Politics

Why clashes in Ethiopia’s Tigray region are ominous

Both the government in Addis Ababa and armed Tigrayan independence fighters have their supporters, from as near as next door to as far away as Tel Aviv

Yasuyoshi Chiba / AFP

Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters arrive after eight hours of walking in Mekele, the capital of the Tigray region, Ethiopia, on 29 June 2021.

Why clashes in Ethiopia’s Tigray region are ominous

Amr Emam

last update on 11 Aug 2026

The clashes between Ethiopian federal soldiers and Tigrayan fighters in the country’s north last week were no sudden, unexpected outburst. Rather, it sprang from old regional grievances left to simmer since a patch-up peace deal in 2022 ended a two-year war that killed 600,000 people.

In early August, it was reported that the Ethiopian army had traded blows with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) near the border with Sudan, in a conflict that involves the Eritrean armed forces, Ethiopia’s well-armed Fano tribe (Amhara nationalists), and the Rapid Support Forces, a powerful Sudanese paramilitary organisation.

Unresolved problems have plagued the fragile 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, reached after the 2020-22 Tigray war—one of the deadliest conflicts of the 21st century. As part of the accord, the TPLF agreed to disarm its heavy weapons and accept an interim regional administration, while the federal government promised to restore basic services, let the displaced return home, and settle territorial disputes.

In reality, the core problems were never fixed. Western Tigray was seized during the war by the Fano and their allies, who were then allied with the federal government. This forced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayan civilians to flee their homes, to which they have not yet been able to return. The TPLF now insists that pre-war borders must be restored, even as the federal government and Amhara authorities treat the wartime changes as permanent.

The TPLF also rejected the council set up during the war. In May 2026, it reconstituted the pre-war council and claimed the regional presidency for 2025-26. This marginalised the federally-recognised interim administration and left Mekelle, the capital of Tigray region, with two rival authorities: one backed by popular support, the other recognised by Addis Ababa.

REUTERS/Tiksa Neger — Members of Amhara region militias ride on their truck as they head to face the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), in Sanja, Amhara region near a border with Tigray, Ethiopia on 9 November 2020.

Simmering grievances

Tigrayan officials accuse the federal government of imposing an economic blockade by restricting fuel, aid, and public-sector salaries, while launching drone strikes and blocking the return of displaced people to western Tigray. The TPLF’s exclusion from the general elections in June only deepened the sense of political marginalisation across Tigray (it was one of several irregularities that clouded the vote which gave Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party another five years in power).

The clashes that broke out earlier this month in western Tigray, close to the Sudanese border, are among the most serious since 2022. Both sides quickly blamed the other. Media reports describe the use of heavy artillery and drones, with some Tigrayan units having previously fought in Sudan, where hundreds of Tigrayan civilians fled.

For months, tensions have been rising. The TPLF has recruited and mobilised new conscripts as public rhetoric sharpens, and while neither side appears eager to repeat the war of 2020-22, both want to strengthen their hand. In doing so, miscalculation remains the greatest immediate risk. If Tigrayan forces push deeper into contested territory, or if federal troops try to seize back control of Mekelle and the main roads, the fighting could spread, drawing in others. Eritrea's forces are already in the area.

Tigrayan officials accuse the federal government of launching drone strikes and blocking the return of displaced people.

Dangerous moment

A fresh outbreak of war in Tigray could hardly come at a worse moment for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. There is a growing international scramble for control of vital trade routes through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, partly triggered by Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces against the TPLF in 2020-22, is now at odds with Addis Ababa.

At the heart of their dispute is landlocked Ethiopia's desire to secure access to the Red Sea, specifically sovereign control over the port of Assab in Eritrea, which sees Ethiopian soldiers on its coast as a threat. For Ahmed's Prosperity Party, Red Sea access is a necessity for a country of Ethiopia's size, history and ambition.

Diplomats worry about Ethiopia's intentions. In an interview with the Oromo Broadcasting Network, the Ethiopian premier reportedly claimed that Eritrea is not only Ethiopian territory, but also belongs to the Oromo people, the ethnic group from which he and other Ethiopian government figures hail. Eritrea could respond by supporting the TPLF, but this would almost certainly trigger a direct confrontation with Ethiopia, which would further destabilise the Horn of Africa and compound the security threats posed both by al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Houthi militia in Yemen.

AFP — Somaliland President Abdirahman Abdullahi Mohamed during a press conference with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar at the Presidential Palace in Hargeisa, 6 January 2026.

Drawing in others

There are other interested parties, however, and they are watching particularly closely. Israel, for instance, has already reportedly begun sending weapons to Ethiopia. Their alliance is driven in large part by their shared desire for Red Sea access. This explains why Israel recently recognised Somaliland, a region of Somalia with a section of coastline.

Egypt has stated its support for Eritrea and Somalia. Cairo regards any Ethiopian military presence on the Red Sea as a direct threat to its national security and to free navigation through a key maritime corridor and gateway to Egypt's lucrative Suez Canal. Egypt and Ethiopia are also at daggers drawn over Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, which now controls more than 80% of Egypt's freshwater.

Analysts have been left wondering whether regional rivalries will pull neighbouring states into Tigray if fighting erupts, with some regional powers lurking in the shadows and watching closely. Ethiopia's northern headache could easily morph into a regional headache.

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