What is behind Washington's stepped-up Gulf presence?

Saudi Arabia: Seeking partnerships beyond blocs

In light of the new international landscape, nations in the region have found it necessary to establish partnerships with influential countries to compensate for the diminishing American presence and to strengthen their positions in international and regional groupings — all while avoiding entanglement in bloc-oriented politics. 

An example of this strategy in practice was the signing of the cooperation charter and the culmination of several agreements during the Saudi-Russian summit held in Riyadh in October 2019.

This summit followed the visit of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz to Russia in 2017, which was preceded by establishing the "OPEC+" agreement involving both OPEC member and non-member countries. This agreement laid the groundwork and the framework for formal cooperation, the exchange of perspectives, and the advancement of stability within the petroleum market.

Its goal was also to enhance the market's capacity to manage fluctuations. Furthermore, in December 2022, the Saudi-Chinese summit formalised a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the two nations.

Read more: China-Arab Summit signals potential of new era

The common factor in both summits is that they involve allies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and adversaries of the United States. This underlines their inclusion through Saudi Arabia's gate as partners in several significant domains once exclusive to Washington.

Beyond the Russian partnership's contribution to stabilising energy markets through the "OPEC+" framework, China, as the world's foremost energy importer, has also entered the equation.

This is driven to ensure a steady resource supply, leveraging the Kingdom's substantial oil reserves and China's expansive market. More specifically, Saudi Arabia has established a link between the stability of the Chinese economy and the security of vital maritime routes, notably the Strait of Hormuz.

Another notable diplomatic outcome of the Saudi-Chinese summit is President Xi Jinping's unequivocal stance against any actions that might interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This includes resolutely rejecting assaults targeting Saudi civilian populations, civilian infrastructure, territories, and vested interests.

This highlights the obligations of a major nation aligned with Iran toward ensuring the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.

In addition to energy considerations, the alignment of positions on a range of matters, including the Yemeni crisis, Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, the Palestinian issue, the Syrian conflict, and the ongoing situation in Ukraine.

China's role as a sponsor of the Saudi-Iranian agreement signed on 10 March 2023, particularly grabbed Washington's attention. It came during a period of turbulence in relations between Washington and the three involved parties: China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

This development positions Beijing as a contributor to regional settlements between these major powers, extending its influence within the Gulf region and on a broader global Islamic scale.

Washington's return to the region via the Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz holds significant economic and political importance due to its strategic location within the world's largest oil-producing region. It is a critical passage for global oil trade, connecting the Arabian Gulf to the broader world. It controls the movement of commodities to and from the Indian Ocean, Western Asia, and the ancient Near East.

Approximately one-fifth of global oil production (equivalent to 21 million barrels daily) and a quarter of the world's liquefied natural gas traverse this route. Moreover, it facilitates about 10% of the monthly crude oil imports of the United States, as stated by the US Energy Information Administration.

In 2018, 76% of the crude oil and condensates transported through the strait were destined for Asian markets — particularly China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. These countries collectively accounted for 65% of the total oil volumes transported through the strait during that year.

In the same period, the United States imported approximately 1.4 million barrels of oil daily through the Strait of Hormuz, constituting around 18% of its total crude oil imports, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

Within this context, the scope of the Iranian-Chinese cooperation agreement, formalised in March 2021, becomes apparent. This agreement is a 25-year trade and strategic collaboration agreement between the two countries.

The information available on this agreement is limited and is based on reports published by The New York Times during that period. As per these reports, China is poised to allocate a substantial investment of $400bn into the Iranian economy throughout the agreement's span. In return, Iran will ensure a consistent oil supply to China, with the prices significantly lowered compared to prevailing rates.

The United States returns to the region by addressing maritime tensions, particularly regarding protecting global navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has consistently employed this vital water passage to influence Western nations to ease sanctions.

Against this backdrop, more than 3,000 American sailors have been deployed to the Gulf region via the Red Sea. This deployment is part of a US strategy to deter potential Iranian threats directed at commercial vessels navigating the Strait of Hormuz. 

Tim Hawkins, the spokesperson for the US Fifth Fleet headquartered in Bahrain, has stated that the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD-5) and the dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) "have recently entered the Red Sea, following transit through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean."

This deployment prominently underscores "the United States' resolute dedication to upholding maritime security within the region." This commitment is directed towards deterring actions that could lead to instability and alleviating tensions that arise due to disruptions from Iran and its attempts to seize commercial vessels. 

Washington justifies its actions by highlighting Iran's seizure or attempts to seize nearly 20 regional vessels over the past two years.

Notably, American forces successfully thwarted two Iranian attempts to take oil tankers in international waters near Oman on 5 July. Similarly, Iran captured two vessels in regional waters last April within a week. Additionally, Iran was accused of launching a drone attack on an Israeli-owned tanker in November 2022.

Last week, in response to these incidents, American officials advised commercial ships to exercise caution when traversing Iranian waters. Furthermore, the US is considering deploying military personnel on commercial vessels that navigate through the Strait of Hormuz.

Washington's attempt to return to the region through Saudi-Israeli normalisation

Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has told his advisors that he is currently opposed to completely normalising relations with Israel. He hesitates to pursue an accord with the present hardline government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Moreover, as The Times of Israel stated, the Kingdom is not currently inclined to establish a similar agreement to the one forged between the United Arab Emirates and Israel in 2020.

These leaked reports cannot be separated from the US administration's intention to hinder various diplomatic tracks pursued by Saudi Arabia to foster economic, security, and defence partnerships with different nations, particularly China and Russia.

The United States aims to encourage Saudi Arabia to limit agreements with Chinese technology companies like Huawei, avoid pricing oil sales in Chinese yuan, and reject China's proposals for establishing military bases on Saudi soil.

In contrast, the United States acknowledges Saudi Arabia's adherence to the resolutions outlined in the 2002 Beirut Summit.

These resolutions stressed establishing relations with Israel contingent upon the full implementation of United Nations resolutions, particularly realising a two-state solution and establishing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The United States also acknowledges that any agreement that might compromise Palestinian rights cannot be achieved between Saudi Arabia and Israel, given that Saudi Arabia perceives itself as the guardian of Islamic holy sites.

The United States' most probable approach to regain influence in the region is reviving the Abraham Accords, even though this might have consequences for Israel's future regional role.

However, ongoing regional shifts —particularly the escalating Iranian influence in the area and the challenges faced in nuclear negotiations with Tehran — could potentially lead Saudi Arabia to consider the option of a joint security treaty.

Such a treaty might entail a commitment from the United States to provide defence for Saudi Arabia and the broader Gulf region in the event of an attack.

This could encompass responsibilities such as overseeing and monitoring a civilian nuclear programme and the potential procurement of additional defensive resources like THAAD missile defence systems to counter Iran's ballistic missile capabilities.

Ongoing uncertainty informs American strategy

The ongoing uncertainty continues to shape US strategy concerning the regional power struggle, encompassing the Arabian Gulf through the Syrian-Iraqi borders and extending into the Eastern Mediterranean.

The recent agreement involving the release of five American hostages in exchange for a payment of $6bn underlines that a negotiating approach remains a dominant framework in interactions with Tehran.

Furthermore, the sudden resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) organisation and its evolving activities in northeastern Syria indicates that terrorist groups may not be immune to potential developments.

Amid these circumstances, the Arab region is open to various possibilities as anticipating US priorities becomes challenging. This is especially true given the initial signs of heightened competition for international interests and resources in Africa, alongside an uncertain outlook concerning the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine.