Should the US be wary of Chinese military power in the Middle East?https://en.majalla.com/node/293496/politics/should-us-be-wary-chinese-military-power-middle-east
Should the US be wary of Chinese military power in the Middle East?
China has neither the willingness nor the ability anytime soon to substantially project military power into the Middle East. To continue to meet its ends in the Middle East, Beijing may not need to.
Reuters
Visitors stand in front of a giant screen displaying Chinese President Xi Jinping next to a flag of the Communist Party of China, at the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution in Beijing, China October 8, 2022.
Should the US be wary of Chinese military power in the Middle East?
It is not difficult to see why US officials view China’s increasing influence in the Middle East with greater concern.
Through investments, trade, arms sales, and lately diplomacy, China has patiently built a strategic sphere of influence in the region that is only going to grow and more seriously challenge America’s regional position and interests.
But will China set off alarm bells in Washington and attempt to solidify its regional clout by establishing a permanent military presence in the region?
We believe that China has neither the willingness nor the ability anytime soon to substantially project military power into the Middle East. To continue to meet its ends in the Middle East, Beijing may not need to.
Increasing influence
Chinese investments worth hundreds of billions of dollars in physical and telecommunications infrastructure have flooded the region over the past decade. Most countries comprising the area of responsibility of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) have Belt and Road Initiative agreements with China.
Those same countries also have 5G contracts with Huawei, the Chinese state-owned telecommunications company. Even in Israel, America’s closest partner in the region, Beijing has opened a new $1.7bn technological port to support large shipping vessels capable of carrying more than 18,000 containers.
From 2015 to 2021, China devoted $2.6tn in trade with a region on which it depends for half of its crude oil. More than 10 years ago, that trade surpassed the United States. Today, Chinese exports to the region are roughly three times those of the United States.
Two-thirds of China’s exports to Europe and Africa now transit through infrastructures built by Gulf countries. A free trade zone between China and the Gulf states, which would be huge for Chinese-Arab economic cooperation, is a matter of when not if.
Chinese arms sales to the region still pale in comparison to those of Washington, but that does not mean they have not grown. From the 2012-2016 period to the 2017-2021 period, China’s exports increased by 290% to Saudi Arabia and by 77% to the UAE.
Photo taken on Nov. 9, 2022 shows the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, a two-seater combat trainer, at the Airshow China in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, China.
To compensate for its technologically inferior weapons, China offers lower costs (of both equipment and maintenance), favourable financing, faster delivery times, and no end-use monitoring agreements, all of which regional partners find appealing.
For now — except for a modest number of Chinese ballistic missiles sold to Riyadh in the late 1980s — Chinese military transfers to the region are limited to smaller and lower-end platforms including armed drones. But that could change, given recent Saudi and Egyptian interest in Chinese air defence systems as well as advanced fighter jets.
In regional politics, China has stepped up its mediation efforts, facilitating a diplomatic agreement between longtime rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia in March of this year.
That Riyadh and Tehran did all the negotiating years prior to the agreement and did not need Beijing is beside the point.
What matters is that China’s political foray into the region, which is meant to support its economic priorities and nothing else, creates the perception of Beijing supplanting Washington in Middle East diplomacy. What that tangibly means is unclear, but perceptions often find a way of becoming reality in the Middle East.
China's political foray into the region creates the perception of Beijing supplanting Washington in Middle East diplomacy. What that tangibly means is unclear, but perceptions often find a way of becoming reality in the Middle East.
Intentions
Any attempt at assessing whether China would employ the military instrument more generously to enable its economic activities in the Middle East must start with an understanding of China's potential desire to pursue such a course of action.
If strategy consists of ends, ways, and means, then Beijing's strategy seeks to expand Chinese influence in the Middle East (and globally) and ultimately replace American hegemony (the ends).
It endeavours to do that by competing with the United States in various domains and cultivating strategic partnerships with regional powers (the ways). And it utilises primarily economics and lately diplomacy to meet its ends (the means).
In this triangular construct, a potential Chinese military presence in the region falls in the category of means. Logically, China would only consider it if it were necessary for the pursuit of its ends and ways and if it were cost-effective. In this case, it is neither.
