Suez and Hormuz: more intersections than we think

The similarities between 1956 and 2026 keep revealing themselves, as do the lessons

Suez and Hormuz: more intersections than we think

After the Suez War, Winston Churchill was asked whether he would have acted as Prime Minister Anthony Eden had done over the 1956 conflict. “I would never have dared to start it,” he said. “And if I had dared, I certainly would not have dared to stop.”

For some, the same could be said of Donald Trump’s war with Iran—that he should not have started it in the first place, but once he had, he should mobilise the institutions of the American state and rally his allies across the world to shape its final chapters, as George H. W. Bush did before the 1991 Gulf War, and as George W. Bush did before the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

This is only one point of intersection between the wars of 1956 and 2026. There are more. For instance, both the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz (that has been closed by Iran since America began its attack) are key maritime passages through which so much trade passes that their closure can strangle the global economy. Both the wars, of 1956 and 2026, can be thought of as historical moments that transcend geography and touch the deeper currents of history.

End of an empire

In 1956, Britain, France and Israel went to war over Suez. In the aftermath, the focus was on Israel’s post-war relations with Egypt, the eclipse of the British Empire, the rise of America, and the new dynamics of the Cold War. The objectives had been to topple Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, crush his rising project after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and salvage what remained of imperial prestige.

Militarily, the operation was not a failure. The forces advanced rapidly, and Israel achieved its field objectives in Sinai. It was the politics that proved problematic, when Washington forced London and Paris to retreat. Nasser’s regime did not fall and he emerged more audacious, turning away from the Americans and towards the Soviets. He became harsher at home and more expansive abroad, from the short-lived ‘union’ with Syria in 1958 to the Yemen war in the early 1960s.

Israel, for its part, secured a long truce after its withdrawal from Sinai, strengthened its alliance with France, and obtained the Dimona reactor from Paris. Just over a decade later came the June 1967 defeat. Nasser lost Sinai, Assad in Syria lost the Golan, and Palestinian lands were occupied as well.

No Ben-Gurion

Today, Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel is engaged in an existential battle after the attacks of 7 October 2023. After two rounds of war with Iran focused on disabling the nuclear programme, destroying military infrastructure, and assassinating the Supreme Leader and senior commanders, Netanyahu likely assumed that the regime would collapse from within. But despite the scale of the strikes, the regime reconstituted itself in a more hardline form.

Both the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz are key maritime passages through which so much trade passes that their closure can strangle the global economy

The Revolutionary Guards consolidated power, closed Hormuz, held the global economy to ransom, threatened neighbouring states, and tightened their grip on militias in Iraq and Lebanon. Netanyahu is no David Ben-Gurion, and his relationship with Trump is unlike Ben-Gurion's complicated relationship with Dwight Eisenhower during and after the Suez War.

Israel today is not what it was 70 years ago. It is approaching elections that will determine the political and personal fate of its prime minister, just as it extends its occupations across Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian territory beyond the lands it seized in 1967.

There is an American lesson from Suez as well. London and Paris knew how to start the war in 1956, yet they failed in the struggle to secure peace. It confirmed that the British Empire, already weakened for a decade after the Second World War, had come to an end as the American sun rose. It also marked the beginning of the Cold War. Nasser benefited from Washington's audacity, yet he turned to Moscow.

New bilateral order

Today, many see the Hormuz crisis as a comparable moment of international transition, although in reverse. America remains the world's foremost military and economic power, yet it increasingly appears less able to impose peace alone, while China gradually emerges as an economic, political, and diplomatic pole of attraction. Only a few years ago, leaders in the Middle East and beyond would instinctively turn to Washington in search of guarantees and understandings. Today, all roads seem to lead to Beijing, which has become an indispensable stop for agreements and mediation.

It is as though Trump has helped bring into being the world he once described when he spoke of a "G2" world—a bipolar order featuring America and China. This now appears to be one of the defining features of the international order taking shape. Chinese leader Xi Jinping, with his ambitions for Taiwan, will know that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev used the Suez Crisis to tighten his grip on Hungary on the road to the Cold War.

Trump is no Anthony Eden. Washington, enamoured of its solitary leadership of the world and weary of it at the same time, is not Britain exhausted after the Second World War. America can endure long wars and heavy losses, as it did in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, far more than the European empires could. Yet it faces the same danger that confronted London and Paris: a military victory that fails to produce a stable peace.

At Suez, the war revealed that the old powers could no longer lead the new world, and its consequences fed the widening divide between West and East. At Hormuz, the war revealed that there is now no single power that can, on its own, impose order or peace. The bullet that starts the war is no less important than the word that ends it. In the future, even greater intersections between Suez and Hormuz may be revealed.

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