The first priority is Trump’s image, not national interests.
Jacquelyn Martin/ REUTERS
Vice President JD Vance at a news conference as Jared Kushner, left, and Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy for Peace Missions listen on 12 April 2026, in Islamabad.
US-Iranian negotiations have gone nowhere. For his part, US President Donald Trump unilaterally extended a two- week ceasefire that had been scheduled to expire on Wednesday after the Iranian delegation refused to attend talks in Islamabad. Both countries have blockades in place—Iran preventing most shipping out of the Arabian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz, blocking about 20% of global oil and gas supplies, and the United States preventing ships from entering or exiting Iranian ports—and have been issuing threats, appearing far apart.
The impasse shouldn’t be surprising. US and Iranian leaders are approaching the war and negotiations very differently—which means their negotiating teams are operating in entirely different universes.
The Iranian team is pursuing Tehran’s vision of national interests and seeks real concessions to secure the regime and advance its geopolitical position. The US team is pursuing Trumpian image management. They’re not looking for meaningful results but headlines and photo-ops they can use as the basis for a positive story to aid a beleaguered president, at least until their latest lies become obviously untenable and they seek new ones.
US officials’ statements usually put Donald Trump at the centre, spinning, exaggerating, and lying to create a narrative of a strong leader in control of events. Trying to defend Trump’s decision to ease sanctions on Iranian oil exports in an attempt to reduce energy prices that rose because of the president’s own war, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent absurdly asserted that Trump was “jujitsuing the Iranians” by “using their own oil against them.”
The US negotiating team does not include Secretary of State Marco Rubio or career diplomats. It is led instead by Trump’s associate Steve Witkoff, a real estate investor, and Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law. That’s different from negotiations with Iran under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden, which were led by diplomats and included nuclear scientists and experts.
Trump wants a deal just to find a nonhumiliating way out of the conflict he started without a good strategy, international support, or a path to victory
US statements typically didn't mention the president by name, instead casting talks as among multiple countries. Iran's current negotiating team features diplomats, politicians, and scientists, and statements typically refer to "the Islamic Republic" rather than cast the war as the leader's personal glory.
The asymmetry gives Iran leverage. It marks US leaders as more eager for a deal, with Iran more willing to endure the ongoing economic damage. Iran doesn't want an agreement unless it's highly detailed, technical, and implemented in stages to build trust and ensure compliance. The US team, meanwhile, wants an agreement that says they reached one and finds a nonhumiliating way out of the conflict Trump started without a good strategy, international support, or a path to victory.
US President Donald Trump signs a document reinstating sanctions against Iran after announcing the US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal, in the Diplomatic Reception Room at the White House in Washington, DC, on 8 May 2018.
Iran also has good reason not to trust the United States, especially Trump. In 2018, in his first term, Trump reneged on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the 2015 nuclear deal that had taken years to negotiate—despite Iran's compliance. In 2025, in his second term, Trump bombed Iranian nuclear sites and then lied that Iran's nuclear programme was "completely and totally obliterated." Less than a year later, he went with the opposite lie, claiming that Iran was on the verge of acquiring multiple nuclear weapons, and alongside Israel launched a campaign of airstrikes and assassinations.
With this war, Trump has said many different things and frequently shifted the goalposts. He has called for regime change, unconditional surrender, handing over nuclear material and agreeing to zero enrichment, curbing Iran's missile programme, ending Iranian support for various regional groups, giving Israel formal diplomatic recognition, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and more. Trump and other US officials have repeatedly lied about the facts on the ground, the state of the Iranian government, and what Iran has or has not agreed to.
As a result, the United States has no credibility, making Iran wary that Washington would fail to follow through on war-ending promises and instead pocket gains and attack again later in pursuit of more.
Trump doesn't need Iran to actually make big concessions—he just needs headlines saying there's a deal or even just progress toward one. That generates positive coverage and makes markets rise, which in turn generates more positive headlines and gets investors worrying more about missing out on a rally than about getting caught in a crash.
The reality of US national interests, such as nuclear nonproliferation and reducing Iranian support for anti-American militias, is evidently less important to him and his team than short-term narratives that could benefit the president. The problem for him is that those short-term narratives then contradict one another, creating an endless cycle of failure and response.