Chinese soldiers ride in jeeps as they drive in a parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, at Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2019, in Beijing, China.
If China has been able to meet its strategic objectives through economic, information, and diplomatic means, then why introduce military power into that equation?
China prefers to continue to free-ride on US security, which guarantees freedom of commerce and navigation in the region that is necessary for Chinese oil imports.
Until the United States decides to reconsider its policing role and drastically cut its military presence in the region – which is not likely anytime soon – China feels little need to deploy greater military resources to that part of the world.
When the United States began to build a military infrastructure in the region in the early 1980s, it was in response to two main threats to its core priority of energy security: first, the Soviets; second, the mullahs in the Islamic regime in Iran.
Successive American presidents deployed military power to the region to prevent the Soviet Union from taking over the oil-rich fields of the Gulf after it had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and to shield oil-producing Arab partners from the theocracy in Tehran.
The idea was, and still is, to prevent any regional or international power from controlling the energy resources of the region and with it the price of oil globally. So, when Saddam Hussein chose to threaten that core US tenet in the Middle East by occupying Kuwait and challenging Saudi Arabia, the United States reacted swiftly and decisively by utilising military force.
With half of its crude imports coming from the Middle East, China today has the same strategic calculus as the United States did decades ago. Except that the Soviet Union is gone, Saddam is gone, and the threat of territorial conquest of Gulf governments is negligible.
Left is Iran, which China does not consider a threat to its energy interests. On the contrary, China and Iran are strategic partners, although it is unclear what the real terms of that partnership are.
In this photo released by the official website of the office of the Iranian Presidency, President Ebrahim Raisi, left, shakes hands with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in an official welcoming ceremony in Beijing on Feb 14, 2023
So, in short, viewed from Beijing, aside from small-time pirates, terrorists, and saboteurs, there is no significant military threat to Chinese energy interests that must be addressed with Chinese military power.
Despite the fact that China had almost nothing to do with it, the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic accord was a master stroke for Beijing because it incentivises, if not obligates, Tehran to pacify its actions in the region in ways that are consistent with Chinese (and American) objectives.
The Saudi-Iranian diplomatic accord was a master stroke for Beijing because it incentivises, if not obligates, Tehran to pacify its actions in the region in ways that are consistent with Chinese (and American) objectives.
China has probably learned from the United States the limits and burden of stationing permanent military assets in the region.
Why go through that inefficient and oftentimes ineffective model, Chinese leaders must tell themselves, when the tools of economics and diplomacy can do the job just as well if not better? Also, why be hostage to the political whims of host nations whose permission for access and basing is required?
While it's true that the purpose of America's military presence in the region goes well beyond deterrence and warfighting, China has no interest in developing closer military ties with regional powers. China's approach is incredibly transactional. It is more than happy to sell more arms to the region, but it sees little value in investing in other forms of security cooperation.
This goes back to the issue of Chinese threat perceptions. If Beijing does not view Iran as a threat, then it does not feel the need to work with regional states on improving their military capabilities to jointly address that threat, beyond again selling them Chinese weapons.
None of the above suggests that a Chinese military presence would not offer advantages or advance Chinese objectives in the region and around the world.
In theory, a Chinese military presence could very much cement the perception of Chinese hegemony in the region and, as a result, enable many of Beijing's strategic pursuits and command regional loyalties. The symbolism of improved Chinese military power in the region could be powerful.
Spectators wave Chinese flags as military vehicles carrying DF-41 nuclear ballistic missiles roll during a parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of Communist China in Beijing.
A Chinese military base in the region could also be useful to evacuate Chinese citizens (precisely what happened when China used its Djibouti base to evacuate thousands of its citizens from Libya); to increase the tempo of anti-piracy operations at sea; to protect sea lines of communication; and to further engage in peacekeeping. However, these are not priorities or core ingredients of China's strategy.
China's willingness to increase its military power in the Middle East can always change, but does the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have the ability to pursue this objective?
China's military strategy focuses on modernising and developing capabilities for a high-end, short-duration fight within the first island chain, including technologically advanced missiles, stealth aircraft, naval vessels, submarines, and other hardware.
