Will the STC's dissolution bring Yemen closer to unity?

Talks in Riyadh were aimed at generating forward momentum in Yemen, but there are still huge hurdles to overcome

Saudi-backed forces in control of the Second Military Region Command on the outskirts of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout province, on 3 January, 2026.
AFP
Saudi-backed forces in control of the Second Military Region Command on the outskirts of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout province, on 3 January, 2026.

Will the STC's dissolution bring Yemen closer to unity?

An eventful six weeks in Yemen have been capped off by the dissolution of the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which began in December by seizing half of Yemen’s territory, before withdrawing and ultimately disbanding.

After its forces were pressured into retreating from the two large central and eastern governorates of Hadramout and Al Mahra two weeks ago, the STC’s adventurous leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, fled the country, as his colleagues prepared to fly to Saudi Arabia for a dialogue conference. With a weakened hand, the STC’s Secretary-General Abdulrahman Jalal al-Subaihi told delegates that the organisation had chosen to fold, dissolving itself as a political, organisational, and military entity.

In doing so, the council took a decisive step at a critical juncture, marking the beginning of a path toward a comprehensive resolution of the Yemeni crisis, one that has fractured the anti-Houthi coalition, creating an awkward situation for Gulf allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (which had backed the STC). The parties must now agree on how to incorporate the former STC’s military and security formations, along with their weapons and equipment.

Semblance of order

The oil-rich governorates of Hadramout and Al Mahra are now back under the control of forces loyal to the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which is led by Rashad al-Alimi. The PLC has international legitimacy, a point he reiterated on Saturday, when he called himself “president of the country and the high commander of the armed forces” in a statement about the situation.

Yet absorbing the former STC’s armed units may be challenging, given that they comprise indoctrinated fighters whose principal loyalty is to their tribes. In a region with a history of grievances and long memories, unifying the anti-Houthi coalition and integrating these tribal units within the Ministry of Defence, Interior Ministry, and other state institutions may not be easy, especially after the past six weeks.

The STC’s dissolution may help. Its other leaders, who travelled to Riyadh, disowned any responsibility for its actions, blaming al-Zubaidi for the decision to attack Hadramout and Al Mahrah in early December, and acknowledging the damage caused by his gamble. Al-Zubaidi is understood to have fled Yemen by boat to Somaliland, before flying to Abu Dhabi.

AFP
Fighters loyal to the "Southern Transitional Council" on a pickup truck bearing a picture of the council's leader, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, in the Sheikh Salim area, on 16 May 2020.

One man’s ambitions

In several statements throughout 2025, al-Zubaidi said he wanted a “two-state solution” in Yemen, calling for a separate, sovereign state in Yemen’s south, which he even named ‘South Arabia’. South Yemen was an independent state comprising eight governorates from 1967-90, before the unification of Yemen was agreed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The PLC, of which al-Zubaida was vice-chair, said his secessionist agenda “does not align with the objectives for which the coalition was formed”.

In a region with a history of grievances and long memories, unifying the anti-Houthi coalition and integrating tribal units may not be easy

Founded in 2017, the STC was built to serve al-Zubaidi's personal political ambitions and to preserve his control over resources supplied by its Emirati backers. His face adorns billboards throughout South Yemen, where his supporters want a return to the pre-1990 borders, before unification with the north. Within the STC, al-Zubaidi ruled without challenge, despite gathering figures around him to present the council as a national component. His former colleagues, who dissolved the STC in front of the TV cameras, now feel that they were deceived.

In recent days, al-Alimi announced the formation of a Supreme Military Committee whose goal is to prepare military forces for any anti-Houthi push. With several armed groups still to sign up to the idea, he said the aim was "to strengthen security, protect social peace, and work closely with the coalition and the international community to combat terrorism".

EPA
New recruits in the Houthi ranks during a popular march in Yemen's Amran province on 20 December 2023.

Looking ahead

The hope is that events of recent weeks will inject some momentum into the political dialogue in Riyadh and create space for other political forces that remain stalled by their own agendas, including the Houthi movement, which still controls the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, along with the country's north-west. The talks in Riyadh were aimed at generating forward momentum in Yemen, but there are huge hurdles to overcome.

In recent days, the Saudi defence minister said his country would "nurture" any agreement reached between Yemen's various actors. Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen has historical, geographical, and cultural roots, but Yemen's stability is also a top national security priority for Riyadh, whose regional responsibilities give it a central role in events.

The Saudi bombing of newly arrived Emirati military vehicles and weapons consignments at Mukalla port in south Yemen at the end of December signalled a strategic shift from Riyadh away from its previous posture of patience, having spent years making space for political solutions and intra-Yemeni dialogue.

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