Why foreign meddling in Sudan's war is only part of the problem

Eyeing on opportunity

Western nations are keen to prevent the expansion of Russian influence in Africa, but Moscow is involved in Sudan because it sees an opportunity. It supports the SAF (in line with positions taken in the likes of Washington, Paris, and London). Anatoly Bashkin, a director at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed this position to African Initiative, adding that Moscow was "focusing on finding diplomatic solutions to the conflict and is ready to facilitate dialogue between the opposing sides".

Strong relations between Moscow and Khartoum were established during the Soviet era, Sudan having been among the first countries to recognise the Russian Federation as the successor state of the USSR. Importantly, Soviet-era policy towards African countries became a template for modern Russian policy. Defence procurement has long been key. Under Omar al-Bashir, who ruled from 1993 to 2019, Sudan became a big buyer of Russian military equipment.

In 2008, Moscow did not endorse an International Criminal Court decision to issue an arrest warrant for al-Bashir, who it accused of orchestrating ethnic cleansing and war crimes in Darfur. A year later, the Sudanese president described Russia as "not just a friend, but a state that always acts with justice, never abandoning its friends in times of need".

Russia is open about its primary objective in Sudan: the establishment of a naval base on the Sudanese coast, giving it access to the Red Sea and the nearby Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a key oil corridor and the shortest route between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the 1970s, Somalia gave the Soviets a naval base on its coast, giving access to the same stretch of water in return for weapons, but relations soured in 1977 after Moscow was found to be supporting Ethiopia, and the Soviet advisors were expelled.

In November 2017, during a visit to Moscow, al-Bashir discussed a base with Russian President Vladimir Putin and (then) Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Speaking to RIA Novosti, he also said Sudan could buy Russian Su-30 and Su-35 fighter jets, and expressed an interest in its S-300 surface-to-air missile systems.

Location and resources

Sudan's strategic location is not its only selling point. It is also rich in natural resources, water, and arable land. Of all its resources, gold is by far its most valuable. Much of it ends up in the markets of the UAE via third countries such as Chad.

In 2017, the Russian- and UAE-owned Kush for Exploration & Production Co. Ltd (Kush EP) was given a licence for geological exploration by the Sudanese Ministry of Mineral Resources, while Rusatom Overseas (part of Rosatom, a Russian state-owned energy company) won a deal with Sudan's Ministry of Water Resources, Irrigation and Electricity to develop a nuclear power plant.

Several Russian companies signed concession agreements with the Sudanese government for gold mining, including M-Invest, which was owned by the late Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin. It acted as the investment arm of the Russian mercenary organisation he founded, the Wagner Group, which later became Russia's Africa Corps. Other Russian economic interests related to the export of petroleum products, but the secession of South Sudan in 2011 meant that most of the oil fields ended up in the south, while all the infrastructure—including pipelines and ports—was in the north.

In February 2017, al-Bashir said Sudan and Russia had developed a joint programme to enhance the combat readiness of the Sudanese army. "This will strengthen our army, and it will be able to repel any attacks intended to harm Sudan," he said. Later that year, Wagner teams were deployed to Sudan to train the armed forces (which, at the time, included the RSF) in combat tactics, the use of heavy weapons and artillery, and the protection of strategic sites.

Playing both sides

In 2019, al-Bashir was overthrown. General Burhan was open to the idea of a Russian base on Sudan's coast, but fierce fighting between the SAF and the RSF put all plans on hold. A final decision to approve the construction of a Russian base in Port Sudan was announced in February 2025 by Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Yousef Sharif, in exchange for undisclosed Russian military assistance, which had already increased since 2024. A warm water port in Sudan could be even more important if Moscow loses its naval facility in Tartus, Syria.

Although Hemedti visited Moscow and met senior Russian officials after the overthrow of President al-Bashir in 2019, rumours of active Russian support for the RSF are false, although Prigozhin, who fell out publicly with Putin and died in a helicopter crash shortly after, had close ties with Hemedti, both in business and in his official state capacity.

Although Russia supports the SAF, its weapons often end up in RSF hands via eastern Libya, which is ruled by the warlord Khalifa Haftar (a close ally of Hemedti), and via the UAE, which backs the RSF. In the UAE, shipments are prepared and "mixed" with Chinese and Iranian equipment before being sent to Libya, where, with assistance from Russia's Africa Corps, they are transported to Sudan over the border.

Claims that Russian forces in Libya are effectively maintaining the Haftar-Hemedti logistical "artery" would be an exaggeration, but Moscow is having to balance its approach between support for the SAF and Haftar in Libya, so it turns a blind eye to the flow of Russian weapons to the RSF. This gives Russia another lever of influence, albeit reluctantly, over both sides of the Sudanese conflict. Ultimately, the Kremlin has no wish to get drawn further into the conflict in Sudan.

Ethnic dimension

The problems in Sudan are a Gordian knot whose roots stretch back to the colonial era. The war is more than just a struggle between two opposing forces for control over territory and resources. Sudan is a complex, multi-ethnic state. Too Arabised for Africa yet too African for the Arab world, tribal structures remain a very important factor, dividing society into social layers.

The country's population of 50 million comprises around 600 ethnic groups, speaking 400 languages and dialects. Membership in a particular tribal group still shapes the identity of many Sudanese. The SAF and RSF both have tribal 'pools' from which they recruit, leveraging inter-tribal grievances to do so. Some grievances stretch back almost 150 years, such as to the Mahdist uprising of 1881–1899, when the Ja'alin were loyal to Anglo-Egyptian forces, while the rebels were mainly drawn from the Baggaras.

The term 'Sudanisation' originally referred to the process of forming the governing structures of independent post-colonial Sudan, replacing the British and Egyptian colonial administration. This was carried out mostly by members of the Ja'alin, which deepened social stratification and marginalised southern and non-Arab ethnic groups.

Today, the term 'Sudanisation' is more likely to describe a scenario in which the state seeks to strengthen the dominance of the ruling group, drawing on its traditional and cultural values. In this respect, the Sudanese conflict is little different from most other African conflicts: at its core lies a confrontation between the centre and the periphery.

Inclusivity or bust

Conflict arises where acute social inequality in states with an unformed national identity takes on ethnic dimensions. When the rapidly growing populations of post-colonial peripheries are cut off from the distribution of resources, denied social mobility and even the means for a normal existence, they do not simply refuse to comply—they cannot continue to live as before. Their only recourse is armed protest.

The Rizeigat, a tribe whose members form the core of the RSF, largely represent the interests of marginalised minorities and ethnic groups striving for social equality. Ironically, their agency grew against the backdrop of their bloody role in the Darfur conflict, where they fought on the government's side.

The Sudanese conflict, like most in Africa, has no military solution. 'Victory' for either side will not resolve its underlying causes. The only long-term solution is a negotiated process that creates an inclusive government. Otherwise, the conflict risks becoming a war of all against all, fragmenting Sudan into isolated tribal enclaves, each with its own warlord and armed formations, operating under an autonomous conflict economy based on the exploitation of a population whose freedoms have all been lost.

This problem is not unique to Sudan. It affects many countries in the region and can have a domino effect, in which local crises escalate into cross-border conflicts. Untangling this complex situation is both difficult and vital, but ignoring it, as the world has done since April 2023, is no longer an option.