The need for answers is more urgent with each passing hour of a war that looks more likely to last and which is not understood by a conflict-weary population
AFP
This image grab taken from AFPTV video footage on April 20, 2023, shows an aerial view of black smoke rising above the Khartoum International Airport amid ongoing battles between the forces of two rival generals.
Smoke from fresh battles is blackening skies all over Sudan. Under them, a troubled nation is preoccupied with a familiar question: What’s next?
#Sudan : residents of #Khartoum woke up this morning to the sound of gunfire and plumes of smoke rising into the air as clashes appear to have erupted in the capital city.
These armed confrontations follow weeks of rising tensions between the SAF and RSF military factions. pic.twitter.com/QXQXRsGnzi
The fighting has raged for over a week, causing hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. Civilians are among the casualties and their number is growing as stray bullets fly and missiles hit homes.
Humanitarian conditions are tragic and getting worse as a blend of fear, panic and sadness grips the country. The urgent need for a solution deepens with every passing hour that adds to these bleak days of war, while citizens wonder where the next turn of events will take them.
Three possible scenarios
If the fighting continues without any return to a peaceful political process, the answer to the question being asked all over this war-torn nation depends on how three main scenarios unfold.
The first concerns the implications should the regular Sudanese army defeat the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). What would it do to underline its victory?
The second relates to the opposite outcome, with the RSF taking control of key strategic sites. What direction would the conflict then take?
The third scenario envisions a prolonged conflict that lasts longer, with no clear winner in sight.
As the Sudanese people face this uncertainty, they are also confused about the suddenness of the outbreak of war, and the lack of any explanation from leaders of the two sides to justify the fighting.
Proper insight into the conflict’s origins would help people assess its potential outcome. But media statements from the military leaders have only added to the ambiguity, uncertainty, and frustration felt by the people.
The RSF’s leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, said in press releases: "We do not have a problem with the army, but our problem is with its leadership."
In several statements, he invited armed forces officers and soldiers to join the RSF. Commanders in the regular army have issued similar calls for defections.
Lieutenant General Shams Aldin Alkabashi, a member of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and the man running the fighting, said: "We have no problem with the Rapid Support Forces. Our problem is with Hemedti and his brother." He also invited RSF officers and soldiers to surrender their weapons and join the army, pledging that they would be treated with dignity.
Such statements are part of the psychology of war, designed to influence soldiers and win over the wider people. But it leaves citizens thinking that the death and destruction comes from nothing more than a clash of leadership ambitions.
Scenario 1: A clear win for the army
Any clear win for the Sudanese army – ending in defeat for the RSF and the elimination of Hemedti and his brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, as leaders – would be likely to weaken calls for the military to leave politics and move the country toward democracy.
Any clear win for the Sudanese army – ending in defeat for the RSF and the elimination of Hemedti and his brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, as leaders – would be likely to weaken calls for the military to leave politics and move the country toward democracy.
This outcome could push back any transition to civilian government, leaving the army clearly in control and likely to dominate any discussions with political figures. While the army may bring conditions with it to talks, attention will focus on how open it may appear to be to the democratic transformation and civilian rule that is a condition of international aid for Sudan.
The most dangerous aspect of this scenario is the potential exploitation of a clear army victory by leaders of the former regime.
Supporters of the former regime have been vigorously backing the Sudanese army, hoping to receive something in return when the battle ends. They believe that this could make them a viable political alternative to the Freedom and Change Bloc which came after the regime. Their goal is to either return to power directly, or at least to settle scores with the political forces that toppled them. The chances of such plans succeeding look limited.
As Sudan emerged from the revolution, a feeling of renewal led to widespread political participation, particularly from the youth sector. A strong mass movement was born. It is unlikely to accept a return to power by the former regime.
The international community, not least Sudan's neighbours, will also resist any return of the former regime. There will be continued calls for the army to retreat from power and to set up a civil democratic transition to end the isolation of a country on the brink of economic collapse.
Scenario 2: The RSF triumphant
A clean military victory for the Rapid Support Forces and their subsequent control of Sudan is a complex possibility bringing grave consequences.
It is unrealistic to assume that the RSF would willingly relinquish power in favour of democratic transition after engaging in battle and enduring the hardships of war, despite Hemedti's claims it will do so.
Victorious military leaders are often tempted to expand their political ambitions to safeguard their wealth and maintain their power over national affairs. Hemedti, who is among the wealthiest people in Sudan, hails from a border tribe that extends between Chad, Niger, and Central Africa, and has close ties to the Western region of Sudan.
That could fuel his aspirations for regional expansion or cultivating relationships that enhance his influence, including attracting the attention of global superpowers. America and France are currently competing for influence in the region, and Russia has been increasing its presence, particularly through the deployment of forces from its Wagner mercenary group.
The RSF's control of Sudan would inevitably result in significant and hazardous complications, given the nature of the organisation itself and its leaders' connections with regional and international powers.
