On the normalisation question

The question of normalisation with Israel

During a period when the world was consumed by the vast destruction wrought by the Second World War, and while global empathy was directed towards the Jews due to the Holocaust, little attention was given in the West to the tragic plight of 750,000 Palestinians who were forcibly displaced from their land and transformed into refugees.

This occurred in 1948 when the United Nations sanctioned the establishment of the State of Israel on the land that had until then belonged to the Palestinian people.

For the Palestinians and Arabs, the events of 1948 have come to be known since then as the Nakba (the catastrophe).

The massacres of Palestinians in villages such as Deir Yassin, Al-Tantura, Al-Salha, Al-Dawayima, and numerous others, alongside Israel's destruction of over 400 Palestinian villages, the existence of 58 Palestinian refugee camps across Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, their initial asylum in Gulf Arab states, and the world's failure to ensure their protection or repatriation, have collectively shaped the consciousness and sentiments of Arab people, including Saudis, towards Israel.

Certainly, Palestinian leaders have made numerous mistakes, some of which persist to the present day, such as their ongoing political divisions. However, these shortcomings do not alter the fundamental truth that the Palestinian cause is just.

Similar to all people around the world, Palestinians possess the right to self-determination. Moreover, an international consensus supports the establishment of a Palestinian state on the territory occupied by Israel in 1967, which includes East Jerusalem.

Saudi Arabia's sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause are derived not solely from the shared Arab and Islamic identities between the two peoples, but also from the unique position of Palestinians as the sole population still enduring occupation. This stance is accentuated by the international community's application of double standards.

That being said, let us address several critical aspects surrounding the normalisation question involving Saudi Arabia and Israel.

To begin, it's imperative to clarify that Saudi Arabia has never advocated for the destruction of Israel or rejected in principle to normalise relations with it. Notably, the Kingdom led Arab countries in proposing the Arab Peace Initiative (API) during the 2002 Beirut Arab Summit. Regrettably, Israel has yet to accept this initiative.

Saudi Arabia has also actively supported Palestinian approaches to peace. For instance, the Kingdom supported Palestinians when they opted to engage in the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 and when they secretly negotiated the Oslo Agreement in 1994. Historically, Saudi Arabia has refrained from negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians and remains committed to this stance.

Furthermore, while Israel is technologically and militarily well-developed, establishing relations with Israel before it agrees to make substantial concessions to the Palestinians is not an added value to Saudi security and national interests.

Instead, it becomes a burden, entailing a host of issues that the Kingdom will have to grapple with, ranging from the rejection of public opinion across Arab countries to security concerns arising from Israel's hostile relations with multiple actors in the region.

It's also crucial to acknowledge that Saudi Arabia, dissimilar from countries like the UAE or Bahrain, holds a distinct regional power status. The Kingdom's significance stems from its role as the guardian of two holy Muslim mosques, its G20 membership, its magnitude of influences on the global economy, and its function as a gate for Israel to normalise its relations with numerous Arab and Muslim countries.

Any potential peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel must acknowledge and bolster these significant attributes, enhancing, therefore, its regional power rather than diminishing it. To put it simply, Saudi Arabia has no inclination to bolster other regional powers at the expense of its position in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Finally, the assertion propagated by certain Western analysts and politicians that Saudi leaders can disregard their own people's public opinion and sentiment is baseless. The Crown Prince successfully dismantled the religious police, promoted women's empowerment, fostered the entertainment industry, and took bold anti-corruption measures because a majority of Saudis supported these actions.

 At present, the vision of Saudi Arabia fully normalising its relations with Israel without a reasonable just agreement with the Palestinians is difficult to achieve, which is unsurprising given Israel's actions against Palestinians since 1948 and the intensification of violence between Israel and the Palestinians in recent years.

According to reports from the UN, European sources, and Israeli publications, since the breakdown of the Oslo Accords in 2000, Israel has been implicated in the deaths of thousands of Palestinians.

Moreover, the number of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has risen significantly. For instance, in 2022 alone, Israel constructed 23,861 housing units in East Jerusalem and 4,427 units in the West Bank. In addition, tens of thousands of homes have been demolished, as indicated by records from 2020 which cite 2,586 demolitions across the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.

Israel's successive governments have pursued policies that involve annexing the West Bank gradually, denying Palestinians the right to self-determination. Consequently, vocal objections to the occupation are emerging from within the United States, including prominent members of Congress.

Even within Israel itself, hundreds of academics and public figures, including prominent Israeli scholars Ilan Pappe, Benny Morris, and former Knesset speaker Avrum Burg, have signed an open letter that labels Israel as an "apartheid state."

This letter asserts that the ultimate objective behind the judicial overhaul in Israel is to strip Palestinians of their rights, seize more land, and engage in "ethnic cleansing" of territories under Israeli jurisdiction with Palestinian populations. The letter further calls on American leaders to take action and "end Israeli impunity in the UN and other international organisations."

