Putin talks Islamists, gold, and nuclear power with Mali’s leader

A five-day visit to Moscow ended with agreements to cooperate in a range of areas. Mali wants nuclear power and Russian military support, whereas the Kremlin has its eyes on a precious metal.

Eduardo Ramon

Putin talks Islamists, gold, and nuclear power with Mali’s leader

Just days after Russian mercenaries left Mali after three years fighting armed anti-government groups in the African nation, Mali’s president flew into Moscow to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin.

General Assimi Goïta, who, as commander of Mali’s Special Operations Battalion, took power in a 2020 coup, led a delegation that signed agreements on areas such as gold mining, energy, and security, with a smaller Russian fighting contingent remaining in Mali to assist with the latter.

Goïta’s office said he “received with honours befitting his status” on a visit during which he laid a wreath at the Eternal Flame by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Alexander Garden near the Kremlin. It was his second visit to Russia as head of state, after the Russia–Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in July 2023.

The meeting in June 2025 marked a strengthening of cooperation between Bamako and Moscow, yet it also carried practical significance for the Confederation of the Sahel States, which includes Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, whose governments have all been overthrown by military leaders in recent years).

Ministers signed agreements on trade, scientific collaboration, agriculture, gold, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the latter having been signed by the director-general of Russia’s state-owned Rosatom and Mali’s energy minister. Yet defence and security were also on the agenda for Putin and Goïta.

Importance of security

It is just as well. Days after Goïta returned, armed men set fire to government buildings in Western Mali in a series of large-scale jihadist attacks near the border with Senegal. Reports suggest Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda linked group, targeted numerous buildings, including a police and customs office in Diboli, as part of a wide-ranging attack across at least seven towns.

Mali’s army, whose bases in the region were attacked, said it had ‘neutralised’ the threat and killed more than 80 militants, but the incident shows that its security issues are far from over, despite announcements of progress against the ethnic Tuareg separatists Mali’s army has been fighting for years in the Sahara Desert.

In Moscow, Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov and Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara discussed the implementation of prior military agreements aimed at strengthening security and sovereignty—something Goïta asked Russia (via the Wagner Group) to help him achieve after French and Western forces left in 2021.

Goïta has an insider's knowledge of operations. An army officer and Sunni Muslim from the Malinké ethnic group, he received military training both at home and abroad, including in France, Germany, Gabon, and the United States, before participating in combat operations against terrorist groups, which earned him his stripes.

Russian and Malian ministers signed agreements on security, trade, science, agriculture, gold, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

Consolidating power

In August 2020, Goïta led a coup that ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and was appointed chairman of the CNSP (National Committee for the Salvation of the People), which then declared him head of state. In September 2020, he was named vice president for the transitional period.

In May 2021, Goïta dismissed President Bah Ndaw and his government, accusing them of ties to the former regime. Mali's Constitutional Court declared Goïta interim president, with opposition politician Choguel Kokalla Maïga appointed prime minister.

In July 2023, following a coup in Niger that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, Goïta and Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso (who led a military coup there in September 2022) warned that any foreign intervention in Niger would be considered a declaration of war. The trio of states, which were all now seeking Moscow's military help, joined forces within the new Sahel States Alliance in September 2023.

In January 2024, they announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), marking the end of their pro-Western alignment. That same month, Goïta withdrew from the 2015 Algiers Agreements, a framework that allowed for a recently-disbanded UN peacekeeping force in Mali as a means of stabilising the country after the Tuareg rebellion of 2012.

In April 2025, a national conference, boycotted by the opposition, recommended extending Goïta's presidency until 2030. In July 2024, the Sahel States Alliance became the Confederation of Sahel States, with Goïta named as its president. In November, Goïta dismissed Prime Minister Shoguel Maïga and appointed an army ally, Lt. Col. Abdoulaye Maïga, in his place.

Pavel Bednyakov / AFP
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Mali's junta leader Assimi Goita at the Kremlin in Moscow on June 23, 2025.

During this period, numerous prominent opposition figures, including the influential imam Mahmoud Dicko, left Mali, fearing for their personal safety. In May 2024, the Council of Ministers dissolved all political parties, citing corruption and collaboration with the West. This marked Goïta's consolidation of power, drawing accusations of authoritarianism.

Downward trends

To Goïta's supporters, these drastic measures were partly necessitated by the instability and ongoing fight against terrorism. Additionally, the African perspective on authoritarianism differs from the European view. In Africa, strong leadership often enjoys popular support, and democracy can often be associated with chaos.

Nobody denies that Mali's security and economic indicators remain critical, with downward trends continuing. This makes Russia's role ever more important. In the short- to medium-term, neither Mali nor its Sahel allies are capable of independently overcoming armed anti-government groups, many of which are tied to global terrorist networks.

Landlocked Mali is not alone in facing attacks by JNIM and others, with Burkina Faso also being attacked by jihadists. Yet Mali's border region with Senegal has long been considered stable. This will worry leaders in the capital, Bamako, because the border region is important for Malian trade, as it is an access route for imports arriving at the Dakar ports on the Atlantic coast.

Having sought new (Russian) partners in security, Mali has also sought non-Western support in other areas, like education and economic development. Goïta has engaged with China, Türkiye, and the Gulf states, but has leaned heavily on Russia, whose interests include Mali's gold reserves.

In the short- to medium-term, neither Mali nor its Sahel allies are capable of independently overcoming armed anti-government groups

Taking back control

Mali is Africa's second largest miner of gold, and as Goïta's Moscow visit came to an end, his government announced that it had completed the takeover of gold mines abandoned by companies from countries such as South Africa and Australia, who left after the Malian government increased taxes, revised contracts, and ordered regulatory crackdowns. Canada's IAMGOLD Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex was placed under state control last month.

Mali hopes to mine and then refine gold through a new Russian-built refinery, before exporting the precious metal, the price of which is at record highs. Russia, meanwhile, promises to "export security" and to give Mali a peaceful nuclear energy programme. The country's energy shortages—and the high cost of electricity—are major obstacles to economic development and diversification beyond resource extraction, comparable in severity to armed conflict and instability.

Rosatom, which is not under Western sanctions, is one of the few Russian entities capable of building a nuclear plant, versions of which it has constructed in Türkiye, Egypt, and Bangladesh. Security for the plant would be provided by the Russian African Corps, in coordination with local forces.

This is a long-term project that requires immense effort, but many view it as an existential necessity if Russia and the Sahel are to transition from close cooperation to full synergy between their security and economic strategies. The stakes are high.

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