Politics

Leaked exchanges 'Signal' the importance of the Red Sea

A waterway wedged between Africa and Asia is the preferred transit route for around 30% of global containerised trade. No wonder foreign stakeholders are all vying for bases along the route.

Al Majalla

Leaked exchanges 'Signal' the importance of the Red Sea

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb

last update on 14 Apr 2025

When a small group of very senior American defence, intelligence, and diplomatic officials mistakenly added a journalist to a classified discussion they were having over the Signal app about US air strikes in Yemen last month, everyone focused on the security lapse.

Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, was added to a discussion including National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe. Goldberg could hardly believe his luck.

They were discussing US air strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen. The Houthis, which currently control the capital, have been supported by Iran for years and have been attacking both merchant and military vessels in a busy maritime corridor off the coast of Yemen since late 2023 in support of the Palestinians of Gaza. As a result, most commercial operators are diverting vessels around Africa instead, adding to costs.

The Signal mishap and its repercussions—now known as ‘Signalgate’—underscores the broader and growing US preoccupation with securing safe shipping passage through the Red Sea and safeguarding the vital trade route that includes the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden.

Maritime artery

In good times, the Red Sea is the preferred transit route for around 30% of global containerised trade and 12-15% of all international commerce, including an estimated 6.2 million barrels of oil per day, because it is the most direct sea route from Europe to Asia. Having to sail around the southern and western coasts of Africa adds 7-10 days. Higher insurance, more shipping fuel, and longer staffing hours add to the costs.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only heightened the strategic importance of the Red Sea as Europe reduces its dependency on Russian energy. Other powers are seeking a foothold on the route, including the United Arab Emirates, Russia, China, and Türkiye. This is a region in which the United States has dominated militarily in recent years, so Washington is keeping a close eye on developments.

The Red Sea is no stranger to confrontation. It has long been a theatre of geopolitical rivalry, dating back to the early 19th century, when Britain occupied the city of Aden (in southern Yemen) in 1839 to secure its control over the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the strategic bottleneck between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Getty Images — A photograph of Males Loading Camels during the construction of the Suez Canal, circa 1860.

The opening of the French-financed Suez Canal in Egypt in 1869 revolutionised global commerce by linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, allowing passage between Europe and Asia. The significance of this only deepened over time, shaped by political and military developments that redefined regional and global power dynamics.

In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal—a defining moment in the struggle for sovereignty. Britain, France, and Israel declared war against Egypt in October of that year, but US pressure forced their withdrawal. This called 'time' on France and Britain as global powers, leaving the US and USSR to fight for dominance in a bipolar, Cold War world.

A decade later, in June 1967, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, leading to the closure of the canal for eight years. When Egypt and Israel next fought in October 1973, Egypt reclaimed both the Sinai and the canal, reopening it in June 1975. Three wars in three decades underlined the global importance of the Red Sea trade route.

Seeking a foothold

Its role today is obvious. Any disruption in ships' passage has an immediate impact on oil flows and international trade. This keeps the focus on the region and the countries within it, such as Sudan, which has the second-longest coastline along the western shore of the Red Sea (750km) after Egypt and the second-largest exclusive economic zone in the Red Sea (92,500 sq.km) after Saudi Arabia.

According to international law, this gives Sudan sovereign rights to explore and exploit marine resources in this zone, yet despite this strategic maritime wealth, much of Sudan's coastline remains underdeveloped and under-utilised. Port Sudan is the exception, yet its infrastructure is now dated and neglected. Given that Sudan is currently locked in a state of civil war, foreign powers eye an opportunity. But with whom?

Last year, Sudan's government cancelled a $6bn deal with the UAE to develop the Abu Amama port (north of Port Sudan) following accusations that Abu Dhabi was supporting the Rapid Support Forces, which has been fighting the army and seizing great swathes of territory in Sudan's west, including the diamond-rich Darfur region (the UAE denies funding the RSF in exchange for minerals).

Keen for another warm water port, Russia has been pursuing a naval base in Port Sudan since the era of ousted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, especially since December 2024, when its Syrian ally Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, imperilling its current Mediterranean naval facility in Tartus on Syria's western coast.