While China can currently use these capabilities closer to home, they face shortfalls in joint operations, tactics, sustainment, and deploying these assets globally.
Building capabilities to project power and sustain large forces outside the Pacific remains a secondary strategic priority and comes at a high cost, diverting both focus and funding from preparing for a Taiwan contingency.
Even China's two active aircraft carriers do not yet pose a serious threat. They will not constitute a credible capability or be able to deploy far from China's shores until the PLA can perfect carrier landing and provide protection without relying on land-based airfields to launch and recover aircraft and to provide surveillance support.
China has no military bases or formal alliances in the Middle East, but its forces still operate effectively in the region, although on a limited scale. Conducting what the United States calls campaigning activities, they engage in peacekeeping, maritime security, and arms transfers, usually executed by a single service.
Every year, they pursue a few military exercises, naval port calls, and senior leader visits. Overall, the Chinese military lacks the cultural and language skills required for more frequent and meaningful military engagement.
PLA leadership does not empower engagement teams to negotiate, requiring they stick to scripted, tightly controlled, talking points that emphasise the party line—and diminishing their capability to form strong defence relationships.
Most importantly, the Chinese do not have the military capability to stop an Iranian attack across the Arabian Gulf or effectively fight with and help defend an Arab partner in such a contingency. China will not be able to conduct such large-scale contingency operations in the region for the next 5-10 years due to fundamental capability gaps.
The PLA lacks sufficient strategic air and sealift assets, tankers, missile defence, medical and engineer support, joint logistics, search and rescue, and joint command and control capabilities required for global combat operations. As a joint force, the Chinese have no experience in complex expeditionary operations and lack a global command structure.
Even if we assume that the PLA can fix these critical shortfalls sooner than planned, they will still need a network of regional military bases and infrastructure to receive, stage, move, integrate, and provide sustainment for any joint force deployed to the region for deterrence, intervention, or combat operations.
Unlike Washington, Beijing does not have the defence budget or long-standing military relationships to support a large basing network or force presence in the region.
The PLA will undoubtedly continue to fill critical gaps in weapons technology, doctrine, and organisation to reach its 2035 goals. They will also continue to negotiate with Middle Eastern nations and explore options for limited military basing that will help protect their citizens, secure resources, protect sea lanes, and bolster their logistics reach—and provide a capability to expand operations if needed.
Still, their focus will remain on preparing for a fight closer to the mainland. In the near term, China will use its existing capabilities to continue limited regional engagement through security, peacekeeping, and arms sales, reserving its high-end capabilities for a hard military power approach to deter its adversaries and prepare for combat operations around its own periphery.
A different playbook
Even though Washington should not worry much about the likelihood of increased Chinese military power in the Middle East, US policymakers and military leaders should be concerned about China's ability to leverage all instruments of national power to improve its strategic position in the region.
In other words, the United States has a Chinese influence problem, not a Chinese military power problem, which requires Washington to seriously reconsider many parts of its approach to the Middle East.
After decades of fighting Middle East wars, providing for regional security, and stationing hundreds of thousands of troops at large installations throughout the region, the United States should take a page out of China's playbook and double down on its diplomatic, information, and economic activities to maintain influence in the Middle East — in addition to upgrading military cooperation.
The United States should take a page out of China's playbook and double down on its diplomatic, information, and economic activities to maintain influence in the Middle East — in addition to upgrading military cooperation.
The United States should use its existing force presence, relationships, and capabilities to reinvigorate and streamline security cooperation, exercises, and engagements, including foreign military sales and armament cooperation programmes.
Because there are political, information, military, and economic elements to arms sales and cooperation, they form a foundation for long-term relationships and build influence.
The United States can also preserve its influence by keeping its combat capabilities and regional infrastructure warm. Unlike China, the United States still maintains the capability to rapidly project power into the region.
US forces need to continue to exercise this capability with regional partners — to preserve muscle memory, reassure partners, deter adversaries, and prevent competitors from filling the void.
China's increasing influence in the Middle East is not theoretical; it is real. But Washington's regional partners' infrastructure is second to none.
The US policy focus should be less on what Beijing is doing or planning to do in the Middle East and more on how best to leverage all elements of US national power to safeguard long-term US interests.
