One of the most important questions for the future of Syria is the role of the SDF. For a decade, the alliance between the US and the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF (in fact led by the armed wing of the Syrian branch, the YPG, of the Kurdish Workers Party or PKK), has facilitated the defeat of the Islamic State (IS) as a territorial statelet, while allowing, under an American security umbrella, the SDF to develop its own statelet in northeast Syria.
That statelet has effectively administered millions of Syrians, over 20% of Syria’s territory, almost all its oil reserves and much of its arable land while denying that region to al-Assad and his Iranian and Russian allies. But as an offshoot of the PKK, the very success of the SDF brought both it and its American sponsors into repeated conflict with Türkiye. Managing these contradictions dominated US-Syria policy and, at times, overall Middle East policy between 2016-2024.
The December 2024 Syrian upheaval—by all but eliminating Iranian and Russian influence in Syria and producing a government in Damascus with whom the US, Europe, Arab states and above all Türkiye, want to cooperate—totally reshuffles SDF’s and Washington’s roles in Syria, with particularly strong impact on the SDF.
There are now three major paths forward for the SDF: continuation of its current independent status and partnership with the US; a major clash with Türkiye with the US, to one or another degree, caught in the middle between two valued partners; or the integration of the SDF as a military force and a regional statelet into the new Damascus national state dominated by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
MVP Trump
Various actors impact which path the SDF will take, beginning with the SDF leadership itself, the PKK headquarters in Iraq, Türkiye, and the new Damascus government. But the most important outside player is the Trump administration.
Given the lack of experience with the new Trump ‘47 administration and Trump ‘45’s often contradictory approaches to Syria, predicting a specific approach is difficult. Nevertheless one should presume Washington will seek to advance its many Syria-related interests, and these can be inventoried.
Most important is sustaining the weak position in which Iran finds itself. Other security interests include minimising whatever remaining influence Russia has in Syria, keeping IS contained, and, if possible, finalising its destruction.
Maintaining strong relations with Türkiye, given its role in Syria and the broader Middle East, particularly in the Ukraine war, is also vital. Given Syria's importance, developing relations with the Damascus government is paramount, but it can also help guarantee success in the above-mentioned goals. A functioning government can also create the conditions for return home for Syria’s 12 million refugees and IDPs, dramatically reducing the financial burden of the US and other donors.
First path
The first potential path—the US continuing its current relationship with the SDF and the SDF maintaining effective control of the northeast—would certainly allow continued anti-IS operations. But it is important to note those operations’ purposes and limits. They are not configured to eliminate the last vestiges of IS presence, mainly in the Badiya desert south of the Euphrates and so far beyond the SDF’s reach.
Rather, apart from securing thousands of IS prisoners and tens of thousands of potentially dangerous IS family members, the anti-IS operations by the SDF supported by the US focus on counterinsurgency to keep IS from infiltrating into Arab communities along the Euphrates and deeper into northeast Syria. The joint effort also includes both partners developing intelligence on IS in the Badiya and other areas beyond the northeast, enabling occasional US strikes.