President Biden himself has, up to this point, declined to meet with Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu. In an interview with CNN, he even characterised the current cabinet in Israel as "one of the most extreme cabinets he had ever seen."

In fact, there exists a consensus among major Israeli political parties, both secular and religious, to exclude East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, the settlements in the West Bank, and the Palestinian refugees in any potential deal with the Palestinians. Notably, none of these parties openly embraces the idea of a two-state solution as the definitive resolution to the ongoing conflict.

Saudi Arabia is aware that Israel is not yet ready to take genuine steps toward peace with the Palestinians, therefore, it is not in a rush to normalise its relations with Israel, if this does not change. Accordingly, there are more open questions than answers regarding how Saudi Arabia can accommodate the American request to normalise relations with Israel without undermining its own interests.

Thomas Friedman, for example, who, at the very least, erroneously asserted that the "Saudi leadership is not interested in the Palestinians or knowledgeable about the intricacies of the peace process" put forth a proposal that according to him "at a minimum, the Saudis and Americans (should) demand four things from Netanyahu for such a huge prize as normalisation and trade with the most important Arab Muslim state".

• An official commitment to never annex the West Bank.

• No establishment of new West Bank settlements or expansion of existing ones.

• Prohibition of the legalisation of unauthorised Jewish settlement outposts.

• Transferring certain Palestinian-populated territories from Area C in the West Bank to Areas A and B, as delineated in the Oslo Accords.

In exchange for these conditions, he suggested that the Palestinians should endorse the proposed Saudi Arabia peace agreement with Israel.

Friedman's suggestions seemingly aim to undermine the current Israeli government in order to establish a new one that excludes religious Israeli parties, thereby halting or slowing down the ongoing deterioration of Israel's image and support in the United States.

Importantly, these ideas do not serve to bolster Saudi Arabia's influence in the region; instead, they appear to detract from it and elevate the power of its regional competitors at its expense.

If a peace treaty with Saudi Arabia is indeed deemed a "huge prize" for Israel, in line with Friedman's accurate assessment, then the reciprocation for Saudi Arabia should be commensurate with this significant reward.

Friedman himself acknowledges the presence of a robust core within the Democratic Party that would resist any agreement that fails to align with "President Biden's own demand that Palestinians and Israelis experience equal measures of freedom and dignity."

In light of this, one might question why Saudi Arabia should entertain the notion of accepting a peace treaty with Israel that falls short of the global consensus for establishing a Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.

While nobody can speak on behalf of the Saudi government except its officials, the indications emanating from Israel regarding a potential deal with Saudi Arabia are far from encouraging.

Israeli discussions revolve around the concept of economic peace, evading the fundamental issues underlying the Palestinian conflict. They are not willing to commit themselves to the principle of a two-state solution, to cease the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and to establish a definitive timeframe for resolving the various aspects of the conflict, as outlined by UN Security Council Resolutions and the international law.

In fact, a statement from an Israeli official explicitly expressed the sentiment that "we have nothing to give the Palestinians… we will not freeze the settlements even for one second... and at the end, the Saudis (not the Israelis) will have to give (the Palestinians) something" in order for them to endorse the proposed peace treaty between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

In short, the actions and statements of the Israeli government do not demonstrate a willingness to move toward peace with the Palestinians in exchange for establishing normal relations with Saudi Arabia. The extent to which the United States can pressure them to do so remains to be seen.

China and Russia

Saudi Arabia has fostered robust connections with both China and, to a lesser extent, Russia over the years. The significance of China for Saudi Arabia can be attributed to various factors, including trade, scientific and military technology transfer, as well as political orientations.

In terms of trade, China stands as Saudi Arabia's foremost trading partner. In 2021, the bilateral trade volume amounted to $87.3bn. Specifically, Chinese exports to Saudi Arabia totalled $30.3bn, while imports from the kingdom reached $57bn. In comparison, Saudi Arabia's trade with the United States during the same year was valued at $24.5bn, encompassing US exports to Saudi Arabia at $11.6bn and imports from the Kingdom at $12.9bn.

Notably, there exists a considerable trade imbalance with China favouring Saudi Arabia by $26.7 bn, whereas this discrepancy with the US is only $1.3 bn. This positioning underscores China's significance as one of the principal sources of hard currency inflow for Saudi Arabia, playing a pivotal role in the country's economic well-being, including the materialisation of Vision 2030.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia holds the distinction of being China's primary crude oil supplier, constituting 18% of Beijing's total crude oil acquisitions. This interdependency renders China highly reliant on Saudi Arabia to fuel its extensive economy.

With considerations such as the prevailing sanctions on Iran and its underdeveloped oil infrastructure, Saudi Arabia emerges as the foremost contender in China's oil market, with Russia serving as a secondary player (contributing 17.8% of China's oil requirements). It is worth noting that China serves as a vital economic lifeline for Iran.

Given Saudi Arabia's significant oil trade influence over China, the latter may be inclined to exert its sway over Iran as circumstances necessitate.

