How the Middle East can capitalise on Iran’s regional setbackhttps://en.majalla.com/node/326311/politics/how-middle-east-can-capitalise-iran%E2%80%99s-regional-setback
On 24 June, the world woke up to a transformed Middle East. US President Donald Trump declared a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, with the latter having suffered a massive defeat, along with its ally, Russia, and its regional proxies.
The key question now is, how to build on this success and promote lasting stability in a region that has seen little of it. The first step is to strengthen containment of Iran, but the details of this task are critical to its success.
The US has played the central role in both this conflict and in previous ones—sometimes successfully, sometimes not. That will change to some degree in this “day after.” Not because President Trump has lost interest in this important region, but because his views on where—and where not—the US could be helpful have evolved.
The “where not” here is important, as Trump’s political base includes many who favour isolationism. They can be persuaded, as the recent strike on Iran has shown, but only if American commitments are short, low-cost, and visibly necessary to advance interests that Americans accept as legitimate.
In Trump's vision, the US will be the actor of last resort—an over-the-horizon security guarantor willing to act only when critically important
The region thus should take seriously the sketch of American Middle East Policy that Trump laid out in his May Riyadh speech. In his vision, the US aims to be the actor of last resort—an over-the-horizon security guarantor willing to act only when critically important. The US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites is a clear example. In his speech, Trump made a point to emphasise his confidence in the region's ability to address many of its problems independently.
This suggests an optimal division of labour between the two primary actors in the region, the United States and regional states. The American security umbrella will focus, in concert with Israel, on Iran's direct strategic threats, but dealing with Tehran's residual proxy networks in the region—from Gaza and Lebanon to Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—should be more of a function of regional states, in an informal coalition.
This makes sense, first, because Arab states and Türkiye—which neighbour states that harbour proxy networks—have a keen interest in weakening these groups and Iran's control over them. Second, regional powers possess the long-term vision and intuition that the United States lacks, making them more effective players.
The following is a working plan for regional players to further weaken proxies, although I outline areas where the US could potentially act. Other actors are less important. Broadly, the European Union and Britain support US goals, but beyond financial support, can undertake little independently on regional security. China and Russia have been largely powerless during the 20-month campaign raging throughout the region, despite their important niche role in the Security Council.
People erect tents amidst the rubble of destroyed buildings as displaced Palestinians return to the northern areas of the Gaza Strip in Jabalia on January 23, 2025, during a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was reached.
Gaza
The UAE and Egypt have both advanced "day after" plans for Gaza with joint Palestinian Authority, regional, and international roles. The basic outlines are good, but they require Hamas to surrender political and military control to some other Palestinian, pan-Arab, or joint entity.
This is possible but will not be easy, and Israel will insist on the right to act if Hamas reconstitutes its capabilities, as with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There are divisions among Arab states over how ready the current Palestinian leadership is to assume a Gaza role, but at some point, the region will have to go with whatever Ramallah can muster.
The US role here is crucial; only it can compel this Israeli government to abandon what is becoming a never-ending war in Gaza against Hamas remnants, at great cost to the population. One collateral benefit of President Trump's decision to strike Iran is the credibility it gives him to press the Israelis here.
Syria
Leading Arab states, generally aligned with Türkiye, have commendably taken a leading role. The task, however, is different in Syria, as most overt Iranian influence has gone (although Iran has both covert ties to many Syrians and an intense desire to return), and the current Syrian government has shown its enmity towards Assad's ally, Tehran.
Rather, the problem to be tackled is the extreme fragility of the new Syrian state, wracked by 14 years of war, half of its population displaced, and hundreds of thousands killed, and an enduring economic crisis. It also faces deep internal discord, with armed groups of questionable loyalty to the central government in the north, northeast, west, and south, along with a residual Islamic State (IS) presence.
Only the US can compel Israel to abandon what is becoming a never-ending war in Gaza
The first priority for regional states is securing economic support, including lobbying Washington to accelerate the permanent lifting of sanctions that are still hindering a serious recovery. The second is to remain united. Divisions within the Arab world over Syria policy, emerging in 2018, undercut a common position on the Assad regime. This was eventually rectified, but only after al-Assad rejected any reforms in exchange for his full participation in the Arab League in 2023.
