Politics

From jihadists to Syria's new rulers, HTS's evolution explained

Over 13 years, Syria’s largest armed faction has evolved from IS offshoot to Al-Qaeda affiliate to local militia and, finally, the national government. Like Syria, it has completely transformed.

Axel Rangel Garcia_Al Majalla

From jihadists to Syria's new rulers, HTS's evolution explained

Abbas Sharifa

last update on 30 Jan 2025

When Idlib-based fighters launched a major push for Aleppo in late November, it caught everyone by surprise—not least the Syrian army of Bashar al-Assad. In the hours and days that followed, it became clear that this was a concerted effort by various well-prepared factions, led by the biggest: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Founded by Ahmed al-Sharaa and initially known as Jabhat al-Nusra (Nusra Front), the forerunner of HTS began life as a branch of the Islamic State (IS) in the early days of the Syrian revolution in late 2011, winning the endorsement and guidance of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (who would later be killed in Idlib in 2019).

Following a series of successful military operations against the regime that garnered public support, the group developed a strong reputation, benefitting from a surge in followers and supporters, including foreign fighters attracted to join its ranks.

Severing ties with IS

Concerned about the growing influence of its Syrian offshoot, al-Baghdadi decided to fully incorporate Jabhat al-Nusra under the IS banner, dissolving the Nusra name and absorbing its human and financial assets, together with its military hardware. However, the leadership of al-Nusra was wary of replicating the disastrous experience in Iraq, which had been marked by sectarian conflict and strategic missteps.

They recognised that such an affiliation would undermine the Syrian revolution’s gains, so to preserve its independence and strategic vision, on 10 April 2013, al-Sharaa publicly severed ties between al-Nusra and IS, proclaiming his allegiance instead to Al-Qaeda and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In so doing, it went from being an IS offshoot to an Al-Qaeda affiliate, effectively becoming the latter’s Syrian branch.

Reuters — Khaled Brigade, a part of Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (HTS), hold amilitary parade inDamascus, December 27, 2024.

Yet that affiliation was largely nominal. It was a strategic and political necessity to block IS’s ambitions of expanding into Syria, and despite supposedly being part of a bigger group, al-Sharaa refrained from any activity outside Syria’s borders.

He focused instead on building a power base under a separate jihadist framework and pursued de facto autonomy, so when Al-Qaeda’s leadership sought to relocate to Syria to assert control over Jabhat al-Nusra’s operations, al-Sharaa asserted the group’s independence of “external affiliates” in the summer of 2016.

The rebranding begins

Al-Sharaa sought to alleviate concerns among other factions regarding al-Nusra’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda and invited them to join the broader project. To this end, he ditched the name Jabhat al-Nusra and rebranded the group as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). The founding declaration emphasised the group’s severance from Al-Qaeda, presenting JFS as a national entity with a local focus.

Just six months later, in early 2017, he rebranded it again, launching Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant). This unified his group incorporated several smaller factions, including Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Jaish al-Ahrar, Harakat al-Fajr, Liwa al-Haq, Jaish al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din.

A bigger entity, HTS began charting a distinct political path grounded in pragmatism, realism, and adaptability, all within the framework of its Islamic orientation. This evolution of HTS is key to understanding Syria’s new rulers.

In 2017, HTS began charting a distinct political path grounded in pragmatism, realism, and adaptability

It marked a significant ideological departure from Salafi jihadism. Influential figures such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada no longer held any sway over the group's decisions or ideological direction as HTS started to reform its Islamic discourse, breaking with the rigidity of Al-Qaeda and IS.

Instead, it embraced the teachings of the four mainstream schools of Islamic jurisprudence, signalling a shift toward broader inclusivity in religious interpretation. It further distanced itself from transnational jihadist frameworks by prioritising Syrian cadres for advanced leadership and Sharia positions.

Regrouping in Idlib

In late 2016, HTS joined the Jaish al-Fatah coalition and sought to retake the city of Aleppo, but despite some early success, the Assad regime—with the help of Russian airstrikes—recovered all lost territory. Internal disputes between factions and Al-Qaeda's attempts to dominate HTS's Syrian leadership exacerbated the loss.

Although al-Sharaa had formally broken ties with Al-Qaeda, he tried to maintain ideological and literary unity with it. This angered al-Zawahiri, who countered by establishing Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) in February 2018 (al-Sharaa eventually dismantled Hurras al-Din, consolidating his position).

Al-Sharaa redefined HTS's combat doctrine as that of a local, national liberation movement and continued to refrain from conducting military or security operations outside Syrian borders—this emphasis on local objectives set HTS apart from global jihadist groups.

Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters — Khaled Brigade, a part of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), hold a military parade, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Damascus on 27 December 2024.

HTS's military composition reflects this local focus. Most of its 18,000 fighters were Syrian nationals. Foreign fighters, including Uzbeks and Chinese Uyghurs, made up around 5,000 members.