In contrast to the United States, China displays a higher degree of receptiveness towards transferring scientific technology and facilitating the localisation of the military industry within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

As reported by CNN, Saudi Arabia has been actively engaged in the independent production of its ballistic missiles since 2021, with China playing a significant role in this endeavour. The report sheds light on the occurrence of "numerous large-scale transfers of sensitive ballistic missile technology between the two nations."

In 2022, the Saudi Advanced Communications and Electronics Systems Co. signed an agreement with China Electronics Technology Group Corp. to build drones. Named Aerial Solutions, the Chinese company, as per the agreement, is committed to "establish a research and development centre and create a team (in the Kingdom) that would manufacture different types of UAV systems" with complete "communications system, flight-control, camera, radar and wireless-detection systems."

Owing to commitments aimed at maintaining Israel as the dominant power in the Middle East, allegations of human rights violations, and fears of armed race in the region, the United States and other Western countries have recurrently obstructed the export of precise ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. These countries have also refrained from endorsing the localisation of this industry within the Kingdom.

Of utmost significance, China's enduring foreign policy principles align seamlessly with those of Saudi Arabia, founded upon principles such as "respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."

In stark contrast, certain facets of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy diverge from those of the United States. This distinction is especially evident in the case of principles such as the "liberal rules-based international order", "democracy", and "human rights", which have been employed in the past to legitimise interventions in sovereign states.

Unlike China, Russia's importance to the Kingdom revolves around two key areas. Primarily, Russia as a member of OPEC+ aids Saudi Arabia in maintaining a favourable oil price, as observed recently, and it serves as a potential source for advanced weaponry over the long term. While Russia's endeavours to promote a multilateral global order are incongruent with Saudi Arabia's interests, this transformation is a protracted process.

Given this context, can Saudi Arabia feasibly accommodate the American requests to restrict its relations with China and Russia?

Thus far, leaked reports from the discussions between Washington and Riyadh have indicated relatively moderate demands. Specifically, these demands encompass refraining from engaging Chinese giant Huawei in Saudi projects, abstaining from granting China access to military bases in the Kingdom, and refraining from using the Chinese currency in trade. Pertaining to Russia, the US request centres on discontinuing coordination with Russia on oil prices, citing the pretext of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

It seems plausible that Saudi Arabia could accede to all US stipulations regarding China and Russia. After all, it aligns with Saudi interests to continue trading with China in US dollars, thereby bolstering the acquisition of hard currency reserves.

Furthermore, China has not exhibited intentions, at least presently, to establish military bases within the region. And in the event of viable alternatives from American firms, Huawei can be substituted should they match China's technological prowess and cost-effectiveness. As for Russia, Saudi Arabia can perceive it as a market competitor and endeavour to undermine its influence.

However, acquiescing to US demands presents three significant challenges for the Kingdom that pose intricate dilemmas:

Firstly, compliance could erroneously convey to China that Saudi Arabia is aligning against it alongside the US. While immediate countermeasures may not be swiftly undertaken by China, over time it may bolster its ties with other countries such as Iran to the detriment of Saudi Arabia.

Secondly, although the US does not presently request Saudi Arabia to curtail its oil supply to China, such a demand could arise during confrontations, such as if China moves to annex Taiwan.

This would be particularly pertinent if a NATO-like alliance with the Kingdom was established, as witnessed when Europe ceased oil purchases from Russia at the United States' behest. Saudi Arabia cannot afford to take such measures.

Thirdly, treating Russia as an oil market competitor could inadvertently drive down oil prices, thereby diminishing the Kingdom's financial revenue that it needs for the realisation of its Vision 2030 goals.

Conclusions

The ongoing competition among global powers, primarily the US and China, and to a lesser extent Russia, presents a spectrum of challenges and opportunities. Saudi Arabia, thus far, has adeptly capitalised on this scenario, maintaining favourable relations with key global players while concurrently leveraging existing opportunities. The Kingdom has skillfully navigated the West-Russia rift to secure favourable oil prices, elevated its economic and technological bonds with China, and initiated the localisation of its advanced defence industry.

The American-proposed "grand bargain" primarily seeks to curtail China's and, to a lesser extent, Russia's expanding influence within the Gulf region.

The major advantage for the Kingdom resides in the potential NATO-like defence agreement with the US. However, this gain might come at the expense of straining its economic relations with other major powers, potentially compromising its long-term security.

Saudi Arabia might lose, for example, its economic clout with China for Iran, and the two countries might bolster their military connections in the event of a Sino-US rivalry concerning Taiwan, paralleling the ongoing Western-Russia contest surrounding Ukraine.

Furthermore, entering into a defence agreement with the US would entail limitations. Saudi Arabia would never receive advanced weaponry comparable to those granted to Israel.

Finally, the path to normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel is riddled with complexities. Saudi Arabia will meticulously weigh the potential gains against its own interests while entertaining how to accommodate the American request for normalising relations with Israel. With regional dynamics and international principles at play, it will follow a nuanced and cautious approach to this issue.