France’s African empire may have had its ‘Suez Moment’

As the US takes a different view of the Niger coup than the former colonial power, Paris has seen its influence in West Africa disintegrate faster

Majalla/Agencies

France’s Suez Moment has been a drawn-out one. Its influence has waxed and waned since the 1960s, but it has been on an overall downward trajectory throughout. Al Majalla explains.

France’s African empire may have had its ‘Suez Moment’

Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy

last update on 24 Sep 2023

President Emmanuel Macron on Sunday announced that France would withdraw its ambassador from Niger, added that military cooperation was "over" and French troops would withdraw in "the months and weeks to come" with a full pullout "by the end of the year".

Empires do not die quickly.

History shows that the process is usually long, drawn out, and sometimes difficult to discern. But there is usually a single event that becomes an inescapable symbol.

It could be that the world has seen the latest example, in Africa’s west, with the coup in Niger, although the full picture is not yet clear.

So first, here are some historical comparisons to contextualise recent events.

The foremost traditional empire of the modern world also had one of the most emblematic endings. In 1956, the Suez Crisis showed the world the new limits of Great Britain’s power.

The loss of the Suez Canal confirmed Britain’s secondary status to the rising world powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and helped the independence movements in many African colonies. Within around five years, rule from London was over for all of them.

The British Empire had become a rump of a few territories in the Gulf, and they were independent within 10 years.

The same process has been less obvious for the second most powerful empire of modern times: France. There is no such climatic event for it, although there is general agreement over the beginning of the end: the battle of Dien Bien Pho that took place in Vietnam in 1954, which brought an end to the French empire in Indochina.

Getty — Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announcing the nationalisation of the Suez Canal to a crowd of 250,000 people during a celebration of the 4th anniversary of the July 26, 1956 revolution.

While the Suez Crisis is always associated with the downfall of the British Empire, it also brought about the demise of French colonial rule in Africa, with France as one of the three nations that invaded Egypt to seize control of the canal alongside Israel and Britain.

The loss of the Suez Canal confirmed Britain's secondary status to the rising world powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and helped the independence movements in many African colonies. Within around five years, rule from London was over for all of them.

1962: An end to direct rule and the beginning of Françafrique

France's rule in the continent essentially ended in 1962 with Algeria's independence after a brutal struggle.

Djibouti and the Comoros were French until the 1970s, and after that, it had 13 colonies in Polynesia and the Caribbean, which became known as France d'outre-mer or overseas territories.

Britain's colonial policy of indirect rule had allowed African countries more flexibility in making choices about their future, while France's relationships with its former colonies took a different course.

Paris dropped a colonial policy of mission civilatrise — civilising indigenous peoples. But it kept hegemony over Francophone Africa for decades, using a web of novel economic, military, political and cultural tools.

It created a sphere of influence known as Françafrique with the then president of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houghet- Boigney, seen as its key figure.

In effect, France backed its commercial interests over everything else and supported regimes aligned with its economic priorities.

It even retained control over the monetary policy of some former colonies via the currency used within the Communauté Financière Africaine, the CFA franc.

This currency – still in use, although long-subject to reform plans – requires the participating African central banks to deposit a large proportion of their foreign currency reserves into the French treasury.

France also kept a substantial military presence via cooperation agreements with African states over defence and military matters. It gave the former colonial master a broad license to intervene to guarantee territorial integrity and act against any "internal turmoil", and in response to outside intervention.

Military training was provided in exchange for the right to station troops and purchase raw materials.

The measures, in effect, guaranteed that governments friendly to France would rule, and they were no mere historical anomaly.

They were used.

Between 1997 and 2002, France launched 33 operations in Africa via an army known as Force d'Action Rapide, which had 44,500 troops. Ten of the operations had mandates from the United Nations or were under UN command.

After 1962, Paris dropped a colonial policy of mission civilatrise — civilising indigenous peoples. But it kept hegemony over Francophone Africa for decades, using a web of novel economic, military, political and cultural tools.

Soft power used to maintain influence

France also used soft power to maintain its influence, using educational and cultural programmes to keep its links to this part of Africa for decades.

Even when some former colonies adopted socialism and moved toward the Soviet Union in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, France was able to maintain relations. It restored its privileged position in the region when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

But times were changing in Africa, too. A run of events in the 1990s provided milestones on the demise of the French empire in Africa.

First, came the death of Felix Huphouet-Boiney in December 1993 and, with it, the loss of the main leader of Francafrique and the president of the Ivory Coast.

Then, in January 1994, a devaluation of the CFA franc undermined the economic ties between France and West Africa.

And much worse was to follow.

Rwandan Genocide

The length and extent of the genocide in Rwanda between April and July in 1994, in which an estimated 800,000 people died, was blamed on France. Many Africans hold the former colonial power responsible for the scale of the killing to this day.

