The war in Sudan is really a battle over spoils

Leading role in Darfur

The RSF has its roots in the Janjaweed militias, which Hemedti commanded during the Darfur conflict and were rehabilitated by al-Bashir's regime in the south of Sudan during the civil war there.

The regime created the Rapid Support Forces and incorporated them into the National Intelligence and Security Service. Hemedti, their commander, had already rebelled against al-Bashir, he told Channel 4 of the UK in 2008, in a dispute over finances and demands for official recognition for himself and his militia, including military ranks.

Up until then, Hemedti insisted that he was not part of any official institution and was fighting against the rebels in Darfur at the personal request of al-Bashir.

However, suddenly a man who had no previous official profession and no previous military training was promoted to the rank of general in the National Intelligence and Security Service in 2013.

The main difference between Hemedti and the old-style Janjaweed leaders was that he did not enjoy the social status of tribal leadership, which Moses Hilal and other former Janjaweed leaders had.

Read more: Hemedti: From camel trader to second most powerful man in Sudan

Hemedti built himself up by becoming a successful businessman with financial resources which helped him recruit loyal fighters. He boasted at a press conference in 2014 that he could gather 100,000 fighters, who had no other source of income.

Fighting became a way to earn income in Darfur, which was the economic reality created by the war there. Hemedti's lack of traditional tribal interests and desire for social status and military rank made him the ideal candidate to take on the rebels for the Islamist regime — a top-notch mercenary without any baggage.

Ranks, recognition and resistance

The RSF proved effective in battle. A string of victories gave them significant status and influence in the al-Bashir regime.

They arrested political critics of the regime, including those who warned of the danger of creating a military force parallel to the regular army. Prime Minister Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and the former leader of the National Congress Party, Ibrahim al-Sheikh, were prominent detainees.

Meanwhile, the arbitrary granting of military ranks to the RSF triggered resentment among the regular army, sowing the seeds of the current dispute.

By June 2019, Sudan's Transitional Military Council had been formed following al-Bashir's removal. The RSF participated in a joint operation to disperse a sit-in protest demanding the transfer of power to a civilian government.

It became a massacre that the Sudanese people still remember with great sadness. 

Widespread protests followed by Russian entry

Widespread protests erupted once again, forcing the Transitional Military Council to negotiate with civilians and agree to the Constitutional Document and the formation of a transitional civilian-military government with a Sovereign Council.

From August 2019, Abdalla Hamdok was heading the government. The regular army and the RSF were both represented in the Sovereign Council by their generals, Hemedti and the regular army's Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Read more: Al Burhan: The reluctant ruler of Sudan

It was agreed that the presidency of the Sovereign Council would be handed over to a civilian president in the last third of the transitional period. However, as this milestone approached, the military staged a coup in October 2021, declaring the end of the partnership and effectively ending the democratic civilian transition process in Sudan.

During the transitional period, the regular army's influence in government steadily increased. It hindered moves toward civilian rule, playing up tribal and regional differences in the process.

Meanwhile, the economic and regional influence of the RSF also grew. It also established strong economic and military ties with the Russian private army known as the Wagner Group.

Hemedti and his forces also supported Russia in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, and Libya, where he supported General Khalifa Haftar's forces in 2019. 

As the movement toward civilian government loss momentum, some political organisations left the wider allied movement – the Forces for Freedom and Change – and staged a sit-in in front of the Republican Palace to demand the overthrow of Hamdok.

It was the prelude for a coup.

These splinter groups later formed what was known as the Democratic Mass, which became the main political force behind Hamdok's 25 October overthrow.

However, due to the widespread rejection of the coup and pressure from the international community to end the situation, the groups behind it agreed to engage in a process to restore the path of democratic civilian transition.

Image rehabilitation

Hemedti tried to rehibilitate his image in the international community by adopting the discourse of democracy and human rights and allying with groups that signed the framework agreements for the move to civilian rule.

He even succeeded in recruiting some of his close civilian allies – including Ibrahim El-Mirghani, the former Minister of Communications during al-Bashir's era – who has direct family ties to Mohammed Othman Al-Hussein, the spiritual father of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

This influenced some exhausted and eager civilian components to make concessions.

But the political process was polarised from the beginning, complicating any military or security reform. Both the regular army and the RSF resisted change throughout the transitional period. The failure to make progress led to the October coup.

Immunity from accountability

The pressing question now is: What does the military want?

The answer could be immunity from accountability. It could be that the conflict effectively becomes a move toward such immunity, via a kind of shameful auction, where those who do not deserve it buy it from those who have nothing.

To justify this, the army drew lofty parallels to the transitional justice experiences of Colombia and South Africa. But they conveniently ignored political responsibility for the crimes committed.

This went to such extremes that the RSF and Hemedti were portrayed as champions of human rights in Sudan, starting with his appointment as "Person of the Year for Human Rights" and continuing to portray him as an ally of democratic forces.

The transition period should have been defined as a period to achieve reform and reconstruction. Instead, it deteriorated into struggle for power and control.

A race for spoils

From the outset, international mediators realised that the political reform process and transition to civilian rule in Sudan were being subverted into power-grabs and a race for spoils.

This was made clear in a recent report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Volker Perthes, to the Security Council on the Juba Peace Agreement that set up the move toward democracy.

It suggested that some of the leaders of the movements that signed up are only seeking power for themselves — a conclusion that can be generalised to cover all participants in the process.

Read more: UN envoy to Sudan optimistic about transition to civilian rule

Perthes understands how the transitional process was hijacked to divvy up power and secure influence rather that a genuine move toward democracy. This explains why the regular army has functional independence from any executive branch of the state.

It also explains why Hemedti does not object to being part of the army, but does not want to be subject to or subordinate to the army's commander-in-chief. Instead, he prefers to be subordinate to the head of state.

UN experts have failed to explain how any of this will help end the problems caused by the proliferation of armies and armed groups in Sudan.

This could be because international brokers themselves see the process as bargaining for power between factions rather than a credible move toward re-establishing democratic transition.

Army and RSF overlap

The discussion about how long it may take to integrate the RSF is also up for debate, with some claiming it needs 10 years, while others say two years is enough to convince them to accept a compromise solution in five years. However, none of these parties have answered the crucial question: what are these numbers based on?

The RSF differs from the army only in terms of its tribal composition. Any reform process should reflect and address this. Both the RSF and the regular army are forces that, in the recent past, have fought the same enemy, with the same combat doctrine, weapons, and training.

According to estimates, a large number of RSF officers are former officers from the regular armed forces. So why does their integration need decades, unless it is merely a bargaining chip for the continuation of their leaders' battle for political influence?

The international community and its mediators have become solely focused on reaching an agreement, in any form, without considering whether it serves the goals of stability and democracy.

Naturally, Islamists and remnants of the previous regime have exploited the tension to further destabilise the path toward democratic transition in Sudan and take revenge for their loss of power. Many sources believe they were behind the first shots fired in the current conflict.

But the ambitions of the generals to monopolise comprehensive rule remain the main driver of the conflict. Both parties — the regular army and the RSF — are equal partners in the violations witnessed in the October coup in 2021.

The current conflict between them is merely a battle for its spoils.