Why Libya isn't the right model for Iran’s nuclear climbdown

Gaddafi's motivations

Notwithstanding such technical details, calls for applying a 'Libyan Model' in Iran fundamentally misjudge the geopolitical, technical, and strategic realities pertaining to Libya and Iran, respectively. The main driver for Gaddafi to get rid of his programme was to end sanctions imposed on Libya after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland, killing 243 passengers, 16 crew, and 11 residents.

Dismantling the programme merely required a decision by Gaddafi. For all intents and purposes, the programme was practically non-existent. It was called a "programme in boxes" by the former IAEA Director General, Mohamed El Baradei, after a visit to Tripoli. Libya had bought the equipment for its programme, but had not even unpacked the boxes in which they were delivered!

El Baradei's comments poured cold water on the hype and hysteria surrounding the dangers of Libya's nuclear programme, which did not go down well in Western capitals. Soon, the IAEA was shunted aside by the US and UK, whose specialists took over the lead on dismantlement. The IAEA was relegated to the role of passing a resolution to provide international legitimacy to these actions.

On 10 March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which welcomed Libya's "transparent and proactive" disclosure of its clandestine nuclear programme, concluding that Libya's nuclear activities had not progressed beyond a "feasibility study" with no evidence of weaponisation, fissile material production, or indigenous enrichment capability, Libya having relied on imported components.

The IAEA's mandate is to prevent the use of nuclear technology for military purposes, but it was not allowed to participate in the dismantling of Libya's programme. Instead, the boxes were handed to the US and UK, who are understood to have destroyed the contents.

Libya wanted sanctions lifted, and its desperation to dismantle its nascent programme was palpable. I recall a cabinet minister dispatched from Tripoli vehemently objecting to my decision to delay the adoption of the resolution by my insistence on the inclusion of wording to describe the dismantlement as a step towards a nuclear-free Middle East (a provision that both the US and Israel strongly opposed).

Iran's circumstances

Unlike Libya in 2003, Iran in 2025 is far from desperate to dismantle its programme, which in turn is far from nascent. Gaddafi's nuclear ambitions were embryonic and imported, whereas Iran's programme is well-established and homegrown, its nuclear infrastructure having been built over decades.

This is said to comprise more than 16,000 centrifuges (including advanced models like the IR-6), stockpiles of enriched uranium (now at 60% purity, nearing weapons-grade) and domestic expertise in uranium mining, fuel production, and reactor design. These capabilities are deeply institutionalised, making dismantlement technically unfeasible.

Geopolitically, today's Iran and Gaddafi's Libya were parts of different alliances and had different regional influences. While Libya was highly isolated, Iran still has a network of international partners, not least Russia and China. Although it lost a Middle East ally with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Tehran is normalising relations with Gulf Arab states and Egypt, and maintains close relations with Turkey and Pakistan.

The context is different, too. Libya's dismantlement occurred during a period of undisputed US hegemony. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq convinced Gaddafi that weapons of mass destruction made him a target, not a deterrent. Today, however, a multipolarity empowers Iran to leverage Sino-Russian support against Western pressure, as seen in its continued oil exports despite sanctions.

With sanctions having slashed Libya's oil revenue by around 80%, Gaddafi prioritised survival over nuclear prestige, but Iran faces no comparable pressures, and its regime is not at risk in the same way that Gaddafi was, with his system of patronage threatened. Iran's non-oil trade with China hit $20bn in 2023 (despite sanctions), Russia provides military support, and Iranian leaders see nuclear weapons as a security guarantee against foreign intervention, particularly after Libya's 2011 collapse.

The IAEA and JCPOA

The IAEA's handling of Libya and Iran underscores divergent trajectories. In the case of Libya, the IAEA Board was confined to adopting a resolution. In the case of Iran, it has been involved since allegations about a possible military nuclear programme came to light more than two decades ago, closely monitoring Iranian compliance with resolutions through inspections, and Iran voluntarily applying the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Given this long-running (and often problematic) relationship between Iran and the IAEA, it is inconceivable for the IAEA not to be involved in any future monitoring. For a decade now, the framework by which Iran's programme was monitored was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 agreement reached between Iran and six world powers (Russia, China, France, Germany, the UK, and the US).

This limited Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. Under the JCPOA—from which Trump withdrew the US in 2018—Iran's incremental concessions were reciprocally tied to sanction removals, a framework incompatible with unilateral dismantlement demands.

Gaddafi was unseated by a popular revolution in 2011 and killed later that year. This solidified Tehran's belief that denuclearisation invites vulnerability. Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 solidified another belief in Tehran: that negotiating partners can be firm one year but acquiesce the next. For Iran, there is a deep double standard over nuclear weapons in the Middle East, given Israel's undeclared capabilities.

While talks between American and Iranian envoys have been ongoing in Oman and Rome in recent weeks, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of progress. Both sides appear to sound positive. Yet it will all come down to American expectations, and whether this relates to the level of enrichment or total dismantlement.

Looking ahead

Iran appears keen on securing a deal that would end sanctions, but not at any price. Last month, Kamal Kharrazi, who heads Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, said: "The Libya model is a joke. We have learned from Gaddafi's mistake—disarmament led to his lynching. Our nuclear knowledge is irreversible."

While it is difficult to predict how the US-Iran talks will progress, three dates could have an impact. The first is Trump's planned Gulf visit next week. The second is Trump's 60-day Iran deadline (which differs depending on the start point, which is disputed).

The third is the 18 October expiration of the snap-back provision in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. Under this provision, if Iran breaches its commitments, UN sanctions can be rapidly reinstated ('snapped back') without requiring unanimous Security Council approval.

It is difficult to see how the US and Iran could reach agreement this month, so October is the more feasible date, but that gives Israel five months in which to launch a military strike, which US intelligence believes it intends to do so.

In conclusion, while US and Israeli hawks continue to invoke the 'Libya model' in calling for the total dismantlement of Iran's nuclear programme, the analogy is increasingly detached from reality. Iran's nuclear capabilities, regional alliances, and the lessons it took from Gaddafi's end all render any decision to fully dismantle untenable.

A path of phased concessions for sanctions relief, with caps on enrichment, is far more feasible, especially it this addresses Tehran's security concerns, not least Israel's own nuclear weapons. In essence, this would be a modernised version of the JCPOA that Trump withdrew from, one that recognises the context of a regional security system and provides for the establishment of a nuclear-free Middle East.