Future scenarios and red lines for the foreign fighters in Syria

Alongside the Syrians who ousted Assad in December were Chechens, Uyghurs, Arabs, Europeans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turks, and Albanians, to name but a few. What next for them?

A fighter loyal to the interim Syrian government poses for a picture outside an armoured vehicle in the Zahra district of Syria's west-central city of Homs on January 4, 2025.
OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP
A fighter loyal to the interim Syrian government poses for a picture outside an armoured vehicle in the Zahra district of Syria's west-central city of Homs on January 4, 2025.

Future scenarios and red lines for the foreign fighters in Syria

Since the Assad regime crumbled in December 2024, the issue of foreign fighters in Syria has emerged as a major topic of debate confronting the new administration in Damascus, especially after the Ministry of Defence said it would confer military ranks upon some of them.

Ministers argue that these fighters made significant sacrifices for the liberation of the Syrian people, are loyal to the new government’s policies, pose no threat to Syria’s allies, and are too few in number to affect the overall structure of the military.

Yet in Syria, opinion is split. Some are happy for these foreign fighters to integrate into local society. Others are firmly against them having any formal role within Syria’s military or security institutions. Who are these fighters, why did they put their lives at risk, and what does the future hold for them?

Although there are no official figures, estimates suggest there are around 2,500 foreign fighters within the ranks of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—the largest armed group in the alliance of militias that defeated the Syrian army and drove former President Bashar al-Assad from the country.

HTS had most of the foreign fighters in northwestern Syria, where the group was based for years. These fighters chose to stay with HTS after it broke from Al-Qaeda in 2016, declining to join Hurras al-Din, which became Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate.

OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP
Military fighters affiliated with former Al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) attend morning prayer at an open-air stadium on the first day of the Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday in Idlib on June 16, 2024.

Ideological shift

Their decision to stay with HTS coincided with an ideological shift, marked by the adoption of locally-oriented jihadism and the abandonment of any intent to engage in combat beyond Syria’s borders. These fighters remained almost entirely committed to HTS’s policies, which emphasise non-hostility towards foreign states and focus exclusively on confronting the Syrian regime and its allies within national borders.

Foreign fighters in Syria hail from a diverse range of national backgrounds. Uyghurs (or Turkistanis) from China represent one of the largest contingents, possibly thousands, with most affiliated with HTS. Other prominent groups include Chechens, who are renowned for their combat experience, as well as Arabs from the Arabian Gulf, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.

Other less prominent nationalities include fighters from France, the UK, and Germany (many European fighters have since returned to their home countries), plus recruits from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Albania, Iran, the Maldives, and others.

HTS's foreign fighters were distributed among various brigades and groups, either on a non-ethnic basis (such as the Egyptians or Europeans, who operate without forming independent battalions), or on an ethnic basis, including the Chechens under Ajnad al-Kavkaz (around 150 fighters) and the Uzbeks and Uyghurs (around 1,500).

Additionally, there are the Jazrawiyya, who work independently in religious advocacy and humanitarian roles (around 200 individuals), and Ansar al-Tawhid, which consists of a mix of predominantly local fighters alongside some foreign combatants, bringing the total to no more than 800 fighters.

Foreign fighters in Syria hail from all over the world. Uyghurs from China represent one of the largest contingents.

Process of integration

Following the fall of the Assad regime and the setting up of the Ministry of Defence, the new Syrian administration began the process of integrating foreign fighters into newly established military formations within the Syrian army. 

Among those being integrated are the Turkistan Islamic Party, commanded by Abu Muhammad al-Turkestani (around 2,500 fighters), Ansar al-Tawhid, led by Abu Diab al-Sarmin (around 200 fighters), Ajnad al-Kavkaz, led by Muslim Shishani (around 250 fighters), and the Chechen group Ajnad al-Sham, led by Abu Abd al-Malik al-Shishani (roughly 300 fighters).

President Ahmed al-Sharaa has said that foreign fighters who contributed to the fall of the Assad regime "deserve to be rewarded". Speaking in January, he said the regime's crimes meant that it was necessary to rely on foreign fighters who stood by the Syrian people, took part in the revolution, and helped bring down the regime, hinting that they could be granted Syrian citizenship for their efforts.

In line with this approach, the Syrian administration is working to integrate these fighters into the newly established Syrian army, disbanding independent foreign factions and placing their members under a unified chain of command. 

According to the official Syrian News Agency (SANA), some foreign fighters have been appointed to senior military positions, such as Abd al-Rahman Hussein al-Khatib, reportedly a Jordanian, who was appointed a brigadier general, while 50 other commanders have also been tasked with overseeing military operations.

REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano
A soldier stands in front of a demonstration in support of the Syrian government in Aleppo on March 7, a day after forces loyal to the former Assad regime launched an attack on the forces of the new government.

Among them are: Abdul Bashari, aka Khattab al-Albani, the long-time leader of the Albanian contingent; Omar Muhammad Jaftchi, aka Mokhtar al-Turki; Alaa Muhammad Abdel-Baqi, an Egyptian national; Abdulaziz Dawood Khodaberdi, a Uyghur; Molan Tarsun Abdul Samad, a Tajik; and 'Dhu al-Qarnayn' Zanor al-Basr Abd al-Hamid, aka Abdullah al-Daghistani, commander of the Army of Emigrants and Supporters.

Four future scenarios

What might happen to these foreign fighters now? There appear to be four possible scenarios, which may unfold simultaneously, depending on developments, ideological leanings, and the nationalities of the individuals involved.

The first scenario is the Bosnian model of integration and settlement. Foreign fighters would integrate into Syrian society as ordinary citizens, pose no threat beyond Syria's borders, respect the fabric of civil society, fully comply with Syrian laws, and not establish independent organisations within the state.

The second scenario is the Afghan model of repatriation. Foreign fighters would return to their countries of origin along with their families, where reintegration efforts would be undertaken to restore them as regular citizens. This works in states with rehabilitation programmes, but in more security-focused countries, returnees risk being detained.

The third scenario is granting political asylum with non-engagement conditions. Countries with a strategic interest in gathering intelligence on jihadist networks may offer political asylum to some foreign fighters who are unwilling to return to their home states due to security-related risks. 

Some Chechen fighters reportedly withdrew from northwest Syria to fight in Ukraine against Russian forces

The fourth scenario is the Iraqi model of relocating to another battlefield. For instance, some reports suggest that some Chechen fighters withdrew from northwest Syria to fight in Ukraine against Russian forces and Chechen government troops loyal to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. 

Recognition and red lines

Tailored arrangements may also be made with fighters' countries of origin, allowing for case-by-case solutions, but many are expected to stay in Syria. Indeed, the Syrian administration's current approach to integrating foreign fighters into its armed forces has historical precedent. For hundreds of years, foreigners have played decisive roles in wars and combat, then been formally recognised through military ranks. 

The French Foreign Legion, founded in 1830, is a primary example of systematically integrating foreign soldiers into a regular military structure. In the American Civil War (1861–1865), between a quarter and a third of all Union soldiers were foreign-born. Likewise, the International Brigades (foreign volunteers) supported the Republic in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, with many granted ranks based on merit.

Damascus has some "red lines" for the foreign fighters in Syria. They must not be extradited without clear legal justification; they are not allowed to form independent organisations outside the authority of the state, and they must refrain from any activity that could threaten the security of Syria's allied nations. Abide by those, it seems, and they are welcome to stay. 

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