President Macron acknowledged the waning influence of his nation in the region this year. During a visit to Gabon, he said: "The days of la Françafrique are well and truly over."

It had long been evident that a reset was needed for France's policy over Africa.

Macron's rise to the presidency in 2017 helped bring it about. He acknowledged that an update was needed to reflect the new world realities that emerged since the Cold War's end.

And so, in Macron's first term, he devised a more realistic policy based on reciprocal partnerships, to replace the legacy of French colonialism. It created a diplomatic along with a refreshed foreign policy.

But tangible change has proven harder to achieve.

The length and extent of the genocide in Rwanda between April and July in 1994, in which an estimated 800,000 people died, was blamed on France. Many Africans hold the former colonial power responsible for the scale of the killing to this day.

Tangible change difficult

There are several reasons why.

They range from bureaucratic resistance within the French government to negative perceptions of the former colonial power within African societies. And there is also a lack of interest among some African leaders, who are keener on new relationships with the alternative world powers coming into the region.

And over the last five years, France has been stuck with a pattern of military action – in countries like Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Mali – limiting its recourse to new foreign policy tools.

This security-driven approach has meant France has ignored ongoing shifts in the political and social dynamics in the Sahel. And it had left the former colonial power unable to prevent coups run by domestic militaries in a range of countries – including Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali – while more recently, governments have been deposed at gunpoint in Niger and Gabon.

AFP — Two demonstrators in Niger's capital, Niamey, hold up a sign calling for France's departure, on September 2.

Religious and moral lines

Political deadlock and worsening security in the region have also stoked demand for social change, sometimes along religious and moral lines.

According to an analysis by the BBC, of the 27 coups in Africa (excluding North Africa) since 1990, 78% have occurred in Francophone states.

And so the shortcomings of French policy are clear, unlike any signs that meaningful change will follow. And so, its influence in Africa is waning just as new powers seek more involvement there, primarily China.

Of the 27 coups in Africa (excluding North Africa) since 1990, 78% have occurred in Francophone states.
And so the shortcomings of French policy are evident, unlike any signs that meaningful change will follow.

Powerful symbolism

The Niger coup looks like a powerful symbol of this decline and could reveal France's arrival at its weakest point. It is unable to influence events, either via the new military regime or with the people of the country. The only mediators in demand are the US and Algeria, and to some extent, the Economic Community of West African States, a regional bloc better known as Ecowas.

Does the Niger coup amount to a Suez moment for France?

It is true that the French empire is long gone, but the country's privileged position remained, amounting to what some called a neo-colonial arrangement. And as with the UK and Suez, the position taken by the US could define the extent of this historical landmark.

In 1956, as Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt, Washington opposed the action, concerned that it would spark anti-Western Arab nationalism. That, in turn, could open the door to Soviet influence in the Middle East.

US opposition meant the troops from its trio of allies had to be withdrawn from the banks of the canal.

Paris and Washington's interests opposed

And today, Washington's stance on the Niger coup is at odds with that of Paris. France supports the military intervention advocated by Ecowas. Washington has called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. It has dispatched the second most senior state department official to negotiate with new military rulers in Niamey to restore civilian rule.

The White House has not labelled the military takeover in Niger as a coup, meaning it can act as a mediator.

This demonstrates that Washington's interests do not necessarily coincide with Paris's. The primary interest of the US is to maintain its military base on which anti-terrorist operations in the Sahel depend.

And Washington is determined to deny China and Russia the opportunity to increase their influence as Africa increasingly becomes an important arena for a new rivalry between great powers.

AFP — Demonstrators carry an anti-France banner during a demonstration in support of the military coup, on August 3, 2023.

As the international geopolitical system is reshaped along the lines set out in the latest US National Security Strategy of September 2022, Washington does want to be associated with an ally that is unpopular in Africa.

As a new world order emerges, Washington does want to be associated with an ally that is unpopular in Africa.

Glaring common denominator

This brings in a glaring common denominator shared by the change of government in Niger and the military takeover, or palace coup, in Gabon: growing anti-French sentiment fuelling a rejection of the political status quo.

Nothing is more telling about the decline in French influence than President Ali Bongo's appeal for support from the outside world to "make noise" on his behalf. He used English rather than French, abandoning the language of his longtime protector.

And so France's Suez Moment has been a drawn-out one.

The country's influence has waxed and waned since the 1960s, but, throughout, it has been on an overall downward trajectory. The decline has been partly due to the former colonial power's own making and shifting dynamics in Africa.

Francophone cultural links will remain. But they will not be enough to slow the overall decline. Instead, they could provide a sound basis for starting a new and mutually beneficial relationship, in line with the hopes expressed by President Macron.

The challenge France faces will be implementing its hitherto slow-moving vision in a fast-changing world.

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