What does "victory" look like in Sudan's ongoing conflict?

Previous wars

Sudanese likely still recall the complexities of the country's southern conflict, where the army confronted a popular movement led by John Garang.

After two brutal decades of fighting, the war culminated in negotiations that saw Sudan suffer significant losses and the secession of southern Sudan.

When the army and the RSF banded together to fight armed movements in Darfur, they failed to achieve the total elimination (or forced surrender) of the armed movement.

A method that was once (somewhat) successful was negotiation.

The Sudan Liberation Army movement, led by Minni Arko Minnawi – the current governor of Darfur – was persuaded to sign a peace agreement with the government of the defunct regime, known as the "Abuja Agreement" or "Darfur Peace Agreement".

However, this was not a negotiation between defeated and victorious parties. In fact, at the time, negotiations granted Minnawi a position as assistant to former President Omar al-Bashir. But once the agreement expired, he took up arms against the government again, with more severity this time.

The JEM saga

The Islamist regime once aimed to eradicate the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) through violent confrontations, as well.

The military engaged in an intense battle against JEM, driven in large part by the fact that its founder, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, was an Islamist figure who opposed the regime.

Due to Ibrahim's notable political acumen, the regime plotted meticulously to assassinate him in 2011.

Earlier, in 2008, the JEM had executed Operation Long Arm, during which they boldly entered the capital, Khartoum, in broad daylight. In an unprecedented move in the country's history, the army fought JEM on the streets of Omdurman. It was the first time that the war in Darfur had reached the country's capital.

Despite the army's eventual victory, the operation highlighted the JEM's resilience and potency. The latter garnered support from numerous Darfuri fighters and political figures, even as the Islamist regime accused it of being linked to the Popular Congress Party, headed by Hassan al-Turabi.

In 2017, the regime executed an elaborate ambush of the JEM carried out by the RSF, known as the Battle of Wadi Hor. The government announced that it had completely eradicated JEM during the battle. In fact, the movement lost nearly 70 per cent of its forces and land.

However, the JEM did not surrender. It refuses to give up arms or engage in the narrative of defeat. It has been working to overcome the effects of that battle and reorganise its ranks. Additionally, it has not signed a peace agreement or forfeited, even after the fall of the Islamist regime.

Enduring threats

Enduring threats of internal urban conflicts to the country's stability and security continue to be seen.

Some examples are the Sudan Liberation Army Movement, led by Abdul Wahid Muhammad Nur, and the People's Movement-North, led by Abdul Aziz Adam Al-Hilu.

Compared to the JEM, Abdul Wahid's movement is less equipped for battle and has a smaller military. But it exercises significant control over key territories and passageways in the Jebel Marra region. For more than two decades, it has maintained this authority thanks to its robust backing in those areas.

Abdul Wahid's Sudan Liberation Army Movement has been engaged in combat with the army for over 30 years. This goes back to its origins as a faction within the People's Movement, prior to the secession of South Sudan.

After the most recent outbreak of war on 15 April, it engaged in several confrontations with the army across areas in the Blue Nile state and South Kordofan.

RSF like no previous adversary

Based on historical evidence, then, it appears that the Sudanese army's ability to obliterate its enemy – or coerce surrender from rebellious forces – during urban warfare is a challenging proposition at best.

This is especially true when discussing the RSF, a formidable and well-equipped militia that has faced allegations of human rights violations.

Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta, an integral member of the Sovereignty Council and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army, said that the "rebel forces must vacate Khartoum before negotiations can commence."

However, this assertion does not consider the widening scope of the conflict across Kordofan and Darfur states, where the RSF has seized numerous territories.

Notably, Darfur wields tribal spheres of influence that extend beyond its borders into Chad and Niger. This intricate and wide-reaching web only makes the task of completely subduing the RSF more difficult, if not virtually impossible.

Armed with advanced training from the Sudanese army, the RSF boasts weaponry and combat capabilities that surpass those of previous armed factions that have gone against the army.

The RSF also enjoys a substantial numerical advantage and considerable economic resources accumulated since its inception during the era of ousted President Omar al-Bashir.

Sudan's path forward

The most enigmatic, unclear, and complex version of Sudan's future revolves around the narrative put forth by the RSF.

It contends that its victory lies in eradicating the remnants of the Islamist regime within the military and dismantling the militias associated with the ousted president's party—the National Congress.

It's undeniable that fighters with Islamist leanings persist within the army. But the RSF engaging in a destructive campaign to eradicate them carries severe repercussions, the consequences of which are overwhelming.

The other part of the RSF's specified mission involves transferring authority to civilian hands.

However, historical evidence casts doubt on the extent to which such a transition can be trusted.

The notion that a combative force engaged in war, depleting vast human and military resources, could seamlessly transform into a benevolent political actor that willingly relinquishes power without any strings attached is hard to accept.

Lebanon's example

During the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, often referred to as the July 2006 war, Hezbollah, led by Hasan Nasrallah, achieved military successes against Israel independently from the official Lebanese army.

Reflecting on this, Walid Jumblatt, a prominent and outspoken Lebanese politician and leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, famously remarked, "Nasrallah and Hezbollah emerged victorious, while Lebanon suffered defeat."

Lebanon has grappled with the aftermath ever since, and the concealed influence of Hezbollah and its leader persists.

If the vague propositions presented by the RSF materialise, Sudan might find itself in a comparable scenario, if not one mirroring precisely what transpired in Lebanon.

This matches the RSF narrative that paints it as a noble political actor, which has thus far refrained from disclosing its actual intentions. But, at the end of the day, a narrative is just that – a narrative. The one who wields the pen will not write into existence their own defeat.

In this situation, the RSF wields both the pen and the weapon, crafting a favourable position for itself. Therefore, it becomes the victor, while Sudan, its revolution, and its cultural heritage suffer continued losses.

Meanwhile, the absence of a clear substantiation of what a "victory" amounts to within this conflict continues to raise questions.

With each faction contending that it was thrust upon them, the importance of ending this conflict promptly remains imperative for the survival of Sudan itself.