Trump's Iran strategy is irking Israel

What concerns the Israelis is not a possible return to JCPOA-era caps, but how quickly the Trump administration is willing to make concessions

Lina Jaradat

Trump's Iran strategy is irking Israel

On paper, Israel started 2025 in the best position when it comes to dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. Israeli strikes against Iran in 2024 had reportedly left Iran virtually defenceless, destroying all of its most sophisticated air defences. Hezbollah, one of Iran’s most powerful proxies whose missile arsenal was partly meant to serve as a response to an Israeli strike against Iran, was lying in shambles. And the cherry on top: President Trump, who exited the 2015 nuclear agreement and promised to re-implement maximum pressure, was about to enter the White House.

Four months into 2025, the picture has changed, and Israeli overconfidence has given ground to doubt. The Trump administration appears in no rush to strike Iran alongside Israel, or to give Israel the leeway (and weapons) it needs to do so unilaterally. And although Trump said the US would “lead the pack” in attacking Iran if a deal was not struck, the Israeli government is sceptical. At the same time, the deal currently being negotiated is one that could easily let Iran remain a “nuclear-threshold state”—namely a state that can quickly cross the nuclear threshold and build a bomb.

Meanwhile, internal debates are raging inside the Trump administration, possibly already affecting the fourth round of talks, which has been delayed. Washington appears confused about what it wants out of a deal, whether it wants a deal at any cost, or one that would more thoroughly eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat.

PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s position was relatively simple. With Iran more vulnerable than ever to a strike, Israel and the US would pressure Iran to agree to a deal that Israel can live with or (more likely) jointly strike Iran and remove the threat altogether—at least for a while.

Israel could have pursued an even more aggressive strategy, moving to immediately lobby Trump to strike Iran in the very first weeks of his term, without giving diplomacy a chance. However, during the weeks preceding his inauguration, it became apparent that, as some Trump watchers had suspected, the president wanted to leave the door open for diplomacy.

Iran itself understood the importance of sending a clear message to the new administration that it was willing to entertain talks. Most notably, just days after Trump’s electoral victory in 2024, reports emerged that Iran’s UN Ambassador Amir Saied Iravani had met with Elon Musk. Iran may have sensed that the DOGE czar was both a good conduit for messages to the (then) incoming administration, as opposed to a number of Iran hawks who were still believed to be on their way to a number of national-security and foreign policy positions.

The message also made sense, as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected in mid-2024, had stated during his campaign that he was willing to negotiate with Trump, should the US leader win the November elections.

It quickly became evident that Trump wanted to try the diplomatic route first. Israel was okay with this because, in its view, the new administration could pressure Iran into a deal far more comprehensive than the ill-named “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA—the formal name of the 2015 agreement) which would eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme, and address other areas of concerns including Iran’s ballistic missile programme and support for a number of proxies.

In recent weeks, Israel’s PM Netanyahu invoked a “Libyan model” for the nuclear deal, referring to the 2003 agreement that entirely removed Libya’s nascent nuclear programme under former leader Muammar Gaddafi. It's important to note, however, that this deal (and the fate of Gaddafi himself later on) was likely one of the reasons why Iran never considered a similar agreement.

Were the chances of a deal based on those parameters narrow? They absolutely were. But by the time diplomacy would fail, Israel and the US would have been ready to strike and destroy the Iranian nuclear programme. If, by some “art-of-the-deal miracle,” Trump were to pull off a win and convince Iran to agree to these terms, this would also represent an unprecedented victory.

Either way, Iran’s regional influence and ability to benefit from civil wars and chaos across the region (while generating its own) would dissipate. Faced with diminishing regional influence and unable to compensate for this loss by waiving the threat of turning nuclear, Iran would be isolated and defanged.

In many ways, this strategy bears a resemblance to that supported by US Diplomat George Kennan against the USSR during the Cold War: Iran would be contained, checked at every turn, unable to project power abroad, and ultimately forced to face its numerous internal problems. Those range from internal struggle within an ailing leadership, to an increasingly vocal opposition from most segments of the Iranian society to a regime that has come to rely on repression more than legitimacy.

From unease to real worry

The first rule of battle is that no plan survives contact with the enemy, and the Iran talks have been no exception. The first surprise came when Trump announced his intention to resume talks with Iran during a meeting with Netanyahu at the White House. Netanyahu was taken aback, in what is now a typical Trumpian move to turn run-of-the-mill foreign meetings into binge-worthy TV sets. Since then, three rounds of talks have taken place in April, turning a tingling sense of unease in Israel into very real concerns.

The trajectory of talks suggests the US will be satisfied with a modus vivendi that will likely preserve Iran's nuclear threshold status

This comes from two main reasons. Firstly, President Trump has no appetite for a strike in Iran. Recently, a New York Times report claimed the president dashed an Israeli proposal to strike Iran. When asked about the report directly, Trump denied he had rejected the Israeli proposal but said he was in no rush to carry out a military strike. Reading through his statements over the past months, Trump has been remarkably consistent when it comes to describing a military attack as an option of last resort, to be used only if Iran were to cross the nuclear threshold.

Second, Trump appears to be okay with scaled-down demands for a deal, suggesting he may agree to something close (or even more limited) than the JCPOA. Even before the first round of talks in Oman, US statements no longer referred to non-nuclear Iranian activities, despite the destabilising nature of those activities. Israel sees Iran's nuclear programme, support for proxies, and ballistic/drone manufacturing as a part of a whole that cannot be tackled separately.

