Discrediting a dangerous and flawed proposition to protect peace in Sudan

Various armed struggle movements engaged in fierce confrontations with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the South and the East, as well as in Darfur, Kordofan and the Blue Nile.

SAF has committed the same violations that it's been committing since 15 April, such as indiscriminate shelling and the arrest and detention of civilians. Yet we did not witness the aforementioned armed struggle movements taking shelter in hospitals, looting citizens' homes, stealing their property, kidnapping and raping women, or mass killing based on identity.

Khalil Ibrahim's movement stormed Omdurman, and we did not hear of its soldiers committing a single case of sexual assault or looting of any personal property.

The war crimes committed by the militia are crimes that reflect their fascist nature – they are not just side effects of war. Transitional justice is not an empty term. Rather, it involves recognition of crimes, determining who is responsible for them, bringing about accountability and moving toward reconciliation.

However, letting criminals off the hook and rewarding their crimes cannot be allowed, as it would only open the door for the same crimes to recur.

War over spoils

Furthermore, this war that is taking place in Sudan today lacks any historical or political foundations related to the structure of the Sudanese state, as the militia and its allies claim.

This is an evil war over the spoils of a military coup. It broke out between two partners in crime who disagreed about how to divide their gains.

Read more: The war in Sudan is really a battle over spoils

At the time, one side — the RSF — showed its true colours as a fascist organisation that will stop at nothing to satisfy the aspirations of its leader.

Putting aside the militia's crimes of murder, rape, looting, and mass killing, there is also plenty of hate speech, discrimination, and racism that their media mouthpieces spew in their mobilisation videos.

Suggesting that there's a social and political foundation for this war is dangerous on several levels.

First, it deepens the roots of the war and adds more fuel to the fire. It gives the militia justifications for mobilising on an ethnic and regional basis, which further destroys the social fabric in Sudan and complicates the already delicate issues of coexistence in the country.

Secondly, it's simply not true. The militia was not founded because of grievances suffered by the Sudanese people.

Rather, the RSF is a tool of violence and repression created by an ousted regime, with no theoretical or political basis. Its only mandate is to achieve its goals.

This includes protecting the regime – as seen during the massacres of September 2013 in Khartoum, and in Darfur, North Kordofan, and other areas until the fall of al-Bashir's regime – and serving the aspirations of its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), as has been the case since the overthrowing of the regime in April 2019.

And thirdly, it deprives citizens and social communities of genuine representation (in favour of a private-sector militia that works solely for its own benefit) while dragging them into wars and conflicts that do not concern them or serve their collective interests.

Purging political cadres

Another reason that this campaign is flawed: SAF cannot be reformed by incorporating organisations with political orientations and aspirations into their leadership. That's what's on the table, after all: the incorporation of the RSF into the Armed Forces Command.

Instead, the purpose of this reform should be to purge the armed forces and its leadership of all politicised cadres. The new and unified SAF should be a national body independent of any political influence on its decision-making by the entities to which its commanding officers belong.

Prerequisites for becoming a member of the Armed Forces – and attaining a position of leadership – should be based on professional qualifications, performance, and dedication.

The process should not be controlled by political empowerment practised by Islamists and the National Congress Party, nor as a reward for the civil war, as proponents of the RSF desire.

This unacceptable political appeasement – and intimidation of the country's future – is blackmail.

Additionally, due to a lack of proper training and criteria, the leaders and members of this militia don't have the necessary skills or ethics when it comes to adopting acceptable military practices, understanding laws of war, and treating citizens fairly – as we've seen in this war.

In our persistent calls for reforming the armed forces and the security sector in Sudan, our priority has been to elevate these ethical and professional obligations that govern the militia's practices.

Repeating cycle

In the modern history of Sudan, we have seen at least three cycles involving rocky transitions, flawed democracies, military coups, and eventual totalitarian dictatorships. This war and what it has encompassed should bring this vicious cycle to an end and pave the way for peace, stability, and good governance in Sudan.

To reform the military and security establishment, we need to depoliticise their institutions, not increase their politicisation while trying to benefit from parts of it.

To rebuild Sudan, we must address the roots of the war, rather than try to adapt or exploit or serve personal and political aspirations, while labelling this as a simple "reality" of politics.

The reality is that the existence of the militia as an institution is one of the reasons – if not the main catalyst – for this war.

Any solution that does not begin with ending the institutional existence of the RSF militia and then dealing individually with its soldiers as armed citizens, whether through military rehabilitation and integration into formal institutions, or civilian rehabilitation and demobilisation, is nothing but a mere postponement of the outbreak of another armed conflict in Sudan.

Reforming the armed forces and the security and military sector in Sudan is a cornerstone of stopping this war and preventing future ones.

It was one of the demands of the December Revolution that was stained with the blood of martyrs. And it is a national task, just like reforming the economic and health system in the country; it must be done via a proper, scientific approach far from political influence and away from regional and ethnic biases.

This should start with identifying – and dismissing – the Islamists who are in decision-making centres within the army, rather than simply re-contextualising Islamists' control.

National political forces must "do their homework" instead of taking the easy way out by regurgitating the mobilisation slogans that the militia uses to cloud public opinion.

Whatever steps are taken in the pursuit of ending the war in Sudan, they should explicitly exclude rewarding those who caused it or participated in its making. The commanders of the army and the RSF are equally accountable, each according to their own actions.

Flirting with the mere possibility of these groups continuing their political lives normally – and without consequence – after the end of the war is not only undeserved but can lead to even further catastrophic outcomes.