What lies in store for Xi Jinping in Washington?

Beijing does not see Trump as someone capable of grand bargains like some of his White House predecessors were, so the Chinese leader will temper his expectations

Donald Trump walks alongside Xi Jinping at the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, on 14 May 2026.
AP
Donald Trump walks alongside Xi Jinping at the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, on 14 May 2026.

What lies in store for Xi Jinping in Washington?

During his visit to Beijing last May, US President Donald Trump could not resist asking Xi Jinping whether he had received other presidents there, as the Chinese leader escorted him through Zhongnanhai, a former imperial garden adjacent to the Forbidden City in Beijing. “We very rarely receive presidents here,” said Xi, then added that the only invited president was Russian premier Vladimir Putin.

The reply may have seemed incidental, but it captures something of the relationship between the two men. While Trump insists on describing Xi as a “friend,” Beijing is reluctant to reciprocate, keeping the tone professional. This week, Trump returns the gesture, hosting Xi in Washington, meeting his Chinese counterpart at the aircraft steps before hosting a lavish dinner for him in the capital.

Diplomats often say that leaders’ personal relationships, summits, and visits play an important role at pivotal moments in the US-China relationship. This began in 1972, when American diplomat Henry Kissinger visited Beijing and established a close relationship with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, paving the way for US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit later that year to meet Mao Zedong. Seven years later, President Jimmy Carter opened the White House doors to Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping.

Repeated meetings between Xi and Trump during Trump’s two presidential terms have shown that relying on personal chemistry between the two leaders has not produced the same kind of transformation in bilateral relations as occurred in the 1970s. This is not simply about Xi Jinping’s personality and his preference for a more institutional and methodical relationship; it is also about Trump, who has not proven to be a man of grand bargains and sweeping settlements in the way he likes to present himself.

Writing in The Atlantic, Jonathan Czin, a former director for China affairs at the US National Security Council, said Trump was no Harry Truman (who founded NATO in 1949), John F. Kennedy (who managed the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 through secret diplomacy) or Ronald Reagan (who negotiated arms control treaties with the Soviets). He is certainly no Richard Nixon, who reshaped the course of the Cold War by the China thaw.

Getty
President Nixon meets with Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-Tung in Peking, during his 1972 visit to China.

Most of Trump’s diplomatic achievements to date remain unfinished or open to interpretation. His summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un failed to produce a lasting political agreement, his claim to have halted the war between India and Pakistan was rejected by New Delhi, and he has repeatedly failed to persuade Putin to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, despite saying he could do so in 24 hours.

Clear conclusion

Beijing has drawn a clear conclusion from this record: that Trump is not a man of grand bargains. Still, that does not mean that he can be taken lightly. The unpredictability of his actions makes him more dangerous at the negotiating table. In recent years, Chinese diplomats have learned to take advantage of both Trump’s pragmatism and the fluctuations in his foreign policy, sometimes without doing much at all.

With that in mind, Beijing left nothing to chance ahead of Xi’s visit to the White House. Provoking, underestimating, or putting Trump in a position where he appears to have lost could all backfire. China believes that his policies have pushed it to expand its international presence, showing the world that Beijing is the more stable partner, or at least a necessary counterweight to American policy. Still, Chinese planners have worked hard to avoid miscalculations in Washington.

Preparations were cautious and deliberate. They identified areas of leverage and opportunity. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng travelled to Washington to lead a Chinese delegation and put the finishing touches on the summit agenda. Trade and tariffs, the war with Iran, and artificial intelligence (AI) are all on the table.

In recent years, China has learned to take advantage of both Trump's pragmatism and the fluctuations in his foreign policy, sometimes without doing much at all

Trade and tariffs have taken on added importance as the trade truce agreed by Trump and Xi in Busan a year ago approaches its expiry. Although Washington stepped back last year from increasing tariffs after Beijing used its control of rare earths as leverage, tariffs remain in place across several sectors. The average effective US tariff on Chinese imports reached 22.8% in July, according to the Penn Wharton Budget Model, but bilateral trade rose by 5.4% compared with the same period in 2025, with Chinese exports accounting for 75% of the total.

This gives Beijing considerable negotiating room. Higher tariffs could prompt China to use rare earths and other economic tools, while lower tariffs would widen the trade imbalance in its favour. Beijing knows that Trump needs to show economic results before the mid-term elections in November, particularly for farmers. Likewise, Beijing has shown that it takes US concerns into account.

Although it opposed wording from this month's G20 finance ministers' meeting (calling for action on 'non-market policies and practices'), China has taken measures that could be read as a partial response to those demands, such as tightening regulation of the automotive industry to curb a damaging price war and prevent dumping in overseas markets, and pushing weaker domestic companies to either merge or fold. Seemingly in response, Trump said he was open to allowing Chinese cars into the US if Chinese manufacturers built factories on US soil and employed Americans.