In Netanyahu's view in particular, the 2015 nuclear agreement showed how dealing separately with one issue could fuel the others: The lifting of sanctions and perception that the issue with Iran was "resolved" both helped finance a surge in Iranian proxies and allowed the US to turn its eyes to other issues it viewed as more pressing. Similarly, a nuclear Iran wouldn't be dangerous just because it could use its nuclear weapons (though this is a real concern), but also because it would use its nuclear shield to act even more aggressively.

The fact that the Trump Administration stopped talking about non-nuclear issues deepened some of the discomfort Israel was feeling towards the US-Iran engagement. The first round of talks served to confirm that the US was not just seeking a deal but was also ready to make significant concessions to secure one. The fact that the talks quickly moved to the expert level after two rounds also signals a willingness to mend any gaps.

A comment by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff during an interview on FOX had particularly concerned the Israeli leadership. Witkoff, who has become Trump's point man on all of the main diplomatic topics, said, "They (Iran) do not need to enrich past 3.67%", referring to the limit on uranium enrichment. 

Since Trump's exit from the 2015 agreement, Iran has significantly expanded its enrichment capabilities, moving from 3.67%-enriched uranium (as per the nuclear deal) to 60%— much closer to the 90% needed for weapons-grade fissile material. Witkoff's comments suggest that the US isn't looking to go beyond the limits set by the 2015 JCPOA agreement. Following a backlash, Witkoff quickly corrected course, stating that the goal was to "eliminate" Iran's enrichment and weaponisation. Iran immediately responded by saying that enrichment was a "red line", suggesting the Islamic Republic would not agree to a full removal of its enrichment programme.

Though Israel could technically live with Iran enriching uranium at a low level for civilian purposes, this misses the point. What concerns the Israelis is not a possible return to JCPOA-era caps, but how quickly Trump is conceding to Iran.

A tall order

These concerns are compounded by the complexity of the current landscape. We're no longer in 2015: Iran is now much closer to a bomb, and rolling it back will be extremely difficult. Even if limits were placed on enrichment, Tehran would still retain the ability to quickly transition from low-enriched uranium to higher levels.

It has developed and rolled out a significant number of advanced centrifuges that can help produce enough fissile material in a couple of months, as well as a centrifuge-making industry that would enable it to quickly build and deploy additional centrifuges. This is in addition to the existing enriched uranium Iran has stockpiled, which is enough to make several bombs.

To truly roll back the programme, an agreement would have to not only set limits on enrichment but also remove centrifuges, monitor centrifuge-making factories, and remove existing stockpiles of uranium. If Iran's goal is simply to use nuclear power for civilian purposes, Tehran could also adhere to the "gold standard", which sets limits for truly peaceful nuclear programmes. Such limits include an agreement not to enrich uranium, and instead to buy low-enriched uranium from abroad.

Lina Jaradat

Read more: Iran's nuclear programme and the possibility of military action

Another key point is the issue of weaponisation, namely the process of producing a bomb that can be fitted into a delivery vector, such as a missile. The 2015 deal did not place any limits on weaponisation, nor did it regularly monitor possible weaponisation programmes. A new agreement would have to tackle this issue not only by removing some of the existing components of Iran's weaponisation programme, which reports claim still operate, but also by maintaining regular monitoring to show Iran isn't working on this important leg of a military programme.

Of course, the chances of Iran agreeing to all of those conditions, or even some of them, are low. Without significant pressure, Iran is unlikely to agree to fully dismantle its nuclear programme. The critical point is that Iran wants to remain a nuclear-threshold state, viewing such a status as a guarantee against further changes by the US, and more broadly against any future attack or attempt at regime change. The trajectory of the talks so far, with the US giving significant ground in a very limited amount of time, suggests that it is not keen on pushing Iran's limits and will be satisfied with a modus vivendi that will likely preserve Iran's nuclear threshold status.

Going at it alone?

In the wake of reports that Trump had dashed an Israeli offer to carry out a strike, several Israeli outlets circulated claims that Israel was prepared to strike alone. Netanyahu appeared to hint at this possibility, warning that he was "committed to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons" and would "not relent", "retreat", or "give up", in a deliberately defiant message. Netanyahu reiterated his message at a conference, stating, "Israel will never allow Iran to have nuclear weapons. Not now, not ever".

Whether Israel has the ability to significantly roll back Iran's nuclear programme is a matter of debate. Israel has been preparing for a strike for more than 15 years, but Iran has also moved to shield itself from some of Israel's aerial capabilities during that time, building deeply-buried facilities.

Planet Labs / AFP
This satellite image taken on April 2, 2025, shows American B-2 bomber planes on the tarmac of the US military base on Diego Garcia island, as well as six logistical Stratotanker aircraft for in-flight refuelling.

Support from the US would provide Israel with one of the most potent bunker-busters, and a plane to carry the bomb, whereas a unilateral strike would force Israel to use unconventional tactics, be it using dozens of smaller bombs, or even carrying out ground raids. But even these options would ideally require US greenlight as Iran is likely to retaliate not only against Israel, but also against US bases and on maritime traffic in the Arabian Gulf. 

This means that, whether the US approves the strike or not, it would likely be involved in the aftermath. Without prior coordination and a de facto US green light, Israel would jeopardise its good ties with Trump while carrying out a strike that may be less efficient than one it could execute with US support.

This means that, for now at least, a disappointed and concerned Israel is still likely to let Trump remain in the driver's seat, hoping to steer him away from a "bad deal" while still preparing for the possibility that diplomacy will collapse. As Trump said himself, he is "leading the pack"— although perhaps not in the direction Israel wants.

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