Among the many justifications given by Donald Trump for the US and Israel’s war on Iran was to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapon. While Pakistan-brokered talks may yet see the Islamic Republic agree to some restraints on its programme, a permanent commitment to nuclear disarmament appears unlikely.
Iran’s leaders instead conclude that a nuclear weapon would deter its enemies from future attacks and push for a bomb. This is one reason why the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Mariano Grossi, told The Economist in mid-April that he was really worried about increased nuclear proliferation. After all, if Iran does decide to go nuclear, its regional neighbours may well follow suit.
But Iran’s perceived nuclear ambitions are only part of the story. Trump’s behaviour during the conflict, building on his past comments, has made many US allies across the world question whether Washington would protect them in the case of a future nuclear attack. European and East Asian governments, many of which were once adamantly against nuclear armament, are having serious “discussions,” according to Grossi. Has the fallout of a war seemingly aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation, ironically, made it more likely?
A fraying non-proliferation order
In theory, nuclear proliferation is forbidden under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970. This ruled that no one beyond the five states officially in possession of nuclear weapons at the time—the US, USSR, China, UK and France—should pursue nukes, though Israel was known to have its own bomb without admitting it. A total of 191 states have signed up to the NPT, with only India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan and (as of 2003) North Korea outside the framework. However, it is unclear whether this international consensus will last in the changing global climate.
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when the US dominated the ‘unipolar moment’, the NPT order reached a high point when formerly nuclear states in the Soviet Union—Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan —disarmed and joined the treaty, while a post-Apartheid South Africa did likewise. However, the limited punishments meted out to non-signatory Pakistan for going nuclear in 1998, and the failure of sanctions to halt North Korea’s nuclear programme, illustrated that, even in an era of US global hegemony, it was difficult to prevent determined states.
Today, a more fractured international community in a multipolar world will make this task even harder. Yes, Iran has been subject to intense scrutiny, but this is primarily because of the nature of the regime, which powerful Western actors and their Middle Eastern allies have distrusted since the 1979 Revolution. Were a less controversial actor like Türkiye or South Korea to pursue nuclear weaponry, it may not face such a united wall of disapproval, especially if it came after Iran.
Possible contenders
Unsurprisingly, the states reportedly reconsidering their stance on nuclear weapons are in regions where nuclear weapons are already present. In the Middle East, Israel’s nuclear weapons and Iran’s possible pursuit of them prompted Türkiye’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to state in 2019 that it was “unacceptable” for Ankara not to be allowed the same.
This February, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan added it would be “inevitable” for Ankara to join a nuclear arms race if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia’s leaders have similarly linked their nuclear status to Iran’s. And for his part, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman told Fox News in 2023 that, “if they (Iran) get one, we have to get one.”
