A thriving relationship with the Arab world is key to Erdoğan's ambitions

Turkey even pursued policies that the EU considered to be restrictive of human rights and political freedoms and the democratic principles that are part of the West's value system.

There were consequences.

The US imposed sanctions and refused to sell Turkey F-16 fighter jets. Its relationship with Europe deteriorated to the extent that its EU accession talks came to a standstill.

But the move away from the West did not mean a move east — at least not immediately. Ankara indirectly confronted Moscow in Syria. It openly provided political and military support to opposition armed groups that sought to topple the Syrian government, a close ally of Moscow.

Turning point

The confrontation reached its peak in 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian military aircraft which, according to Ankara, had entered Turkish airspace. Moscow took advantage of this incident to apply political and economic pressure on Ankara to gradually modify its policies on Syria.

First came the Astana process in 2015 which established the de-escalation zones that allowed Damascus to gradually increase its control over the majority of the country. Then came the Sochi conference in 2018 at which Turkey endorsed Russia's initiative in establishing the Constitutional Committee for Syria.  

From then, and for some years, it looked like Ankara was moving closer to Moscow, even at the risk of jeopardising its relations with the West. Some even questioned whether this was an irreversible shift in Turkish policies and strategic reorientation.

From this point, Erdoğan was never comfortable with the fact that Moscow had the upper hand in its relationship with Ankara. As Turkey maintained frosty relations with the US, Russia never hesitated to use this advantage as leverage.

Game changer

Then came the war in Ukraine in February 2022.

The conflict offered Turkey the opportunity to redraw its relationship with both Russia and the West. Erdoğan condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and closed the Turkish straits to most military ships, limiting Russia's ability to bolster its fleet in the Black Sea. Ankara also supported Kyiv's military by selling it drones that markedly improved its fighting capabilities.

Most recently, Erdoğan failed to stand unambiguously by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Wagner mutiny. He also allowed fighters from Ukraine's Azov Regiment to return to Ukraine. Only a few days ago he received Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ahead of the Nato summit.

These actions contrast sharply with the forceful public position and actions Moscow took to support Erdoğan in 2016 when a coup against him failed.

The president's recent actions were not well received in Moscow. In fact, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strongly worded statement expressing deep concern about the return of the Azov fighters to Ukraine.

But at the same time, Turkey has managed to maintain close relations with Russia. It not only refused to impose sanctions on Russia but has expanded trade ties, stepping up Turkish exports to Russia and buying cut-rate Russian gas.

Well-positioned intermediary

It left Ankara well-positioned to act as an intermediary between Russia and Ukraine, brokering prisoner swaps and a UN deal to ensure the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea, which lasted until this week.

Managing relationships with Moscow on the one hand and, Washington and Brussels on the other, is a continuous challenge for Ankara.

Erdoğan's latest pivot to the West comes as Russia finds itself in a relatively weakened position as the result of the war in Ukraine, but also its increased economic dependency on Turkey.

Read more: Putin's private army threatens his survival

No doubt, Erdoğan was also motivated by the fact that to turn around the troubled Turkish economy, he needs sizeable direct foreign investments which Russia cannot provide, but the West and the Arab countries can.

His balancing act between Russia and the West – and particularly his hard bargain with the latter – seems to have paid off.  

It is reported that Turkey has extracted a commitment from the US that Congress will no longer block the sale of the F16 jets. Sweden also positively responded to Ankara's concerns and tightened its counter-terrorism laws and committed to increasing economic cooperation with Turkey, including supporting the expansion of the EU's free-trade arrangement.

A new position, via U-turns if necessary

And so Ankara appears to have been successful in recalibrating its relations with both the West and Russia.

In the process, it has defined a middle-of-the-road position likely to serve its long-term interests. This makes it a good time to explain the sudden shifts – sometimes even u-turns – in Ankara's foreign policy.

Abrupt changes in Turkey's foreign policy are nothing new.  Erdoğan has, time and again, proved to be the ultimate pragmatist.

