Iran’s political economy is causing misery. Something has to give

An economic contraction of 2.8% is predicted next year, having contracted 1.7% this year. Will the regime loosen the reins?

Iran’s political economy is causing misery. Something has to give

Just days before the end of the year, the World Bank announced that Iran’s economy had contracted by 1.7%. In April, it had projected a contraction of just 0.7%. Next year, expectations are even worse: a contraction of 2.8% is foreseen. Iranian newspaper Jahan Sanat, which specialises in economic affairs and is close to the regime, summed up this catastrophic decline in a single, telling phrase: this is what happens when the economy is ruled by the ethos of the state.

It drew derisive snorts from Iranian elites, given its ideological metaphors and political insinuations. Yet the system is one of only a small handful around the world that remains bound to a primitive theory of political economy. In Iran’s case, this stems from a deep-rooted, ingrained fear of free enterprise, even at its most limited levels of freedom and capacity.

That fear stems from the conviction among those in power that money is one of the most important sources—and deepest reservoirs—of public power. If a social class or popular current were able to accrue wealth independently from state institutions or instruments, it could organise and pose a threat to the regime’s stability and dominance.

This inclination is not related to modern socialist systems that argue for state intervention in specific areas to create a balance in favour of the most vulnerable, such as by raising taxes, setting a minimum wage, and ensuring a degree of state dominance over highly profitable sectors. It does not even resemble traditional communist systems which provide high levels of care for different social classes within the public sphere.

Serving the state

It is a political and security preoccupation alone that frames and drives the Iranian regime’s view of economics. At its core lies an intensely rigid doctrine that holds that resource wealth (such as from oil) and other monopolies must be exploited by the political system to finance the functions of the state and the instruments of governance, buying the loyalty of certain segments of society.

In essence, then, this is the extension of the state into economics, beginning by tightly controlling the private economy so that it conforms to the conditions set by political authorities. For countless reasons, this has been a factor in the collapse of Iran’s economy, of declining living standards, deteriorating public services, and social unrest.

This is the extension of the state into economics, beginning by tightly controlling the private economy so that it conforms to the conditions set by political authorities

If Iran were a small state with enormous resource wealth whose political system is generally at peace with other states (such as Qatar), such a system may work temporarily, but Iran has more than 80 million people, extracting its wealth is costly, and it is fundamentally at odds with many of its peers, the result of which has been decades of sanctions that have restricted its ability to develop and sell its raw materials.

Political economies may also be better suited to countries whose societies are less complex, but Iran's is marked by stark sectarian, ethnic, and regional sensitivities. Its urban middle class has been swelling for decades, demanding rights including social justice and a quality of life. This has led to huge segments of Iranian society questioning at the structure of the ruling system, not least the authorities' state of emergency that has lasted for decades.

No longer justified

Over the years, Iran's rulers have justified the system as serving a broad political and military project that extends beyond the country's borders, but the argument for this project has now collapsed. In recent weeks, authorities' supporters have been quietly distancing themselves from the ruling powers, after Israeli and American airstrikes destroyed the regime's crown jewels: its multi-billion-dollar nuclear programme.

The regime's biggest question today is whether it can avoid a major shock to the ruling structure. Historically, big political transformations have been followed by economic restructuring. If that does not happen, turmoil looms. Restructuring is not merely a matter of top-down bureaucratic decisions; it affects the positions and interests of millions of people.

The signs are ominous. The local currency is losing value, inflation hit 50% this year, the productive economy is isolated from the modern world, the elites are corrupt, sanctions continue, and anger builds. Restructuring for survival would mean loosening state control and granting more opportunities and capabilities to Iranian society. That is something the Iranian regime cannot bear, just as Iranian society can no longer bear its current conditions. Something has to give.

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