On 2 November 2017, it established the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in the country's northwest, with independent technocrats brought in to run essential services to the region. HTS also sought to integrate popular activists and media figures with broad public appeal, aiming to foster greater local support.

Dealing with the West

Just weeks earlier, in October 2017, it had allowed Turkish observation posts to be established within its areas of control, signalling a pragmatic shift in its approach to international relations.

Asaad al-Shaibani, a co-founder of the SSG, established its Political Affairs Administration, through which he reached out internationally, including to diplomats and representatives of the United Nations. He is credited with laying the groundwork for stronger ties with Türkiye. Today, al-Shaibani is Syria's foreign minister.

In the US documentary The Jihadist, produced by journalist Martin Smith in June 2021, Ahmed al-Sharaa openly criticised Al-Qaeda's methods, denounced the events of 11 September 2001 as an unacceptable crime, and reiterated that IS was banned in areas under HTS control in north-western Syria.

Al-Sharaa said HTS's values align with those of the West, inviting foreign journalists to visit Idlib to see for themselves

He dismissed the designation of HTS as a terrorist organisation, calling it politically motivated and an unjust judgment by Western governments. He further stated that HTS's interests and values aligned with those of the United States and the West, inviting foreign journalists to visit Idlib to see for themselves.

Al-Sharaa called on Western aid organisations to help the Syrian people and described Türkiye as an ally and friend, pledging to confront any foreign fighter who posed a threat to it. Furthermore, he redefined the Syrian conflict as a popular revolution against a criminal and oppressive regime, rejecting the idea that it was a jihadist experiment.

In an unprecedented display of transparency, al-Sharaa disclosed his full name, details about his family, and his views on minority and sectarian rights, which he asserted are protected under Islamic law. He also affirmed his commitment to the ceasefire agreement with the Syrian regime brokered by Russia and Türkiye in March 2020.

Vision and leadership

Despite his reputation for being well-read, al-Sharaa's political vision is not anchored in ideology or pre-packaged theoretical formulas. On the contrary, he is a pragmatic strategist who patiently thinks through his decisions. He avoids military ventures that cannot be calculated and looks out for opportunities, ready to seize the moment.

For al-Sharaa, it is better to negotiate from a position of strength. "When regional and international actors have vital interests tied to you," he once argued, "they are compelled to engage with you as a key player."

AFP — The head of Al-Nusra Front in Syria, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, giving a speech from an undisclosed location on July 28, 2016.

Prior to leading the successful charge through Syria in November-December 2024, al-Sharaa presided over Idlib, home to four million people, including three million residents and one million internally displaced people, the latter mainly living in tents. He established universities in Idlib that enrolled 18,000 students, both men and women, many of whom were HTS members.

He also developed the local economy and improved services in the region despite limited resources. For his fighters and military commanders, he established training camps, founded a Military Academy, expanded alliances with other armed factions, created 17 fully-equipped combat brigades, and supported domestic military production, including the locally-manufactured Shaheen drones.

Alongside that, he built a robust internal security apparatus to combat infiltration and rebellion, ensuring HTS's stability. All the while, he was on the lookout for an opening. Russia's involvement in Ukraine was, therefore, of intense interest, given that Moscow's intervention in 2015 shifted the balance so considerably in al-Assad's favour.

Seizing the opportunity

In October 2023, Israel went to war in Gaza, and in September 2024, Israel went to war in Lebanon, fighting Hamas and Hezbollah, respectively. In between, Israel bombed both Syria and Iran. For al-Sharaa and HTS, it was becoming clear that Iran's longstanding influence in Syria and Lebanon was loosening. With Russia busy in Ukraine and Iran weakened in the Middle East, the timing felt right.

As Israel bombed Lebanon, preparations for a decisive battle against the Assad regime began in earnest. Hezbollah signed a ceasefire agreement with Israel on 26 November 2024. On 27 November, HTS forces launched their offensive. By 8 December, they were marching through the streets of Damascus. By then, Assad had fled.

Al-Sharaa's political vision is not anchored in ideology. He is a pragmatic strategist who thinks through his decisions.

HTS had achieved its mission of toppling the Assad regime. It now had control over most Syrian territory and its state institutions. Suddenly, the challenge became the transition from a military operation to a state-building programme, to create a 'new Syria' that was open to all communities. The vision was a civil, pluralistic, democratic state.

HTS's leadership appears to be acutely aware of the difficulties inherent within this pivotal stage, but say they are both willing and capable of embedding this transformation. They also know that their opportunity to do so will not last forever, so they are operating with a sense of urgency.

The bold and often unexpected decisions made by HTS over its 13-year journey, together with its proven ability to regulate and manage the conduct of foreign fighters within its ranks, inspires cautious optimism about its willingness to integrate its military structure into a cohesive Syrian state with robust, independent institutions. Confidence in its capacity to navigate this complex transition bodes well.

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