kept the calm between the two arch-rivals, could be in jeopardy. Indeed, the moment the Saudi leadership officially embraces Israel, Iran will almost certainly create problems for Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, when Saudi officials insist that normalisation with Israel will not happen unless there is a Palestinian state or at least an effective process to create one, they are not being insincere or paying lip service to the issue.
"True normalisation and true stability will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity," said Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Bin Farhan in January 2023.
Saudi Arabia cannot afford a normalisation deal with Israel à la the UAE and Bahrain that merely suspends or freezes Israeli annexation of Jewish settlements and the Jordan Valley in the West Bank. It requires something more meaningful.
Palestinian protesters take cover from Israeli soldiers during a demonstration against Israeli settlements near the West Bank city of Nablus in August 2023.
If being friends with Washington is bad from Iran's perspective, accepting Israel is a whole lot worse. Not only does Iran not recognise Israel and oftentimes expresses its desire to wipe the Jewish state off the map, but the two nations have been in a shadow war against each other over the past seven years.
Last year, it was reported that the Israeli military had carried out more than 400 air strikes in Syria and other parts of the Middle East against targets belonging to Iran and its allies. That number has most likely increased since.
Seeking US protection against Iranian aggression is paramount for the Saudis, but is Washington ready to accept Riyadh's chief demand? Politically, Biden has a good bit of wiggle room given that even his Republican opponents are willing to work with him on Saudi-Israeli normalisation.
However, it remains unclear whether this support will be sufficient enough to secure a two-thirds majority in the US Senate, which is required to ratify any defence treaty with a foreign nation.
Seeking US protection against Iranian aggression is paramount for the Saudis, but is Washington ready to accept Riyadh's chief demand? Politically, Biden has a good bit of wiggle room given that even his Republican opponents are willing to work with him on Saudi-Israeli normalisation.
Challenges and implications
Putting aside US domestic politics, it's important to address the profound strategic challenges of a US treaty alliance with Saudi Arabia. These challenges are definitely on the minds of the Pentagon and the broader US national security community.
The Biden administration has either thought about all the implications of a defence pact with Saudi Arabia and decided to accept and manage the risks and costs, or it is apprehensive about those risks and costs and leaning more towards saying no to Riyadh. Regardless, it is good to know what Washington is wrestling with, or what it might have to deal with.
US President Joe Biden delivers a speech after the end of the NATO Summit in July 2023.
Risks and concerns
A US mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia — similar to that which the United States enjoys with Nato members, South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and a host of other allies — would, depending on its terms, constitute a very important commitment on the part of the United States and should not be undertaken lightly.
Some specific risks and concerns would be attendant to a US-Saudi defence pact, which should be seriously considered and addressed:
First: America's top two geopolitical priorities are addressing the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific and countering Russia in Ukraine. A defence pact with Saudi Arabia, no matter how limited, will take away precious military and diplomatic assets from those priority theatres and deploy them to the Middle East.
This would be inconsistent with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. Working with the US interagency and especially the Pentagon's labyrinthine bureaucracy to make that dramatic resource adjustment will be an incredibly difficult and lengthy process.
America's top two geopolitical priorities are addressing the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific and countering Russia in Ukraine. A defence pact with Saudi Arabia will take away precious military and diplomatic assets from those priority theatres and deploy them to the Middle East.
Second: If Iran avoids direct military action against Saudi Arabia (thanks to a US-Saudi defence pact), but continues to operate in the grey zone and steps up its destabilising activities against the kingdom through its regional proxies, how would Washington respond?
More specifically, if the truce between Saudi Arabia and the pro-Iran Houthis breaks (and it's possible it will as a result of Iran's objection to Saudi-Israel normalisation), and Saudi civilian targets are attacked again by the Houthis with Iranian weapons, would that trigger a US military response against Iran, or against the Houthis?
And more broadly, is the United States willing to go to war against Iran for Saudi Arabia? Washington will have no easy answers to these questions, but Riyadh will expect answers.
Third: A defence pact could deepen Saudi Arabia's security dependency on Washington and impede necessary defence reforms. One of Washington's wishes in relation to its Arab regional partners is for them to build their own military capabilities so they can better protect themselves and share the burden of regional security.
Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II and Super Hornet
If Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen is any indication, its war-fighting capabilities need massive upgrades. It is likely, though not inevitable, that a defence pact with Washington could delay, and even interrupt, those important reforms.
Fourth: A defence pact with Saudi Arabia could complicate US relations with Israel, Egypt, and the UAE. Washington would have to explain to these traditional regional partners, and Taiwan and Ukraine as well, why Saudi Arabia is getting special treatment. Washington could extend similar security commitments to them, but all at the risk of US military overstretch in the region and across the globe.
Furthermore, more mutual defence pacts mean more security risks for the United States. Logically speaking, the greater the number of parties to a defence treaty, the greater the likelihood of militarised bilateral disputes with Iran and possibly other adversaries.
In other words, the United States would have to contend not just with tensions and possible conflagrations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also between the latter and Egypt, Israel, and the UAE. In short, Washington's security responsibilities and challenges would grow significantly.
Fifth: A defence pact could backfire and lead Tehran to race to a nuclear bomb. Iran might find that the only and most effective way for it to ensure the survival of its regime and defend itself against all perceived external threats is to pursue a military nuclear option. This would significantly harm regional security and global strategic stability and undermine all efforts by the United States to prevent a regional nuclear arms race.
Better ways to upgrade security ties
None of these challenges are insurmountable. However, a US-Saudi defence pact is unnecessary because there are better ways (which I carefully investigated) to upgrade the US-Saudi security relationship.
What's needed is not a formal treaty alliance but a full-fledged US involvement in the kingdom's defence reform effort to attain a more coordinated approach to security that includes joint US-Saudi contingency planning and investments in institutional capacity building.
However, the Biden administration might have different ideas.
Before extending a formal deal to Saudi Arabia, it should seriously weigh all the costs and benefits and, more importantly, have a contingency plan in place for a worst-case scenario, which could very likely arise.
