Saudi Arabia scores ally upgrade in Washington

Trump elevates Saudi Arabia to ‘major non-NATO ally’ status, but bigger issues of normalisation with Israel and a binding security treaty need more time. Nonetheless, this is a huge step forward.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump at the White House, Washington, on 18 November 2025.
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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump at the White House, Washington, on 18 November 2025.

Saudi Arabia scores ally upgrade in Washington

The US-Saudi relationship took a step forward on 18 November when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman landed in Washington for a White House meeting with President Donald Trump on what has been called their “future partnership”. Both leaders were pleased to discuss the significant increase in Saudi investment in the United States—from $600bn to $1tn, particularly in sectors such as infrastructure, technology, and defence.

The lavish welcome extended to the Saudi delegation can be seen as Washington's desire to turn the page on past tensions and to reaffirm an important relationship with mutual interests. And while some US politicians have been critical of Washington’s closeness with Riyadh in recent years, they now appear to be a minority.

Seeking guarantees

After months of draft negotiations, the core of this visit was Riyadh’s attempt to shift its relationship with Washington to a binding, institutional treaty rather than the kind of informal, transactional deals characteristic of Trump’s tenure. For the crown prince, this cannot simply be a White House executive order, since these can be undone by any future president at the stroke of a pen.

Although a treaty would require Congressional approval, Riyadh does not see this as a major obstacle. Such a treaty would offer Saudi Arabia a stable and predictable security environment for decades to come, and is therefore seen as a strategic necessity for the country’s transformation under its Vision 2030 programme.

As previously noted, the historic US-Saudi alliance was based on oil and security, but the world has moved on. Washington is now an energy superpower, no longer reliant on Saudi crude, and Saudi Arabia increasingly feels less secure than it once thought. The 2019 Houthi missile attacks on major Saudi processing plants at Abqaiq and Khurais (which halved the country’s oil production for several weeks during repairs) showed the limits of any implied American ‘security umbrella’. This level of volatility is no longer acceptable for a state building a project the size of Vision 2030.

The primary challenge of the November 2025 visit was therefore the leveraging of Saudi economic, military, and political cards to extract the permanent, institutional commitment long sought by Riyadh. Of these areas, the economic dimension was the most dazzling.

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A scene from the dinner held at the White House in honour of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on 18 November 2025.

Saudi investment

The investment is a win-win and fits into the Saudi economic strategy, but the big numbers perfectly serve Trump’s deal-making mindset, with the Oval Office commitment to raise existing investment agreements valued at $600bn to $1tn over four years—a massive injection of liquidity via the Public Investment Fund (PIF), which is Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. No longer just an oil exporter, this places Riyadh as an American partner in manufacturing and innovation.

Of political importance will be ‘where’ the Saudi investment is targeted. This could be in key political states, perhaps covering constituencies where employment is a top priority or where Republicans face strong challenges from Democrats. Both Riyadh and Washington will know that foreign direct investment can create jobs, just as investment withdrawal can lead to unemployment. This geographic distribution could, if needed, be a last-resort tool to be used by Saudi Arabia if bilateral negotiations in other areas of critical importance break down.

After months of draft negotiations, the core of this visit was Riyadh's attempt to shift its relationship with Washington to that of a binding, institutional treaty

Investing $1tn in America is an astonishing amount by any reckoning, and can be interpreted as indirect pressure to extract the treaty, because Saudi Arabia needs the highest level of certainty regarding the stability of its security environment if it is to make such a generational investment wager. It invokes the maxim: 'If we are betting on your future, then you must guarantee the security of our future.' To an extent, the strategy relies on the power of capital rather than traditional diplomacy.

The US-Saudi 'technical alliance' will be felt, not least in Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is already transforming numerous industries and is widely acknowledged as the next industrial revolution. The alliance covers the export of advanced US chips and joint investments in American AI infrastructure, placing Saudi Arabia at the heart of the battle for digital domination currently raging between the US and China. It also means that Saudi Arabia will share in the protection of US supply chains against Asian influence.

There was also an initial agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, which represents American recognition of Saudi Arabia's right to use nuclear energy under strict conditions (excluding local uranium enrichment). This serves the Saudi strategy to diversify its energy mix and limit emissions within the goals of Vision 2030 and has been part of the package in talks over a US security guarantee. For Riyadh, a Saudi ability to produce nuclear energy is both practical and symbolic. 

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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump during their meeting at the White House on 18 November 2025.