In good times, the Red Sea is the preferred transit route for around 30% of global containerised trade, and 12-15% of all international commerce

Likewise, Türkiye has also sought to revive its historical influence in Sudan through the port of Suakin. In 2017, Ankara said it planned to rehabilitate the site into a logistical and tourism hub, agreeing with the (then) Sudanese government to manage and develop it. Yet, Sudan is not the only Red Sea state being courted.

Littoral states

Eritrea also occupies a strategically significant position along the coast, with ports at Massawa and Assab, but has been unable to develop them. Independent since 1993, it spent much of the previous four centuries being ruled by the Ottomans, Egyptians, Italians, British, and Ethiopians, and is today one of the poorest countries in the world, in which half the population live below the poverty line.

Eritrea's huge neighbour, Ethiopia, with 132 million people, is a regional power in the Horn of Africa, yet it is landlocked. This leaves it heavily reliant on the ports of neighbours, particularly Djibouti, which comes at a considerable cost, so ever since Eritrea's independence, Ethiopia has sought its own access to the Red Sea via negotiations and arrangements.

In January 2024, it agreed with the region of Somaliland to secure maritime access through the port of Berbera for 50 years in exchange for Ethiopia recognising Somaliland as an independent state. This provoked tension with Somalia and brought the region to the brink of war before Turkish diplomats stepped in to diffuse the situation.

Djibouti, although small, controls the western shore of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and hosts the largest concentration of foreign military bases in Africa, including installations operated by the US, France, China, Japan, and Italy. Djibouti also serves as Ethiopia's primary trade gateway, with 95% of Addis Ababa's trade passing through its port.

Pouring money in

Chinese investment, particularly in the Doraleh port and its adjacent free trade zone (both tied to China's Belt and Road Initiative), reflects Beijing's expanding footprint in the region—raising Western eyebrows—in contrast to the opposite side of the Bab-el-Mandeb, where Yemen remains mired in a devastating war that has gripped the country since 2015.

For Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea is at the heart of its Vision 2030 economic strategy. NEOM, begun in 2017 and situated along the Kingdom's eastern Red Sea coast, is one of the world's most ambitious development initiatives. A futuristic smart city powered entirely by renewable energy, it spans 26,500 sq. km and includes more than 40 islands (including Sandala Island, a luxury destination) along 468km of coastline.

Costing up to $1.5tn and employing 460,000 people, the project includes 'The Line'—a linear city free of cars and carbon emissions, designed to house 1.5 million people—and a green hydrogen facility. Yet, NEOM's success, in part, hinges on the stability and security of Red Sea maritime routes. With civil conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, plus piracy and terrorism from states such as Somalia, that is far from certain.

Of all the states concerned, however, Egypt may have the biggest stake in Red Sea stability because it relies on the billions of dollars in revenue it gets from Suez Canal transit fees, which have dropped since the Houthi attacks began.

Reuters — People stand beside the Suez Canal, as a container ship passes through on its way to the Red Sea, in the Ain Sokhna area, April 24, 2017.

To a far lesser extent, Jordan and Israel are also affected. Both maintain short coastlines along the Gulf of Aqaba, where the Jordanian port of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Eilat serve as key commercial and strategic hubs. While Jordan's maritime access is relatively limited, the port of Aqaba is a critical artery for its foreign trade, while Israel relies on Eilat to facilitate trade with Asia and Africa.

Governing the sea

Taken together, these geopolitical dynamics and overlapping security interests suggest the need for a common governance framework—or binding multilateral agreement—which would ensure the security and stability of Red Sea maritime navigation to serve both the interests of the littoral states and those of the broader international community.

Viable models for cooperation already exist, including the Baltic Sea agreements, the ASEAN Navigation Treaty (which played a pivotal role in securing the Strait of Malacca), and the Panama Canal Treaty—ensuring freedom of navigation under international supervision. These offer valuable frameworks for adaptation.

A multilateral governance structure, inclusive of all Red Sea littoral states and backed by the United Nations and relevant regional organisations, may represent the most viable path, but no sustainable stability can be achieved without first ending the war in Sudan, given that it is an essential pillar of broader stability across the Red Sea region. What becomes of the Houthis remains to be seen.

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