Illicit economies play a big role in Syria’s post-Assad flashpoints

In areas like Daraa and Suweida, local groups are elbowing their way into some of the smuggling voids left by Assad’s army and pro-Iranian groups like Hezbollah. That means more to fight over.

the city of Sweida, following renewed fighting between Bedouin fighters and Druze gunmen, despite an announced truce, in Syria July 18, 2025.
Reuters
the city of Sweida, following renewed fighting between Bedouin fighters and Druze gunmen, despite an announced truce, in Syria July 18, 2025.

Illicit economies play a big role in Syria’s post-Assad flashpoints

Long a crossroads for trade and migration, southern Syria is a hub for the smuggling of illicit goods—from weapons and fuel to food and antiquities. In particular, Daraa and Suweida have become important for the trafficking of illicit drugs such as crystal methamphetamine and Captagon, with Jordan a popular transit country for amphetamine-type stimulants.

Some assumed that the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 would translate into a near-collapse of illicit drug trading in Syria, given the regime’s monopoly over both drug production and trafficking. Much of this was coordinated through the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armoured Division, led from 2000 to 2024 by Maher al-Assad, brother of Bashar. He was sanctioned by the US and Europe in 2023 in part because of his role in Syria’s Captagon industry.

As the new administration in Damascus has sought to rebuild after the fall of Assad, several flashpoints have emerged in the country’s south, the most recent and high-profile of which has been the violence in Suweida, which killed more than 1,000 people. Such violence is often portrayed as sectarian clashes, but in fact there is another factor in play: control of the lucrative smuggling routes.

Smuggling hubs

Southern Syria’s geography makes it a natural corridor for trafficking. Bordered by Jordan to the south and Lebanon to the west, the region includes sprawling deserts, mountainous terrain, and poorly monitored border crossings. With state resources stretched and state control loose at best, this has allowed smugglers, armed groups, and local militias to profit from all manner of illicit trading.

Weather conditions along Syria’s border with Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq often help the smugglers. In the summer, the heat and dusty desert conditions challenge border security forces’ detection efforts. In the winter, detection is encumbered by snow, sleet, and fog. In response, neighbouring states have increased border surveillance efforts, co-opting local actors such as militias, tribes, and prominent families to help.

Karam Al-Masri / Reuters
Syrian security forces patrol after being deployed in the village of Al-Soura al-Kubra, following clashes between Sunni Islamist militants and Druze fighters, in Suweida province, Syria, May 2, 2025.

Since 2021, these neighbouring countries have reported both an uptick in seizures and a rise in the frequency and ferocity of clashes between their forces and convoys of smugglers, many of whom are heavily armed and equipped with advanced technology such as drones or GPS-guided balloons.

During the Assad regime years, Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned militias moved to the south of Syria to co-opt local crime syndicates and smuggling families, arming them and supporting cross-border operations as leverage over states like Jordan, particular when smuggling routes overlapped with their own Iran-to-Lebanon corridors. Small-scale factories were established in southern Syria in locations such as militia headquarters, as evidenced when the headquarters of Raji Falhout’s militia was raided and discovered to have hosted a Captagon manufacturing site.

Small-scale factories were established in southern Syria in locations such as militia headquarters

The Syrian regime would sometimes turn a blind eye to smuggling in exchange for tribal loyalty, tolerating Druze militias on the condition that they did not challenge Damascus. With Assad gone, trafficking gangs are jostling to fill in the vacuum left by the regime and the waning influence of Hezbollah and Iran, not least because of rising drug prices increasing the profitability of illegal drug production and distribution.

Lucrative networks

For generations, militias and tribal networks—especially in Suweida and Daraa—have smuggled products like food, medicines, drugs, fuel, and even wildlife and antiquities. Some act independently, others work with larger regional networks or even state-aligned syndicates, such as the 4th Armoured Division and Military Intelligence. Other elements of the Syrian military and security services took bribes to look the other way.

