In Libya, there is little enthusiasm for a roadmap unveiled in August 2025 by Hanna Tetteh, the United Nations envoy tasked with steering the country out of a prolonged crisis, in which the country is divided between two rival camps, in the east and west. She is the latest in a long line of envoys—more than eight since 2011—who have tried and failed to restore stability to a nation that is politically fragmented following armed conflict and economic decline.
The UN mission is criticised, but in reality, any solution in Libya has become hostage to foreign interests that neither Libyans nor UN mediators can meaningfully counter. Statements from the UN Security Council and elsewhere continue to insist that the solution must be “Libyan‑owned and Libyan‑led,” but the levers of power lie beyond Libya’s borders.
Last year, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army in the east, sought to revive the notion of a purely Libyan solution. This prompted a joint statement from ten Western and regional states in November, rejecting any settlement that excluded influential actors in western Libya.
A week later, Massad Boulos, senior adviser to US President Donald Trump for Arab and African affairs, revealed that he had orchestrated the statement. By then, Boulos had already begun crafting a political formula designed to bring together Tripoli (in the west) and Benghazi (in the east) to secure their support for a comprehensive political, military, and economic arrangement.
Boulos reaffirmed this approach during a meeting in Paris in January that brought together Saddam Haftar—who serves as deputy to his father—and Ibrahim Dbeibeh, the national security adviser in Tripoli and nephew of Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh. In April, representatives from east and west agreed on unified development spending. That same month, alongside American, British, Italian, and Turkish troops, their armed forces then jointly participated in the annual US-led Flintlock military exercises co-hosted in the Libyan city of Sirte.
Power-sharing
Although Boulos has avoided disclosing the full details of his proposal, leaks suggest a power‑sharing arrangement that would keep Abdulhamid Dbeibeh as prime minister of a unified government, while elevating Saddam Haftar to the presidency of the Presidential Council. His efforts were also evident during a meeting in El Alamein on 20 June with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye.
The following day, Egypt’s intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli for talks with Dbeibeh. This showed that Cairo wants to be heavily involved in any political realignment in Libya, with which it shares a 1,115km border. Egypt’s relations with Haftar’s camp have been strained of late, due to the latter’s support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, which Cairo considers to be a threat to its national security.