Read more: Erdoğan's pragmatism of continuity

When a policy once described as "zero problems with neighbours" ended up becoming better termed as "zero friends" among Arab countries as the result of what was seen as a "neo-Ottoman" approach, Erdoğan changed tack.

Before he did, Ankara alienated Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq, and directly confronted Damascus. That left it largely isolated in a large chunk of its immediate neighbourhood, jeopardising its economic interests and undermining its political influence.

Erdoğan's about-face worked.

Now, relations are normalised with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the extent that both countries have lately made a number of important gestures to shore up the flagging Turkish economy.

Read more: Saudi Arabia and Turkey herald new era in diplomatic relations

In 2022, Abu Dhabi deposited $5 billion in Turkey's central bank and last April ratified a cooperation agreement aiming to raise bilateral trade to $40 billion within five years.

Last March, Riyadh also deposited $5 billion in Turkey's central bank and Saudi oil giant Aramco announced in June that is in discussions with Turkish contractors over projects worth over $50 billion.

After Ankara dropped open hostility towards Egypt, it was announced this month that ambassadors will be exchanged with Cairo and President Sisi will be visiting Ankara at the end of the month.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan has ceased to call for regime change in Damascus and even positively responded to Russian pressure and started to openly interact with the Syrian government.

Turkish ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs have met on numerous occasions with their Syrian counterparts in the context of Quadrilateral talks which involved Russia and Iran.

Many have questioned the rationale behind the shifts in Turkish policies – asking if they were carefully calculated moves, or merely reactions to regional and international developments – they are probably both.

In my view, Erdoğan's pragmatism is aimed at securing a privileged status and an influential role for Turkey in the new international order that is unfolding.

Cooperation with Russia and Iran prepared the ground for a policy change in Syria. The war in Ukraine provided Turkey with an opportunity to recalibrate its policy towards both the West and Russia.

Domestic dimension

But there is also a domestic dimension that should not be ignored.

These policy shifts have been taking place over time and have been closely linked to Turkish domestic politics, particularly the most recent elections.

This is true when it came to normalising relations with Arab countries. Arab investments are considered to be crucial to turning around the flagging Turkish economy.

Also, the recent elections secured the place of Erdoğan and his political party the AKP as the leader of the Turkish conservatives and nationalists under the "People's Alliance".

Yet, in spite of ideological differences between the AKP and the other nationalist parties – namely Islam versus secularism – they share a common vision of Turkey's position in the world.

In an attempt to understand the underlying logic of Ankara's quest for a privileged international status, one may be able to find the answer in the writings of Turkish nationalist intellectuals.

Here, there is a tendency for writers and thinkers to view their country as an heir to one of the world's greatest empires ruling over most of the Middle East and not insignificant swathes of Europe in the Balkans.

With the international system undergoing profound changes – especially the mounting rivalry between the West on the one side and China and Russia on the other – this was the time for Turkey to chart its own independent course. Only then it would be able to regain the privileged stature it deserves.

Read more: Ghassan Salamé: The birth pangs of a new world order

The argument put forward is that Turkey is at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, straddling all four points of the compass. It has a foothold in the West from its membership in Nato and shares a religion – Islam –  with much of the global south. It is in a unique position to bridge these competing political spheres.

Only time will tell if Erdoğan successfully establishes a privileged international status for Turkey, by balancing its interests between the Orient and the Occident, and between the industrialised North and the emerging South.

Turkey and the Arab world

For Turkey to have any chance of success, it needs to work with the Arab world, with which it shares a complicated history.

And to do that, Erdoğan needs to adapt to 21st-century realities.

Turkish military presence must come to an end in both Syria and Iraq. A formula has to be found that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Syria and Iraq and at the same time address the legitimate security concerns of Turkey.

Furthermore, Turkey should cease, once and for all, interfering in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Both Turkey and the Arab countries have an interest in maintaining a strong friendly and balanced relationship.

A shared history – even with its unpleasant memories –  with obvious common economic interests, should be the basis for a new and mutually beneficial partnership.