Syria cannot afford to postpone pluralism

The country's new leaders say people will eventually be able to form political parties when the transition period is over, but observers are starting to feel sceptical

Syria cannot afford to postpone pluralism

At a recent public panel hosted by Chatham House, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, spoke confidently about the diplomatic breakthroughs achieved since the ousting of Bashar al-Assad. His visit to the United Kingdom, just days after meeting President Trump at the White House, was hailed as another major milestone. It marked the first official Syrian ministerial visit to the UK in over 16 years, made all the more symbolic by the raising of the Syrian flag at the embassy in London— an unmistakable signal of renewed diplomatic ties.

Yet the questions posed by both the moderator and audience pointed to a more sobering reality: Syria’s international rehabilitation ultimately hinges not just on foreign relations, but on the credibility of its domestic political transition. Much of the discussion centred on whether the transitional government is genuinely committed to building an inclusive political system—one that ensures equal representation for all Syrians.

Al-Shaibani outlined a vision built around active political engagement and direct elections as the foundation of Syria’s future political system. While he stopped short of using the word “democracy,” the intention was clear. Yet one critical component was notably absent: he gave no indication of when political parties would be legalised—an essential prerequisite for any credible electoral process.

In the immediate aftermath of al-Assad’s ouster, the transitional authorities moved quickly to dismantle the political infrastructure of the old regime. President Ahmed al-Sharaa ordered the suspension of all parties linked to the former system, including the ruling Baath Party and its affiliated factions within the National Progressive Front.

While the dissolution of the Baath Party came as no surprise, the disbanding of other parties, despite their role in propping up a façade of pluralism under al-Assad, raised concerns among some observers about the trajectory of political life in post-Assad Syria.

The disbanding of political parties linked to the former regime has raised concerns about the trajectory of political life in post-Assad Syria

To provide assurances, al-Sharaa reaffirmed his commitment to political pluralism. This pledge was enshrined in the 2025 Constitutional Declaration, which guarantees the right to political participation and the freedom to form political parties. Yet the declaration carries a significant caveat: these rights are conditional on the passage of a new political party law.

This legal vacuum has effectively stalled Syria's political transition. While citizens are free to discuss politics, the absence of a framework for party formation renders genuine political organisation all but impossible. The result is a troubling paradox: rights are guaranteed in principle, yet remain out of reach in practice. This disconnect has only deepened scepticism among those already wary of the transition's direction.

Bad optics

Al-Shaibani seemed keen to present a balanced assessment of political life during the transition. He noted that, unlike under al-Assad, Syrians are now able to engage in political debate without fear—a huge step up from the Assad era. At the same time, he acknowledged that no political parties are currently active in Syria, but reaffirmed the transitional government's commitment to holding direct parliamentary and presidential elections after the transitional phase, pointing to a provisional four-year timeline. Yet he offered no indication of when the formation of new political parties might be permitted—an omission that casts doubt on the credibility of his electoral roadmap.

Technically, the adoption of a political party law falls within the remit of the incoming parliament. However, the government still has a critical role to play in facilitating and accelerating the process. Several ministries are reportedly drafting legislation within their respective portfolios in preparation for the first parliamentary session, aiming to avoid unnecessary delays. Yet it remains unclear what concrete steps are being taken by the transitional authorities to prioritise the political party law. No lead body has been identified, no roadmap outlined, and no public commitment made to a timetable that would expedite the drafting and legislative process.

With just four years remaining before two pivotal elections, time is a scarce commodity. Political parties cannot be formed overnight; they require time to organise, define platforms, cultivate constituencies, and prepare for meaningful competition. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa—and the movement expected to form around him—already benefits from a substantial institutional and symbolic head start, owing to his central role in toppling the regime and steering the transition. Delays in legalising new parties risk reinforcing sceptics' perception that the process is being deliberately stalled to cement that advantage. Intentional or not, the optics are politically damaging.

Delays in legalising new parties risk reinforcing sceptics' perception that the process is being deliberately stalled to cement a political advantage.

Clear roadmap needed

If the transitional authorities are serious about building a pluralist and inclusive Syria, they must move beyond vague assurances and take decisive action. That starts with a clear, public roadmap for legalising political parties —one that accelerates the drafting, debate, and ratification of a robust parties law.

But more than just a timeline, this law must be transformative. It must guarantee political freedoms, level the playing field, and dismantle the remnants of authoritarian control that still shadow the country's political landscape. Without such a law, politics in Syria will remain the preserve of the powerful—an exclusive privilege rather than a democratic right.

Any further delay, whether intentional or the result of institutional inertia, will only deepen public scepticism and further alienate those already doubtful of the transition's sincerity. Worse, it risks reproducing the very dynamics that ignited the revolution in the first place: centralised authority, political exclusion, and a performative public sphere.

There can be no credible transition without representation. No legitimacy without participation. If Syria is to break from its past, pluralism cannot be postponed—and neither can the laws that make it real. The burden now falls squarely on the transitional leadership to prove not just that they understand this urgency, but that they are willing to act on it boldly, transparently, and without delay.

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