Al Majalla’s exclusive interview with YPG commander Mazloum Abdi gives great insight into a landmark deal reached between Damascus and Syria’s Kurds. This is my take on what Abdi really meant.
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Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, Damascus, March 10, 2025.
Syria is standing at a crossroads. Its new government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim president, raised hopes for restoring a sense of unity following 13 years of civil war that tore the country apart. But after initial optimism, the scale of the challenge has become clear.
Last week, violent reprisals against Alawites—the community from which the Assad family hails from—reached a fever pitch when reports emerged of mass killings and summary executions in their strongholds along the Syrian coastline. Once again, the spectre of sectarian conflict hangs menacingly over the heads of the Syrian people.
The situation remains dire and uncertain, yet a glimmer of hope has emerged after al-Sharaa struck a landmark deal with Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Kurdish YPG, which was repurposed into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fight the Islamic State (IS) during the heydays of the group’s reign of terror. After months of deadlock, Abdi finally agreed to integrate his forces into the Syrian army—something he was dead set against following the Assad regime’s toppling.
The eight-article agreement was signed on 10 March. It sets out the terms for Kurds to be part of the new Syria, as equal citizens with guaranteed rights. Syrians can breathe a sigh of relief that—at least in the short term—a major source of risk for renewed civil conflict has been eliminated.
How Türkiye reacts to the deal given its sour relationship with the YPG, which it sees as an offshoot of the PKK terrorist group, could determine its wider approach in Syria.
For his part, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was swift to welcome the agreement. In a speech on 11 March, he said: “We consider any effort to cleanse Syria of terrorism as a step in the right direction. The implementation of all the agreements reached will serve the security and peace of Syria. And the winners will be all of our Syrian brothers and sisters.”
Abdi is already rejecting one of Türkiye's major demands: for foreign fighters to leave immediately
But that was all Erdoğan said. Perhaps he didn't want to get ahead of himself. While the deal is a positive sign, it is far from ready to be implemented. Right now it is more of a general framework and broad set of principles than a step-by-step plan. The details are to be hammered out in the coming months, and the final agreement should be implemented by the end of the year.
Significant insight
Significant insight into what has been agreed and what has not came in an exclusive interview that Al Majalla conducted with Abdi. I will break down several things he said in the interview and give my personal take. I will also explain how this important moment for post-Assad Syria could affect wider regional and international politics.
In the interview, Abdi tells Al Majalla: "Syria's territorial integrity, the formation of a unified army, a single institutional framework, one capital, and one flag – these are fundamental and sovereign matters. However, many details remain unresolved, particularly concerning implementation mechanisms, timelines, and logistical considerations. Differences persist in the specifics and our respective perspectives."
Here, Abdi is basically saying the details around the general principles of agreement will have to be agreed upon through further negotiations, which indicates the gap between the two sides on certain points could still be very wide.
Abdi also refers to foreign fighters who came to fight alongside the YPG as "Kurdish brothers who came to defend this region and our people during the war. These fighters are ready to return to their places of origin and will do so once a formal ceasefire is reached." Here, Abdi is already rejecting one of Türkiye's major demands: for foreign fighters to leave immediately.
When he says: "The sharing of natural resources should be fair and all regions in Syria should get their fair share", I believe he really means that the oil in the Kurdish regions belongs to us, as is the case in Iraq.
A sheep herder near the Rumaylan military site in northeastern Syria, January 8, 2025
'Power should be distributed'
And when he says: "we do not want to suffer the experience of the Ba'ath Party again, where all powers were centralised in the capital. Some of these powers should be distributed to the regions, not just ours." I think he is actually saying that administrative systems should be set up similarly to regional government models.
When he says, "Kurds have been deprived of their most basic rights, including the use of their mother tongue and education in their own language. The Kurds' political and cultural rights, language and regional governance issues should be included in the constitution," I believe he wants this to be enshrined in the new Syrian constitution.
When he says, "We are now on the verge of a breakthrough in Kurdish-Turkish relations, with the possibility of a ceasefire that will usher in a new phase. I expect this phase to unfold in Türkiye between the Kurdish national movement, led by Öcalan, and the Turkish state. This development will undoubtedly impact the Kurdish issue across all four parts of Kurdistan and, by extension, influence the broader Middle East," what he means here, I think, is that developments in each of the four countries where Kurds live should be taken as part of a whole.
One of the most striking parts of the interview is what Abdi reveals about the US role. He says, "The US is not only encouraging us to negotiate with the Sharaa government but is actively mediating and pushing both sides to sit down and talk to each other". He then goes on to describe in detail what the Americans are recommending to ensure the talks don't derail. I believe this deal was largely ready since the end of December last year, but for some reason, the US thought now was the best time to sign it and pushed the YPG to do so.
The day after the agreement was announced, US CENTCOM posted a message on the X account of the Joint Task Force against IS (Operation Inherent Resolve). "Our partner Syrian forces are always ready for action, mastering the art of coordination and firepower during live-fire exercises," the message read, accompanied by photos of SDF/YPG militants practicing drills.
This made me wonder if the US wants the Syrian Kurds to be part of the new system in Syria, or is a separate place being prepared for them in the 'new Middle East' that seems to be in the making? Regardless of what path they have in mind, both scenarios would have major implications for the region and Türkiye, more specifically.
Additional conclusions
Additional conclusions can also be drawn from the deal. Here is a quick breakdown:
1. Syria's new government has now recognised the YPG and Abdi as the official and legitimate representative of all Kurds in Syria.
2. The YPG have been given political protection by the US and its allies who have been training and equipping them for years. The US wants to keep the YPG armed, not only to fight IS, but also maybe Iran and other groups.
3. Abdi has made it clear that his participation in a new Syria is contingent on the establishment of a regional administration, keeping the YPG intact as a fighting force, enshrining Kurdish rights into the constitution and the Kurds retaining a good share of the natural resources of its areas.
4. Although the deal states that it should be finalised and implemented by the end of the year, it cannot be finalised before agreeing on a Syrian Constitution, which doesn't look likely to finish by this year.
5. In the meantime, the YPG can say that any operations targeting them during this period could "hinder peace efforts".
6. There is a parallel process going on in Türkiye and Syria, as both countries are in the process of drafting new constitutions. How Kurdish citizens figure into the respective constitutions will be telling and I believe there will be some kind of alignment between the two countries on the matter.
7. What happens in Syria is likely, in some ways, to reflect in Türkiye.