Military means

On the issue of defence, the US sale of Lockheed's advanced F-35 stealth fighter jets to Saudi Arabia as a core element of a giant $142bn arms package was the main talking point, not least because Israel—whose pilots already fly the F-35—has expressed concerns about losing its qualitative edge. Yet Saudi demands for the F-35 date back to 2017, and the sale agreement reflects Washington's desire to deter Iran.

Trump's approval of the sale of 48 F-35A jets will make the Royal Saudi Air Force the first Arab state to get this advanced technology, and the second air force in the Middle East after Israel, whose version of the jet has been modified to incorporate Israeli weapons systems and more fuel for long-distance sorties.

The F-35 will give Saudi Arabia air superiority, but because it comes with advanced sensing and radar systems, the planes also function as 'flying command centres' that can detect targets and direct operations from safe distances. This is used to counter such as from ballistic missiles and drones. By increasing its own military capabilities with such an aircraft, the Saudi Air Force reduces reliance on American support.

Analysts have warned that the sale of F-35 jets to Saudi Arabia may fuel a regional arms race. In the final days of his first term, Trump signed off on a deal to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates, but Abu Dhabi later pulled out of the agreement over terms imposed by the Biden administration.

For years, Washington has not sold F-35s to Israel's regional neighbours, including NATO ally Türkiye, which was kicked off the jet development programme in 2019 for buying Russian air defence systems. Approving the Saudi deal, if Congress nods it through, will mean that America will feel it needs to bolster Israeli capabilities.

There are strict security conditions included in the F-35 sales to Saudi Arabia, most notably Riyadh's guarantees that it will protect against technology being transferred to China or Russia. This may necessitate 'kill switches' to disable or destroy the aircraft. Washington's caution is merited. A US intelligence report published on 13 November warned that the Chinese were trying to steal F-35 technology, and Riyadh has a growing economic partnership with Beijing.

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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump during their meeting at the White House on 18 November 2025.

Foreign affairs

In terms of diplomacy, one of Trump's top foreign policy priorities has long been Saudi Arabia's agreement to normalise relations with Israel, most likely through the Abraham Accords. Yet Riyadh has linked this to the guarantee that Saudi Arabia seeks, in the form of a binding defence treaty. The crown prince also reiterated the country that normalising US-Israeli relations relies on substantive progress towards a Palestinian state—something that the current Israeli government would never agree to.

Asked about the Abraham Accords, the Saudi crown prince said: "We want to be a part of it, but with a clear path to a Palestinian two-state solution and the disarmament of Hamas in Gaza." This position is not merely a historic principle or a national or moral commitment; it is a deep understanding of the mechanisms of the US Congress. The true price of the treaty is not economic or military, but political.

A joint defence treaty requires the approval of two-thirds of the US Senate, which is 67 votes. This would mean an element of bipartisan support, because Trump's Republicans currently only have 53 Senators (the Democrats have 45, and there are two independents). For 'centrist' Democrats to vote with the Republicans, there would need to be substantive progress towards a Palestinian state.

Saudi support for its 2002 Arab Peace Initiative has been unwavering in the two decades since it was endorsed by the Arab League in Beirut 23 years ago. The crown prince's linkage to the Abraham Accords elevates the Palestinian issue to the level of strategic necessity for the American project in the Middle East, within which Gaza also features heavily, because Saudi Arabia has also linked normalisation and Riyadh's help in the reconstruction with the disarmament of Hamas.

Saudi Arabia has successfully shifted the weight of its relationship with the US, but a treaty remains the only guarantee for sustained commitment from its key ally

The offer of generous funding for the reconstruction of Gaza has been suggested, and Saudi Arabia could play a leading role in the post-war rebuild, but it refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Israel without a guarantee that this step will lead to "sustained peace" in the region, not just another temporary truce. This puts Washington in a bind: either it presses Israel to accept a two-state solution, or it gives up on a Saudi signature.

Having sought a treaty, Trump announced that the US would grant Saudi Arabia 'Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)' status. A treaty was not forthcoming, but the visit moved its request from mere wishes to a legislative framework. A Saudi signatory to the Abraham Accords is the carrot for Trump, who must also demonstrate unprecedented political readiness to provide a binding, historic security guarantee.

Ultimately, the success of this strategic partnership will hinge on both sides' willingness to pay the price. For Trump and his Republicans, this will be the political price demanded by the Senate. The coming battle will define the shape of the Middle East for a generation. Until then, Riyadh has successfully shifted the weight of its relationship with Washington, but a treaty remains the only guarantee for sustained commitment from its historical ally.

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