Sharaa and Abdi face off over SDF's future. Who will blink first?

Al-Sharaa also wants to do away with SDF self-administration although he is open to granting them a degree of autonomy with an acknowledgement of Kurdish rights and control over the strategic resources in areas now run by the SDF.

Additionally, the new administration wants control over Syria's borders with Türkiye and Iraq and wants to be the one in charge—not the SDF—of arrangements made with the US-led coalition still present in the area ostensibly charged with preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS). Al-Sharaa also wants his new HTS-led government to be in charge of the prisons and camps housing IS fighters and their families.

What Abdi wants

The SDF has categorically rejected this. Apart from insisting on maintaining its autonomy and military structure and refusing to integrate into the new Syrian army, it also is asking for a fixed share of the strategic resources in its area, full control over the borders of its areas, representation in the preparatory committee for the national dialogue conference planned in Damascus, roles in the prime minister and foreign minister's office and the Kurdish rights to be clearly outlined in the new constitution that has yet to be drafted. 

As a gesture of goodwill, Abdi agreed to certain confidence-building measures, including raising the new Syrian flag, transferring civilian border crossings to Damascus, and handing over control of "security zones" in Qamishli and Hasaka once run by the Assad regime.

Wild cards

Further rounds of negotiations were agreed upon, along with the setting up of special committees where Western mediators would discreetly shuffle between Damascus and Qamishli. Meanwhile, several factors at play could act as wild cards that could either soften or harden the SDF position. They include:

Barzani's role: Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani hosted Abdi in Erbil following talks with Türkiye and urged him to unify Kurdish forces in Syria and negotiate as a Syrian entity rather than an extension of the PKK.

Ocalan's potential initiative: Progress has reportedly been made in talks between Ankara and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who might announce an initiative on 15 February, marking the anniversary of his arrest 25 years ago.

US support for Syrian Kurds: Trump's recently-confirmed secretary of state, Marco Rubio, declared that the Trump administration would steadfastly support the Syrian Kurds, prompting the SDF to harden its positions after initially demonstrating greater flexibility. 

For its part, the new HTS-dominated administration in Damascus is banking on the broad Western and Arab support it has received since coming to power, the strength of its growing military and the likely lifting of Western sanctions. It is also seeking to exploit dissent among the Arab tribes within the SDF and to forge potential alliances with factions such as the Turkish-backed National Army.

Türkiye, with its deep-seated opposition to a Kurdish entity in northern Syria, remains a key player. And President Erdoğan will be looking to leverage his good relationship with Trump to see if he can persuade him to pull his support for the SDF.

Cautious optimism

There is cautious optimism that the tough talk between both sides is aimed at boosting their respective negotiating positions ahead of a solution rather than serious threats of escalation and violence. Despite the uncertainty and moving pieces, a peaceful resolution is still possible as long as Qamishli and Damascus keep talking. 

What is certain, however, is that a diplomatic solution will be far less costly than a military confrontation, which could devastate both sides.