Syria needs economic support, but must also do its part

Positive signs

There is no dispute about the scale of Syria's needs. IFI representatives consistently expressed concern about the depth of the economic crisis and emphasised the importance of delivering assistance quickly.

Encouragingly, there appears to be broad alignment on where to begin. The priorities I heard in private conversations echoed those outlined publicly by Mr Barnieh: building institutional capacity, laying the groundwork for credible reform, and restoring public trust in Syria's economic governance.

Moreover, IFI staff praised the engagement they've seen from Syria's transitional authorities. They cited the transitional authorities' openness to technical support and their desire to benefit from institutional expertise. This engagement, while still in early stages, is a positive signal.

Still, this positive momentum has frequently been disrupted. Violent clashes in Sweida, for instance, delayed a scheduled visit by a technical committee tasked with developing a capacity-building plan for Syria's financial institutions.

Administrative bottlenecks have also continued to hinder progress. Bureaucratic hurdles, including ongoing delays in visa processing, have reportedly slowed the delivery of international support. These delays are partly due to the continued reliance on individual discretion for key approvals, rather than streamlined institutional procedures.

Additionally, competing priorities—particularly those related to foreign policy—have at times drawn the attention of senior Syrian officials away from these discussions and the administrative steps needed to advance them.

Age-old challenges

These challenges are neither new nor unique to IFIs. They echo patterns I have encountered in conversations with governments and other international actors since the fall of the Assad regime. Offers of technical support have often stalled due to gaps in communication, poor coordination, or a lack of operational readiness on the ground.

In nearly all cases, Syrian officials expressed genuine gratitude and a willingness to engage. Yet too many of these offers failed to materialise. The delays are not necessarily due to unwillingness, as Syria's fragile transition and institutional weaknesses pose real obstacles. Still, the transitional authorities must do their part to create the conditions necessary for international support to move forward.

Minister Barnieh is right to argue that Syria cannot afford to wait. The same, however, holds true for IFIs and donor governments. Interest in Syria remains high—for now. But without credible signals that Damascus is ready to absorb and act on support offers, attention and resources may well shift elsewhere.

Syria's future depends on its ability to become a reliable partner in its own recovery. Without that, international actors may have little choice but to invest in more viable alternatives. The burden may be shared, but the responsibility to open the door lies with Syria. Only by doing so can offers of support turn into tangible, lasting progress.