REUTERS
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi shares a moment with Russian President Vladimir Putin as Chinese President Xi Jinping looks on during day two of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India, on 13 September 2026.

From Bishkek to New Delhi

As part of his preparations for the summit, Xi embarked on a diplomatic tour that included the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, the BRICS summit in New Delhi, and a visit to Cairo, where he proposed a regional security initiative for the Middle East that envisaged a bigger role for Beijing. More important, however, was his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, given that US-India relations are currently strained. An India-China rapprochement adds another layer of complexity to the US strategy in Asia, which until recently had been for India to balance Beijing.

At the same time, Chinese diplomats have changed tone over the US-Israeli war with Iran. Initially, Beijing sought to maintain a balance between its partners in the Gulf, but more recently it has been forthright in making specific demands of Tehran, not least that the Iranians reopen the Strait of Hormuz and guarantee freedom of navigation, end their attacks on Gulf states, and use their influence with the Houthis in Yemen.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi conveyed these positions to his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi in Beijing. This gives Beijing room to manoeuvre amid US efforts to isolate Iran economically. Secondary sanctions on Tehran (on entities that trade with it, such as Chinese banks) do not appear likely to develop into a direct economic confrontation with China.

Washington and Beijing are more likely to seek an implicit understanding, under which the US does not target major Chinese institutions if Beijing buys less Iranian oil or restructures its trade with Tehran in ways that partly address US demands without joining the blockade of Iran.

Oil and the Strait of Hormuz lie at the heart of this equation. During the war, China showed it could influence crude oil prices through demand, giving Xi leverage in talks with Trump over Iran, especially amid shipping disruptions and rising prices. As a result, Beijing could act as a facilitator or joint guarantor in any future agreement on Iran or in new regional arrangements. Washington may have to acknowledge this reality and make use of it.

Diana Estefanía Rubio

Trump's dilemma

China's room for manoeuvre nevertheless remains limited by its capabilities, the limits of its influence, and its need to maintain a delicate balance among the parties involved in, and affected by, the conflict. An effective Chinese role therefore ultimately depends on Washington's willingness to make room for it.

Here is Trump's dilemma: ignoring Beijing lets China benefit from the status quo at little cost, whereas recognising its role means ceding influence and prestige in the Gulf. Against this backdrop, the recent call between Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on developments in the Middle East was noteworthy.

Other issues could also be on the Washington agenda, not least Taiwan. China will raise it, but it is not expected to be a major point of contention, given Trump's inclination to scale back US security commitments to the island, having described a planned US arms deal for Taiwan as an "important bargaining chip".

On Ukraine, Moscow has mooted the possibility of a trilateral summit between Putin, Xi, and Trump in Shenzhen, on the sidelines of next month's APEC summit. Xi and Modi have meanwhile said they could help end the Ukraine war. Notably, Beijing asked Kyiv not to strike the Russian city of Vladivostok while the Eastern Economic Forum was taking place, and Ukraine complied. It suggests that China may be part of the formula for ending the war.

The contest for AI dominance is also expected to be discussed amid US tech firms' call to slow development, although China is wary that this is a ruse

A US tech trap?

The contest for dominance in AI is also expected to be discussed, particularly after US technology companies called for a slowdown in the development of AI models because of security and safety concerns (something Trump described as a "hoax"). Although Beijing is wary that this is a ruse, it appears prepared for technical dialogue on safety and governance standards.

In Shanghai, Xi recently established the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) with 29 countries based on principles for global governance of the sector. He also launched an open-source AI initiative during the BRICS summit. The Chinese model of AI focuses on expanding practical applications, while the American model emphasises advancing model capabilities.

Beijing appears prepared to accommodate US calls to slow model development and strengthen security and safety measures, but is sceptical that this may be a "Cold War tactic" to slow the pace of progress from US companies' Chinese competitors, which have been closing the gap on American models' capabilities. China is not alone in being suspicious. France's Mistral and the German AI Association warn against using safety concerns to impose regulations that strengthen US tech dominance.

In the run-up to the Washington summit, media outlets have cautioned against high expectations, with Trump's approach and style (particularly in foreign policy) a possible obstacle to bigger breakthroughs. Beijing believes that Washington is more preoccupied with perpetuating its global dominance than with launching major initiatives through which it could work with China to reshape the international order. Xi therefore goes to Washington not in search of a grand bargain, but with a range of bargaining chips that he hopes will allow China to manage its relationship with the US one issue at a time.

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