US President Donald Trump’s decision to sign the full repeal of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act marks one of the most consequential shifts in Syria’s postwar trajectory. The move dismantles the most comprehensive sanctions framework imposed on the country and removes the central legal architecture that entrenched Syria’s economic isolation for more than five years.
The public response inside Syria reflected the scale of expectation surrounding the repeal. Celebrations began more than a week ago after the House of Representatives voted to overturn the act on 11 December. In cities across the country, crowds gathered in celebration, expressing hope that economic recovery might finally be within reach. For many Syrians, sanctions had come to represent more than a foreign policy tool. They were experienced through stalled reconstruction, deteriorating public services, and the daily hardships of living in an economy cut off from normal trade and finance.
Yet while the end of the Caesar Act closes an important chapter in Syria’s postwar experience, it does not resolve the country’s deeper economic or political problems. Sanctions relief removes a major external constraint, but it doesn't address institutional weaknesses that long predate the act itself.
Whether this moment marks the start of recovery or merely a recalibration of pressure will depend on what follows—specifically, on whether the space created by sanctions relief is used to restore basic economic governance, rebuild confidence, and establish conditions under which investment becomes viable. That responsibility now rests primarily with Syria’s authorities rather than with the United States.

Opening the door to engagement
Enacted in 2020, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act was designed to use economic isolation as leverage, denying Damascus access to the resources needed to consolidate power in the absence of political concessions. Through the threat of secondary sanctions, its reach extended far beyond the Syrian state. Private companies and governments alike were effectively warned that any engagement with Syria carried prohibitive legal risk. Even activity not explicitly prohibited was frequently abandoned. Over time, the Caesar Act became the central mechanism enforcing Syria’s economic paralysis.
Its repeal dismantles that architecture. For the first time in years, Syria is no longer legally radioactive. The automatic deterrent that kept regional governments, investors, and financial institutions at a distance has been removed. This matters not because it guarantees recovery, but because it lifts the single most powerful external barrier to engagement.
The timing is critical. Interest in Syria’s reconstruction is high across multiple sectors, from housing and infrastructure to energy and tourism. Yet throughout the transitional period, sanctions-related uncertainty repeatedly halted projects at the announcement stage. Ending the Caesar Act alters that calculation. Legal risk declines and transactions that were previously untenable can, at least in principle, now move forward.
The earliest effects are likely to be felt in sectors dependent on imports, cross-border contracting, and external financing. As restrictions ease, trade and financial transactions should become more accessible, lowering costs and easing shortages. The banking sector, long isolated and forced into informal channels, may also see tentative re-engagement, improving liquidity and commercial activity. More broadly, repeal reduces Syria’s economic isolation and opens the door to greater regional integration, potential diaspora investment, and renewed engagement by international institutions.

Credibility before capital
Despite its significance in easing some of the most severe economic bottlenecks, sanctions relief does not guarantee recovery. It is a necessary condition for economic revival, but not a sufficient one. Investors do not commit capital simply because a country is legally accessible. They do so when institutions are credible, rules are predictable, and risks are manageable. On these fronts, Syria still faces profound challenges.
The most pressing obstacles lie in institutional credibility and economic governance. To attract sustained investment, the rule of law must be meaningfully restored. Investors require a legal system that is stable, predictable, and impartial—one that enforces contracts and protects property regardless of political affiliation.
Read more: Syria's obstacles to investment are many
Under the Assad regime, the judiciary was routinely undermined by political interference and cronyism. While the transitional period has not replicated those practices wholesale, serious concerns remain. The constitutional declaration, though asserting judicial independence in principle, grants the president authority to appoint all members of the Supreme Constitutional Court. This concentration of power undermines confidence in the independence of Syria’s highest courts and weakens trust in the legal system as a whole.
Judicial changes during the transition have further raised alarms. The dismissal of experienced judges due to ties with the former regime, the appointment of religious scholars without formal legal training, and ongoing ambiguity over judicial competence and authority have all contributed to investor hesitation. Legal uncertainty is not a technical inconvenience; it is a fundamental barrier to investment.
Urgent judicial reform is therefore essential. This includes adopting a constitutional framework that genuinely guarantees judicial independence, protects courts from political pressure, and ensures merit-based appointments. Legal decisions must be transparent, consistent, and grounded in clear and coherent laws and regulations.