Jared Kushner and Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif interact in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 11 April 2026.
This approach was evident in the first round of talks. While bombing Iran, the United States sent a list of 15 demands via Pakistani mediators. Iran rejected them all, countering with their own list of 10 demands, including acknowledgement that Iran controls Hormuz and has a right to enrich uranium. Trump threatened massive war crimes against Iran, even genocide—saying that a "whole civilisation will die tonight"—and then agreed to Iran's 10 points as the basis for negotiations. That concession got Iran to the table, but Trump insisted that his threats had forced them to. Positive headlines and market rallies followed.
Repeated lies have eroded US credibility. Tehran doesn't trust Washington to follow through on war-ending promises
But then the Trump negotiating team tried a bait-and-switch, agreeing to none of the Iranian demands they had accepted in principle and issuing demands of their own, such as Iran forgoing all nuclear activity and the United States getting a cut of Hormuz toll revenue. Talks ended without a deal, and markets wobbled.
Then Trump got Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a 10-day ceasefire in Lebanon—stopping Israel's campaign there was another Iranian demand—and then claimed that Hormuz was totally open. Media outlets carried Trump's proclamation and highlighted Iran saying the strait was open while omitting or downplaying the crucial detail that Iran meant open for passage in coordination with its Revolutionary Guard after paying a toll—i.e., in practice, mostly blocked. Oil prices fell, and stock markets rose, even though little on the ground had actually changed.
The USS Abraham Lincoln conducting blockade operations in the Arabian Sea on 16 April 2026.
But Trump then lied that Iran had accepted all US demands, including a joint project to remove all of Iran's enriched uranium, though he kept the US blockade in place. Iranian officials accused the United States of lying and said they would maintain their blockade until Washington backed down. Iran has been hesitant to engage in further talks, saying the US approach does not "demonstrate seriousness in pursuing a diplomatic process."
That could be posturing, trying to get another concession as a precondition to talks, or an indication the Iranians think delays will put more pressure on the Americans.
The Trump administration appears to think that if it can string the process out long enough and scare the Iranians with military threats while tempting them with economic benefits, Iran will eventually agree to a deal. The details don't really matter. Trump will claim total victory, coverage will be positive, and markets will cheer the prospect of normal energy flows, which will generate more positive headlines and praise from wealthy donors.
In the meantime, some people, presumably in or connected to the White House, can ride the market manipulation to make billions of dollars with insider trading. And any longer-term problems can be dealt with—or lied about—when they arise or shunted off to future presidents.
The problem is that this scheme needs the Iranians to play along. Even the American public can't help but notice the closure of Hormuz, with tankers stuck in the Gulf and not arriving at scheduled destinations, creating unignorable shortages. The impact is most visible in cancelled flights, a rapid rise in airline costs in Asia, and higher gas prices throughout the United States.
High gas prices are listed at a Chevron gas station in Los Angeles on 9 March 2026, as gasoline prices surge amid the ongoing war with Iran.
While Trump might be able to sell the idea that Iran made big concessions even if it didn't, such as on uranium enrichment, he can't get many people to believe that the strait is open and energy supplies are flowing when they're not.
But Iran wants longer-term security, not a temporary reprieve. The Iranian regime took a big hit from the United States and Israel and is still standing. That's a point of pride, a demonstration of resilience. Despite Trump and Netanyahu's hopes, the bombing did not make the Iranian government collapse or beg for mercy. Iran has acquired leverage by choking Hormuz and not unreasonably wants something real to loosen its grip.
The Iranians may have gotten wise to Trump's short-term manipulations. Falling markets put the US president under pressure, but any sign of movement toward peace, even a meeting, can trigger a rebound. Therefore, to win significant concessions, Iran needs to stop the appearance of progress and give the global energy supply crunch time to really bite.
The ceasefire deadline passing before an agreement was reached forced Trump to weakly extend the deadline unilaterally. He didn't follow through on his threats, which he probably intended as a bluff. Approaching negotiations seeking a durable peace—such as the deal that Trump ripped up without cause in 2018—would avoid all this; instead, Americans and Iranians are stuck inside Trump's self-aggrandising narrative of personal triumph.