There are now three major local forces implicated in Syria's illicit activities: militias loyal to local Druze and communal authorities, Bedouin tribal groups, and networks with loyalties to the old regime and its Iran-aligned partners, such as Hezbollah. Tensions between these three are now playing out.

In southern Syria, the most influential Druze figure is Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and his loose network of local armed factions known as the Suweida Military Council (SMC). These armed groups have increasingly acted as local security providers in the absence of Damascus. The SMC is known to jealously guard against is any increased presence of state-backed Sunni traffickers into the region.

Bakr Alkasem / AFP
Syrian security forces stand by as a United Nations convoy evacuating families from Suweida.

Several Druze fighters under Hijri's security umbrella have been implicated in drug smuggling operations, with a sought-after Druze fighter with close ties to the Assad regime killed in a reported Captagon trafficking operation in Salkhad. Druze livestock traders have also reportedly engaged in exporting drugs and weapons alongside Bedouin al-Balaas groups from a rural farm in southern Syria.

Tribal routes

The Mazhar family, a one-time Assad regime ally in Suweida, reportedly continues to play a role in smuggling, alongside another Druze entity, the Sheikh al-Karama militia, which has a history of kidnapping regime-aligned smugglers. Alongside them, Bedouin tribes in the southern and eastern countryside of Suweida reportedly move drugs across tribal routes stretching into Daraa and Jordan. Historically marginalised, the Bedouin tribes know the terrain better than anyone, and have familial affiliations beyond Syria, meaning they control routes between southern Syria and Jordan.

In addition to notable clans and networks like the al-Balaas smuggling group, the Ramthan family is also involved, even drawing repeated strikes from Jordan's military. Marie al-Ramthan was killed in one such airstrikes in May 2023, along with his family, on a compound that Jordanian forces said was a staging post. Along with his relative, Sheikh Mohammed Awad al-Ramthan, Marie al-Ramthan was believed to have recruited hundreds of Bedouin smugglers from across southern Syria.

Bedouin tribes know the terrain and have familial affiliations beyond Syria, meaning they control routes between southern Syria and Jordan

Tensions have at times erupted into open conflict between Druze militias and Bedouin-linked smuggling groups, especially when traffickers use violence or target civilians. Suweida has seen an increase in kidnappings, road ambushes, and retaliatory raids—symptoms of a deepening security vacuum and communal fragmentation. On July 11, 2025, competition over control of routes—sparked by a robbery on the Damascus-Suweida highway—incited retaliatory kidnappings and clashes that quickly escalated into the violence that gripped the world's attention in July.

Symptom of malaise

Drug smuggling in southern Syria is the byproduct of war, corruption, and neglect. Syria under the Assad regime had become a narco-state, which had profound implications for its neighbours. Tackling the problem today requires more than border control; it needs political will, regional coordination, and a long-term strategy to restore governance, opportunity, and the rule of law in southern Syria.

 Bakr Alkasem / AFP
A member of the Syrian government security forces sits outside a damaged shop in the village of Walgha, near the city of Suweida, on July 21, 2025.

Smuggling has had a corrosive effect on southern Syrian communities. In Suweida, there has been a proliferation of drugs, criminal networks, and armed clashes. Druze religious leaders have protested the growing lawlessness and demanded stronger local governance. In Daraa, where anti-government sentiment remains strong, industry is virtually non-existent and most young people are unemployed. Despite the risks, the drugs trade offers a source of income.

Anti-smuggling operations by Jordanian forces or rival groups often lead to cross-border shootouts or retaliatory violence. Damascus needs to get on top of the problem, addressing some of the drivers (income, job, food insecurity), beginning by acknowledging the role drug traffickers have played in some of Syria's worst violence since the fall of Assad. Targeted interventions in the Druze and Bedouin communities affected by trafficking will help. By removing the competition for lucrative smuggling routes, the government could remove the reasons to fight in the first place.

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