The biggest danger now is that Arab states, and Ankara, will adopt not only differing positions on Damascus, but also towards the various armed groups controlling large swaths of the country. Here, the Arab world and Türkiye must speak with one voice. One suggestion is to establish a "task list" for internal reforms, governance, internal security, and foreign relations for the new government to consider, similar to the approach taken by the Arabs regarding al-Assad (2021-24).
President Trump publicly informed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that he would work to calm the Syria-related tensions between Netanyahu and Turkish President Erdogan. That would alleviate one of the most tense issues in the current Syrian situation. Beyond that, the United States has an interest in keeping IS down, which requires continued cooperation with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
But in the complicated world of today's Syria, the same SDF is both negotiating with Damascus on the reintegration of north-east Syria into the central state, including administration, economy, energy and security forces, and struggles with Türkiye over its PKK roots. The United States thus has a key role still to play, as well as with the permanent lifting of sanctions. Finally, the United States will have to work with both Syria and Jordan on the 1974 Israel-Syrian agreement and the status of the Occupied Golan Heights.
Vehicles drive near damaged buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect, Lebanon November 27, 2024.
Lebanon
The terms of the 2024 ceasefire, referring back to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, give legal justification to the Lebanese government and people's effort to degrade Hezbollah's status as a heavily armed "state within a state." The UN and international donors have a significant role to play, given the legal questions and dire economic situation, but Arab states are also important, first in terms of financial and other economic support, but beyond that, speaking in unison, pressing the Lebanese government to fulfil its commitments in taming Hezbollah.
The linkage between outside assistance from international actors, including Arab states, on the one hand, and adherence to the disarmament and other provisions of UN Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire, on the other, is critical for peace and stability. One important area of intra-Arab cooperation is the relationship between Lebanon and Syria. Syria needs regional support for blocking arms shipments to Hezbollah. Despite 1701, shipments have been attempted since the change in governments in Damascus. Lebanon and Syria should also establish a joint position on the Shebaa Farms issue.
The United States does not have a significant direct role in Lebanon, although its support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, other forms of assistance, and its Security Council membership are important. Arab states should cooperate with Washington, including on Israeli adherence to the ceasefire agreement, and eventual Israeli withdrawal from the posts they still occupy just inside the Lebanese border.
Iraq
As with Lebanon, Arab states have long-standing ties to the Iraqi government and are increasingly developing economic and diplomatic relations with it. But Iran's influence, through political parties and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), is more diffuse than that of Iran's proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iraq is also more vulnerable as it shares a border and has strong energy relations with Iran, and unlike Lebanon, does not have international legal mandates to reduce proxy power. As one of the world's leading oil producers, Iraq is also a prize central to Iran's regional ambitions.
Arab states can utilise their diplomatic and economic ties to influence the Iraqi government on the margins, thereby preserving its freedom of action. Baghdad needs to be reminded that having too close ties with Tehran can push its Kurdish population towards separation, and its Sunni Arab population into the arms of IS once again, both developments a threat to the region beyond just Iraq. Cooperation with Türkiye on the Kurdish Regional Government-Baghdad relationship should also be a priority.
The American role in Iraq is slowly diminishing but still important, in commercial, especially energy, deals, in preventing a resurgence of IS, and through much legacy legal, financial, and diplomatic development. The bottom line for Washington, Arab states, Türkiye and the broader international community must be that an Iraq following the course of Lebanon or Yemen these past two decades would be a regional catastrophe.
A Houthi walks across the beach with a cargo ship seized by the Houthis in the background, on 5 December 2023
Yemen
No outside entity has had great success in Yemen for decades, with even Iran unable to propel its Houthi proxies to complete control and international recognition. Assuming the conflict between the Houthis and the central government remains largely frozen, Arab states should focus on providing diplomatic support to the legitimate government and humanitarian assistance.
The United States has little interest in taking on the Houthis, assuming they do not restart their marine transit attacks. This complex should almost certainly be left for later, assuming no major changes on the ground.
It took decades for Iran to build up its regional proxy network. And in succeeding, it put the Arab world under great pressure, robbing citizens of four Arab states and Gaza of much of their right to self-determination, and plunging all of them at various times into wars with immense human cost, and destabilising the entire region.
Over the long term, a prosperous and peaceful Middle East requires rollback not only of Iran's nuclear and other military programmes, but of its dominance over other states through proxies. For many reasons, Arab states are far better positioned than outsiders, including the US, for this mission. However, the prerequisites are a unified position among all Arab states and a willingness to counter inevitable Iranian and proxy resistance.