Scenario 3: Protracted fighting with no clear winner
If the war drags on without a decisive victory, the suffering of Sudanese civilians and ordinary military personnel will only intensify.
They will bear the brunt of this catastrophic conflict, which has already brought about population displacement, a lack of access to essential resources like drinking water and utilities including electricity alongside rampant destruction and loss of life.
Deeply saddened by the tragic loss of 3 @WFP colleagues in Sudan. Totally unacceptable.@WFPChief has suspended all aid operations, pending an assessment of the security situation in the country.https://t.co/BqCjH08x3c
The fighting has jeopardised livelihoods at home, further exhausting the already overburdened Sudanese state with the high economic costs of an urban war. Abroad, it has destabilised the region.
If the war persists, we will undoubtedly see a rise in waves of flight and displacement to neighbouring countries including Egypt and Ethiopia, or to peripheral areas outside the control of the warring parties.
The longer the lack of a victor holds, the greater the humanitarian catastrophe will be and the more urgent the response of the international community becomes.
This form of crisis could be more severe, due to the fragility of neighbouring nations already suffering in similar ways, including Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, Niger, Central Africa, South Sudan, and Egypt.
Any decisive victory, whichever way round, may prove challenging. Neither side has achieved military superiority in the week of continuous fighting, a sign that any clear and swift outcome will not occur.
We are greatly alarmed by the escalating violence in Sudan as the first refugees fleeing the fighting arrive in Chad.
In the past days, an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 people have fled Sudan's Darfur region to seek refuge in neighbouring Chad.
— UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency (@Refugees) April 20, 2023
The conditions on the ground also point away from a military resolution in the near term. The conflict spans across a vast area. Both sides have having forces deployed throughout the country.
Even if the Sudanese army resolves the battle in Khartoum, it must still address the conflict in the Darfur region or South Kordofan. Each region's tribal composition may lean one way or the other in terms of picking sides, making a difficult situation more complex. While the RSF may get the backing of Darfur, the army may prevail in the northern and some central states.
Talks may hold the answer to Sudan's terrible question
The most likely outcome is that the conflict ends through negotiation and dialogue. If this happens, it would significantly reduce the chances of prolonged armed conflict. It is the current state of battle that gives this outcome a higher chance of occurring.
Negotiations come in various forms. Talks can happen when one party prevails over the other, leading the victor to impose their conditions. They also occur when both sides perceive themselves as equal in strength, or when they anticipate substantial losses without the possibility of achieving victory. When both parties feel weak, or at least unable to land the final blow, negotiations can also take place.
There is a tendency for talks to produce a paradox, where agreements set up by stronger parties making concessions to weaker ones tend to endure – as seen at the end of the Cold War – while those set up by weaker parties giving ground often collapse. This shows how perceptions of strength can be illusory.
Presently, there is no doubt that Sudan is in a state of weakness. Significant international effort is needed for the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the political process, distinct from what has previously been attempted in the country and among its neighbours.
Successful international intervention would depend heavily on a quadruple mechanism composed of countries that wield influence over both sides, political movements, civil society, and resistance committees. These countries can counter any destructive attempts by foreign powers with vested interests in prolonging the conflict or weakening the Sudanese army.
Successful international intervention would depend heavily on a quadruple mechanism composed of countries that wield influence over both sides, political movements, civil society, and resistance committees. These countries can counter any destructive attempts by foreign powers with vested interests in prolonging the conflict or weakening the Sudanese army.
There is a quartet of nations capable of establishing such a mechanism: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
A vital role can be played by other parties in the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the African Union, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which comprises eight East African countries and works collectively to resolve differences in Sudan via the tripartite mechanism.
Additionally, the Troika countries with interests in Sudan and that have already been actively calling for calm – Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States – could exert influence alongside initiatives from within political and civil society.
Whatever the politics, the condition of the civilian population during the war is a vital factor that will intensify pressure on both sides. The conflict has caused immense suffering, with a population at risk of becoming refugees, or internally displaced persons. This situation is alarming and calls are emerging for urgent attention to alleviate such suffering.
Sudanese citizens have distanced themselves from the ongoing war since the two sides failed to provide them with a clear and convincing reason for it.
They are indifferent to which side wins, concerned instead with its duration and the scale of the suffering it produces. All they want is for the danger to end and a return to calm and security for their homeland.
People are apprehensive about members of the defunct regime taking advantage of the war's outcome to claim power or settle scores with the revolution.
The resistance committees -- the largest revolutionary youth bloc leading the movement on the ground -- have explicitly stated that the war is not their concern and warned against any attempts by the former regime to exploit it for their gain.
Several ceasefires have been declared since the beginning of the conflict due to the critical humanitarian conditions it has created.
The most recent showed greater commitment from both sides than previous ones. There is some hope that the timing will help, coming around the festive period at the end of Ramadan. But mediators have not yet secured a permanent truce and a return to talks for a full and peaceful resolution.